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Abstract 
 
The possession on natural resource wealth has in most cases has turn out to be a curse rather than a 
blessing to many countries that Possesses them. The discovery of oil and gas resources in Ghana has 
brought to the fore debates about how best to manage it to the benefit of the citizens. Transparency 
and accountability has been identified as key to prudent resource governance not only in the case of 
Ghana but globally.  At the heart of transparency and accountability however is the availability of 
information to the citizens which can enable them to monitor the behaviour of governments. 
This study examined how the actual implementation of transparency and accountability initiatives is 
impacted by people’s access to information. Specifically, it investigated how people access 
information, their capacities and willingness to process the information in order to hold government to 
account. The study was conducted using qualitative methods in Cape Three point, a community close 
to Ghana’s Jubilee oil fields. 
The study revealed that making information available is not enough to achieve transparency and 
accountability. Rather, achieving Transparency and Accountability is dependent on people’s 
information access mechanisms, level of education, livelihoods, interests and infrastructure. It was 
found out that within the Cape Three Point community, the people had little knowledge about the oil 
revenues even though the government and the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) have made some information available to the public. The people were also less willing to 
demand accountability even though they were interested in knowing about the oil revenue flows. One 
important implication of this study is that when government or transparency initiatives make 
information public, in reality it does not necessary mean the people have received it or been able to 
construct knowledge or make decisions based on it.   
The study recommends among other things that transparency initiatives must be context dependent 
and be based on an analysis of people’s information needs, proper channels of communication and 
strengthening people’s capacity to demand accountability. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
Liberia has been one of the most cursed of all resource-rich countries. Despite an abundance 
of iron ore, diamonds, gold, timber and rubber, Liberia was for fourteen years ravaged by a 
horrific civil war that disintegrated the nation and brought us near to the bottom of the UN’s 
Human Development Index. Corruption and mismanagement of the country’s abundant 
resources fuelled the war [....] A large part of the problems of the past lay in a lack of 
knowledge and information about the money paid to the government from the companies 
extracting the natural resources. This money belonged to all the citizens of Liberia, not just 
to its rulers, business elite and soldiers... 
                                                                                   President Sirleaf-Ellen Johnson (Liberia)
1
 
 
The possession of natural resources by a country should, according to conventional thinking 
serve as a catalyst for socioeconomic development. Going by the arguments of “Big Push” 
theorists such as Murphy et al. (1988) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1963), resource booms in poor 
countries should translate into development (Sachs and Warner, 1999). However, the view of 
President Sirleaf provides a vivid picture of how poor natural resource management has had a 
detrimental effect on countries that are resource endowed. It is becoming increasingly clear 
that the possession of natural resources, in particular, high value resources such as 
hydrocarbons (oil and gas), gems, gold, does not lead to expected economic and social 
development. This has prompted many to question whether such resources are in fact a 
“blessing or curse” (Davis et al., 2003). 
   
In Ghana, the discovery of oil and gas resources has brought to the fore debates on how best 
to manage natural resources in order to avoid the problems experienced in other countries. 
This fear of mismanagement is particularly informed by Ghana’s own history and the poor 
management of the country’s gold and other mineral resources in the past. In most 
developing countries the possession of oil resource has proved consistently harmful rather 
than a blessing (Schumacher, 2004). Nigeria is one of many notorious examples that can be 
found in Africa where oil revenue has led to massive corruption in government and conflict 
in the Niger Delta where it is produced (Lujala and Rustad, 2012). 
                                                             
1
 Quote extracted from Darby, S. 2009. Talking Transparency–A Guide for Communicating the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative. Oslo: EITI Secretariat. 
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The term “resource curse” (Auty, 1993) is commonly used to describe the negative 
relationship between natural resource endowment and development and has received 
extensive attention from a growing body of literature (Auty, 1986, Auty, 1993, Auty, 2001, 
Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, Lal and Myint, 1996, Stevens, 2003). In the past the problem of 
resource curse was largely explained within the economic sphere in terms of revenue 
volatility (Mikesell, 1997), Dutch disease (Usui, 1997) among others. Even though several 
economic explanations and solutions have been offered for the phenomenon, it has been 
argued by authors that the problem is in fact political in nature (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001) and 
very much due to poor governance. Endemic corruption in various forms including rent-
seeking and patronage by state and private actors has characterised most countries considered 
to be victims of the resource curse (Kolstad and Søreide, 2009). It has been estimated, for 
example, that some $380bn oil revenues in Nigeria have been wasted since independence 
through corruption alone (Kolstad and Søreide, 2009p1).  Similarly,  $1billion is considered 
to go missing annually in Angola (McMillan, 2005p1) The literature therefore has gradually 
shifted from prior economic explanations towards the governance or political side. Karl 
(2007) has argued strongly that the resource curse is basically political and not economic in 
nature.  
The resources curse literature has focussed increasingly on rent-seeking as the primary cause 
of many of the problems experienced by resource dependent countries. Rent-seeking involves 
various individuals diverting as much of the resource revenues for their own benefit 
(Humphreys et al., 2007). Apart from rent seeking being linked to corruption directly, also, 
when high resource rents are involved entrepreneurs would rather engage in capturing this 
rent rather than engaging in productive activities(Kolstad et al., 2008p2). Good governance, 
through transparency and accountability, is increasingly being advanced as a solution to 
curtail rent-seeking and corruption in resource management. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) 
assert that transparency helps in ensuring resource benefits are redistributed and not captured 
by elites. This research therefore is positioned within the framework of transparency and 
accountability as a measure of improving resource governance. 
There is increasing agreement that transparency and accountability are critical to ensuring oil 
wealth does not harm developing countries (Schumacher, 2004).  For the management of 
natural resource wealth, transparency and accountability have become no longer mere options 
available to governments and extractive industries, but rather an obligation that all countries 
must work towards. Empirical research, however, on their impact and actual implementation 
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in the resource sector is relatively sparse. While declarations and global promotion of 
transparency and accountability as a cure to the resource problem is increasing, the gap 
between the rhetoric and reality remains large.  
Transparency in resource management involves making available relevant information about 
every aspect along the resource value chain, including revenue collection and use (Uzoigwe, 
2012p3). One of many initiatives being promoted in this regard is the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI is a global standard for revenue transparency that 
creates a platform for extractive industries to disclose what they pay to governments (EITI, 
2012). Governments on the other hand also disclose what they receive from the companies. 
Through this mechanism information about resource revenues can be made public. It is 
assumed that transparency is a key feature of good governance and required for 
accountability between states and citizens, where increasing information available to the 
public, enables citizens to hold the government to account (McGee and Gaventa, 2010p13). 
Fundamental to achieving resource transparency would require citizens’ accessibility to 
timely and reliable information about all aspects of the resource management chain from 
discovery to revenue collection and use. Stiglitz (1999) argues that it is a citizen’s right to be 
informed about what their government is doing. This citizen-government relationship is, 
however, fraught with imperfect flows of information leading to information asymmetries. 
Such issues are commonly explained through principal-agent theory, which involves a 
Principal (here citizens) who tasks an Agent (government) to perform certain services (e.g. 
manage natural resources) on their behalf. The principal can monitor the behaviour of the 
agents based on information provided by the later.  
According to Stiglitz (2002) governments often would not be interested in disclosing more 
information and transparency, since it would reduce their opportunity to obtain resource rents 
for themselves. Even when information is disclosed, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) also argue that 
it is not enough but other intervening variables such as media competition, citizen’s level of 
education and resources to use the information are key. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) likewise 
point out that making information available will not impact corruption unless it stands a 
reasonable chance of reaching the people.  
Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) argue that how information accessibility impacts on 
accountability and good governance is still poorly understood. This aspect in the literature 
remains a grey area and has a number of unanswered questions. How citizens receive the 
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information, their capacity to process and act on the information remains a gap within the 
literature and Practice. This is a key gap between the rhetoric and reality when it comes to the 
impacts of transparency and accountability. This aspect of the discourse is often ignored or 
poorly articulated. This study therefore addresses the gap by exploring how the people of 
Cape Three Point, a village close Ghana’s oil fields access information about the country’s 
oil revenues and their capacity to act on the information. This study will contribute to an 
understanding of the role of information accessibility in promoting accountability and good 
governance in the natural resource sector.  
1.2 The Case of Ghana 
One of the key reasons for the growth of interest in the issue of resource curse is that many 
countries are receiving large resource revenues from petroleum and mineral resources 
(Stevens, 2003). How these revenues can be used positively for development and enable 
countries to avoid the resource curse, has occupied the attention of many Nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) and donor institutions (Stevens, 2003).  It has been found that such 
revenues have been linked to increased poverty, high rates of corruption, defective 
governance and even civil war (Ross, 2001p4, Stevens, 2003).  
The discovery of oil and gas in Ghana in 2007 has meant that significant revenues would be 
made available to the government. How this resource wealth will be managed is of key 
importance to the future socio-economic development of the country.        
Talk of transparency and accountability in the management of the revenue flows has been 
part of the rhetoric and discussions since the discovery of the oil. The call for transparency in 
the oil sector has been made by political actors in government, civil society organisations, 
donor institutions and most importantly the public.  Most recently, the renowned former 
Managing Director of the World Bank, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, also urged Ghanaians to be 
‘uncompromising on issues of transparency and accountability in the sector’ (Ghana News 
Agency, 2013)
2
. These demands are consistent with Lujala and Rustad (2012) argument that 
“transparency is the single most important means of curtailing corruption and should be 
required throughout the value chain from the signing of contracts to the point of exports” 
(p596). 
                                                             
2
 As quoted in Graphic online: http://graphic.com.gh/Business-News/ghana-must-ensure-transparency-in-
management-of-oil-revenue-okonjo-iweala.html 
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The government has responded to these calls through various measures so far. A new legal 
framework for the management of the oil revenues has been put in place. The Public Interest 
and Accountability Committee (PIAC) has been set up as an institution to provide over-sight 
responsibility. Ghana is also implementing the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI). Institutions like these it is believed would provide reliable information to the public 
relative to the management of the oil revenues in the spirit of transparency and 
accountability.   
Malena and Forster (2004) note that the best measure against corruption is when citizens take 
the centre stage in monitoring the government. For them, strengthening citizens’ voice and 
capacity to demand accountability is critical. For the people of Ghana to be able to take the 
centre stage and respond to that civic responsibility of holding government and extractive 
industries accountable, they require information and capacity to construct knowledge and 
eventually take action. Citizens must, therefore, be armed with information about how the 
resources are being managed in order to make meaningful scrutiny of the government.  
Access to information and communication are unequally distributed and often can be 
influenced by poverty, education, language, rural-urban dichotomy and gender (Norris, 
2004).  Norris (2004) observes that information dissemination and accessibility through the 
radio remains a challenge in Ghana’s rural areas and poor people. Because of the unequal 
distribution of information and other moderating factors, even when government discloses 
information about the oil revenues, key questions remain unanswered about transparency and 
accountability in the oil sector. Questions, such as which citizens have access to the 
information, where and how this occurs, as well as regarding people’s capacity to act on the 
information, remain critical to linking transparency theory to practice and policy.   
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the study 
The importance of transparency includes successful revenue management (Lujala and Rustad, 
2012), addressing the problem of detachment and secessionist pressure (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2012) and perhaps most importantly improving natural resource management and increasing 
wealth (Tsalik, 2003). Whereas the resource curse is not inherently cured through 
transparency, the necessary checks and balances to monitor the management of the revenues 
can be established (Tsalik, 2003).  
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This research aimed at enhancing knowledge and understanding of transparency and 
accountability in the management of natural resources. More specifically, the research 
addresses the missing gap within the transparency and accountability discourse relative to 
information accessibility and people’s capacity to process such information. Even though 
transparency and accountability are established principles for good resource management it 
appears in practice however much knowledge is still yet be acquired in achieving its 
objectives. 
 
The goal of transparency in the natural resource sector is to ensure public access to 
information on various aspects of the management of the resource. The research carried out 
in Cape Three Point explores how citizens have access to information on the flows of revenue 
from the oil companies to the state and how the state utilises these revenues. Following from 
this objective the following research questions are posed: 
1. To what extent has Ghana EITI given these people access to information on how their 
oil        resource revenue is being managed? 
2. Do the people of Cape three points have access to information on the revenue flows 
from the oil companies to the state?  
3. If they do, how do they have access to information on how the government is utilising 
these oil revenues? 
4. Are the people willing to take action on any information they receive? 
5. Do the people of Cape Three Point posses the capacity to process any information 
provided about the management of the petroleum revenues? 
 
1.4 Relevance and Justification of the research 
This research has both immediate and future relevance to the transparent management of 
Ghana’s oil resources and other natural resources in general. It also adds to existing literature 
on both the resource curse, and transparency and accountability. Most importantly, it can 
contribute to the actual practice and implementation of resource transparency and 
accountability policies and initiatives in developing countries. 
The research findings would have relevance in shaping Ghana’s policy and initiatives relative 
to ensuring transparency and accountability. It would serve as a reality check and provide 
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government with a fair idea of how its resource transparency initiatives have impacted on the 
citizens so far. This can be a useful tool to enhance policy decisions and initiatives in future.  
Even more so, it would be of relevance in shaping the policy and campaigns of Transparency 
and Accountability Initiatives (TAIs) and organisations at the global level. This research 
brings to the fore the argument that context matters in policy and initiative strategies. 
Wholesale transfer of transparency initiatives that has worked elsewhere (especially 
developed countries) may not necessary yield the same benefit in all countries. Local 
conditions, such as communication, infrastructure, cultural norms and livelihoods, can 
function to make globally accepted initiatives not work if context is not given much attention 
during implementation. 
1.5 Organisation of the research 
This research is organised into eight chapters. The immediate five chapters provide an 
introduction to the entire study. Chapter two provides a background to the oil industry in 
Ghana. It includes a brief timeline of the industry’s history, the oil revenues and expenditure 
areas, as well as the transparency and accountability context in Ghana. Chapter three 
discusses the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the study. The methods and 
techniques used to undertake the research are discussed in Chapter four. Chapter Five 
provides a descriptive background of the study area that includes the people’s livelihoods and 
how it is being impacted by the discovery of oil and sets the context for the analysis and 
discussions in the subsequent chapters. 
The last three chapters constitute the analysis and discussions of the research findings. 
Chapter Six focuses on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and its impact in 
terms of information accessibility in Cape Three Point. The chapter looks further beyond 
EITI by looking at people’s knowledge of the oil revenue flows and how they acquire such 
knowledge. Chapter seven discusses the willingness of the people to demand accountability 
and also their capacity to take action on information they are provided with. Chapter eight is 
the concluding chapter, which summarises the findings of the research, and includes 
recommendations and limitations.  
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Chapter Two 
Ghana’s Oil Industry and Transparency Context 
 
2.0 Introduction  
Ghana’s oil reserves are significantly less compared to those of Nigeria and Angola, while on 
the global scale it is far lesser compared to those of Norway, Kuwait, and Saudi-Arabia 
among others. This notwithstanding, given the  country’s annual GNI per capita of  $1 810 in 
2011 (World Bank, 2011) and population of 24 million, the oil revenues would be significant 
in the country’s developmental agenda (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012) if managed 
prudently devoid of corruption . The ability to avoid the resource curse through transparency 
and accountability would thus be key in this regard. This chapter provides background 
information on the oil sector and how it is governed in Ghana. Also, a background 
presentation of the transparency context is provided.   
Section 2.1 and 2.2 outlines oil exploration and production in Ghana from 1896 until August 
2007 when oil was discovered in large commercial quantities. This section covers the 
projected prospects of the oil industry in terms of revenues and expenditures. Section 2.3 
focuses on the issue of transparency in the oil industry. It discusses the vehicles that could 
drive the transparency and accountability agenda with emphasis on the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Law, institutions and importantly citizens.  Finally in section 2.4 data based on 
the Institute of Economic Affairs’ (IEA) survey is presented as a back drop to current level of 
transparency.                          
2.1 Oil Exploration 
Ghana announced the discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities on 22
nd
 August, 
2007. The discovery was a result of exploratory efforts by both national and international 
firms since the nineteenth century. Fig 1 below shows a timeline of activities over a century 
culminating in the discovery in 2007. The first onshore oil reserve was discovered in Ghana 
in 1896 at Half Assini (sutherland, 2008). 
Figure 1: A timeline of Ghana’s historical Petroleum Industry Development 
gu 
 
 
 
1896 
First oil well 
drilled at Half 
Assini-
onshore 
1983
89
6 
 189
 1896 
 1896 
 1896 
 1896 
2007
6 
 1896 
 1896 
2004/5
5
6 
 1896 
 1896 
1970
89
6 
 189
 1896 
 1896 
 1896 
 1896 
Between this phase 
production was mainly 
onshore, intermittent and 
unsustainable  
The period saw intensive 
participation of foreign 
companies and a number of 
offshore discoveries made 
albeit on a low scale. The 
Saltpond discovery was the 
only major one. 
The salt Pond 
onshore field 
discovered by 
Signal Amoco 
GNPC was set 
up as a 
National Oil 
Company 
Attempts were made to 
institutionalise the industry 
through the creation of 
GNPC and enacting of 
Petroleum income tax law, 
Petroleum Exploartion and 
Production Act  
Arrival of Kosmos 
Energy and Tullow 
Oil as key industry 
investors and 
players 
This period was most significant 
through the introduction of 
massive investment and 3D 
technology by Kosmos and 
Tullow. This culminated in the 
commercial discovery at jubilee 
field 
Discovery of the 
Jubilee Field off the 
shores of Cape 
three Points. 
2010
6 
 1896 
 1896 This period saw the building of
various infrastructures to enable 
production to begin. The FPSO 
kwame Nkrumah was built and 
delivered in record time within 
this period. Commercial 
production began late 2010.  
Significant 
Transparency 
Initiative- the PRMA 
ACT 815 passed in to 
law 
10 
 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on varied sources of information3. 
Over the period spanning a century and over, there were some important discoveries albeit on 
a low scale. The Saltpond offshore field discovered in 1970 by Signal Amoco was one of 
such fields. The field with estimated 45million barrels of oil underwent production between 
1978 and 1985 (sutherland, 2008). Other notable discoveries included Philips Petroleum’s 
finding in offshore North and South Tano and light oil discovered in Offshore West Cape 
Three Point-2 by Hunt Oil. The jubilee field discovery has been the most significant so far. 
2.1.1 Jubilee Field 
The various oil exploratory activities and discoveries predating 2007 provided not only an 
accumulation of seismic data for the country’s oil potential but also the motivation for further 
intensive investment
4
 in the sector. This perhaps in part saw the massive investment by 
Kosmos Energy and Tullow oil from 2004. Their investments were equally matched with 
modern 3D exploration technology.  This resulted in the commercial discovery of the oil in 
the Jubilee
5
 field in 2007. The initial find comprising of the Hydua-1 and Mahogany-1 wells 
are collectively named as the Jubilee Fields and straddle both the West Cape Three points and 
Deep Tano blocks
6
 (Tullow Oil Plc, 2010). Figure 4 below shows the location of the oil 
fields. 
                                                             
3 Example Sutherland, R. Exploration history and regional geology.  Capital Markets Day, october 2008 2008. 
Tullow Oil Plc,. 
Ghana National Petroleum Company. Exploration and Production [Online]. Accra, Ghana: GNPC. Available: 
http://www.gnpcghana.com/activities/explorationIntro.asp [Accessed 09/9/2012 2012]. 
4
  $550 Million FDI Ghana National Petroleum Company. Exploration and Production [Online]. Accra, Ghana: 
GNPC. Available: http://www.gnpcghana.com/activities/explorationIntro.asp [Accessed 09/9/2012 2012]. 
5 The name Jubilee fields is a result of the coincidence of the oil discovery and Ghana’s 50th independence 
celebration. 
6
 Ghana’s territorial sea with oil potential are divided into blocks and marketed to investment oil firms on that 
basis. 
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Figure 2: Map of Ghana’s offshore oil Fields
 
(Tullow Oil Plc, 2010) 
Position of study Area:  
 
The Jubilee Field is being developed under a joint venture agreement among six international 
oil exploration firms and the government of Ghana, represented by Ghana National 
Petroleum Company, GNPC. The government holds a 10% carried interest in each of the two 
blocks under the joint venture. The remaining percentages are owned variously by the other 
stakeholders. Table 1 below shows the percentage of stake each stakeholder has in the Jubilee 
field. The percentage of ownership likewise reflects the share of revenue from the field.  
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Table 1: Percentage stake held by various actors in the Jubilee field 
Name of stakeholder West Cape Three Point 
Percentage (%) 
Deep Water Tano 
Percentage (%) 
Originating 
Country 
Kosmos Energy  30.875 18 USA 
Anardako 30.875 18 USA 
Tullow oil PLC 22.896 49.95 UK 
Ghana National Petroleum 
Company (GNPC) 
10 10 Ghana 
E.O Group 3.5
7 - Ghana (private) 
Sabre oil and Gas Ltd 1.854 4.05 Switzerland 
Source: Based on information at GNPC website: http://www.gnpcghana.com 
Beyond the discoveries at the Jubilee fields in 2007, there have been other discoveries in 
recent times and these discoveries are being developed to undergo production. These include 
the Tweneboa discovery in March 2009 and subsequently the Tweneboa-2 in January 2010 as 
well as the Tweneboa-3 in January 2011(see figure 2 map insert for their locations).  
2.2 Revenues and Distribution 
The introduction of the petroleum sector into Ghana’s economy would have immense 
benefits if well harnessed and managed. Ghana’s Jubilee oil field is recognised to be of high 
quality
8
 and expected to command high prices in the international oil market (Tullow Oil Plc, 
2010). According to estimates by Tullow oil Plc, Jubilee field holds estimated proven 
reserves of 490 million barrels of oil and associated gas of ~800 bcf
9
. It is however possible 
this reserve could increase to between 1200 million to 1800 million barrels in the future, if 
ongoing tests and drillings yield positive results (World Bank, 2009).  
With the commencement of production in late 2010, it is expected that by mid 2016 
production should peak at 120,000 barrels per day whereas the estimated 490 million barrels 
of oil is to span a period of 20 years (World Bank, 2009 p1). 
In terms of revenues Ghana stands to benefit about $1 billion annually (World Bank, 2009 
p1). The field as pointed out previously is a joint venture between the government of Ghana 
and six other stakeholders. The implication of this is that the total revenues would not be 
                                                             
7 The E.O group a Ghanaian owned company however sold its 3.5 stake in the field to Tullow oil in July 2011, 
thus increasing the later’s share by same margin 
8
 World Class sweet oil 
9 Billion cubic  feet 
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raked by only the government. Figure 3 below shows projections of government’s revenues 
from the petroleum in the life span of the oil fields:  
Figure 3: Gross Revenue & Government Revenue in ($millions)
 
Source: Author’s construction based on data in (World Bank, 2009 p21). 
 
Government’s take or share of the revenue is defined by the fiscal regime10 in operation. A 
fiscal regime outlines revenue streams available to the government and how much it 
potentially stands to benefit. Knowledge of revenue streams provides clarity and transparency 
in revenue management. A fiscal regime varies from country to country and depends on 
prevailing conditions under which oil is found (Gary, 2008). Ghana’s oil fiscal regime11 
could be described as a “hybrid of concessionary and production sharing arrangement” 
(Amoako-Tuffour, 2010b pg4). Government revenues generally are from royalties derived 
from award of oil blocks and its own participation in the venture. Appendix 1 summarises the 
fiscal regime governing the petroleum industry in Ghana. 
 
While some authors
12
 have focused on the merits and demerits of Ghana’s choice of a royalty 
system, as a fiscal regime as opposed to other systems, the key issue is how well the revenues 
derived from the resources are managed. What the government chooses to expend the 
windfall revenues on is very important as it must go to areas that would yield the maximum 
benefits. When the government and public officials loot, or spend these resources on projects 
                                                             
10 A petroleum fiscal regime has to do with the fiscal instruments and contractual framework which indicates 
the host country’s share of the windfall revenues and specifying where they are streaming from Gary, I. 2008. 
UNDP Discussion paper No. 6:fuelling poverty reduction. International Oil and Gas Forum. phnom cambodia: 
UNDP. 
11 The fiscal regime comprises the following elements: a 5 percent royalty for oil revenue; a 10 percent tax on 
petroleum revenue net of royalty and operational expenses (i.e., the oil rent); a share of the oil rent growing 
with the rent amounts; and 35 percent income tax World Bank 2009. Economy-Wide Impact of Oil Discovery in 
Ghana. PREM 4 Africa Region. Washington D.C: World Bank..  
12 See examples: Amoako-Tuffour, J. 2010a. An Evaluation of Ghana’s Petroleum Fiscal Regime. Ghana Policy 
Journal, 4, 7-34.  Adjoa, H. N. Was Ghana right in choosing the Royalty Tax system in the oil sector? Danquah 
Institute Quarterly. 
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for reasons political expediency, then the potential for the country to be plunged into the 
resource curse becomes very real. The public thus must ensure the revenues are put to 
appropriate use. The public can hold the government accountable when they are aware of the 
areas where the revenues are to be expended. Within this focus a discussion of how the oil 
revenues are to be spent therefore becomes necessary. 
2.2.1 Revenue Distribution 
A key provision of the Petroleum Revenue management Act, Act 815 (discussed in 
subsequent subsection), is to detail out how the revenues should be used. This curtails 
arbitrary expenditure to an extent. The law provides two avenues where the oil revenues 
ought to be channelled to. These specific areas include the Revenue Funds and the Annual 
Budget Financing Amount (ABFA).  
2.2.2 Revenue Funds 
Petroleum funds are important components in the management process of oil revenues 
globally and have been extensively reviewed
13
. In pursuance of the provisions of the PRMA 
Act 815 (PRMA 2011), the government established a Petroleum Holding fund, Ghana 
Heritage Fund and Stabilisation Fund. The decision to create these funds was based on 
extensive stakeholder consultations, a national survey and best practices elsewhere such as 
Norway.     
The petroleum holding fund is the primary account created “to receive and disburse 
petroleum revenue due the republic” (PRMA 2011 p5). This account kept by the Bank of 
Ghana (BoG) serves as the primary depository for all oil revenue payments received from any 
source as outlined in the fiscal regime. The setting up of the petroleum holding fund provides 
a relatively easy mechanism for monitoring revenue flows to the government. This 
contributes to the achievement of transparency when it comes to revenue flows. This is 
because all revenues from the various sources (see Appendix 1) become easy to monitor and 
to track. This fund provides disbursements of monies to the two other funds (Heritage and 
Stabilisation) and also the Annual Budget Financing Amount (ABFA).  
The creation of the stabilisation and heritage funds were in respond to two apparent problems 
often related with oil windfalls. First, the country’s monetary and fiscal management could be 
                                                             
13
 Fasano, U. 2000. Review of the Experience with Oil Stabilization and Savings Funds in Selected Countries. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper No. 00/112 , Asfaha, S. G. 2007. National Revenue Funds: 
Their Efficacy for Fiscal Stability and Intergenerational Equity. Social Science Research Network. 
Gary, I. 2008. UNDP Discussion paper No. 6:fuelling poverty reduction. International Oil and Gas Forum. 
phnom cambodia: UNDP. 
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destabilised given the large quantum of oil revenues (relative to the size of the economy) that 
would be introduced into the economy in a short period of time (Amoako-Tuffour, 2010b). 
Also, due to the short term nature of the oil windfall, if misappropriated or treated as income 
presently it would deprive future generations any benefit. As a remedy to the above 
macroeconomic stability and intergenerational equity issues, the petroleum revenue 
management Act, Act 815 stipulated the creation of the two investment oriented funds. 
The stabilisation fund was created “to cushion the impact on or sustain public expenditure 
capacity during periods of unanticipated Petroleum revenue Shortfalls”(PRMA 2011 pg7). 
Payments into this fund are based on an approved percentage by the Parliament of Ghana 
from the holding fund. 
The Ghana heritage fund on the other hand seeks to satisfy the intergenerational equity 
problem. The fund is set up to “provide an endowment to support the development of future 
generations when the petroleum reserves have been depleted”(PRMA 2011 pg8). According 
to Amoako-Tuffour (2010b), the fund beyond this primary objective would also shore up the 
country’s international reserves as well as the state’s creditworthiness in the international 
capital market. 
2.2.3 Annual Budget Financing Amount (ABFA) 
The ABFA is the amount of petroleum revenue allocated for spending in the budget in a 
financial year (Public Interest and Accountability Committee, 2011). This amount, according 
to the law must not exceed seventy percent of the bench mark revenue
14
 to be determined by 
the Minister of Finance. According to the law, the use of the money is to be guided by a 
medium term expenditure framework consistent with the country’s long term national 
development plan. 
The law, however, anticipates a situation where the country may not have a long term 
development plan. Under such conditions the law likewise provides specific developmental 
areas or projects which could be financed with the amount. These include infrastructure, rural 
development, and water and sanitation among others. Appendix 2 shows a full list of these 
areas.  While the list per the law is not prioritised in the order it is stated, the Minister of 
                                                             
14 Bench Mark revenue is the sum of the expected revenue from crude oil, expected gas royalties and the 
expected dividends from the national oil company (PRMA 2011. Petroleum Revenue Management Act. ACT 
815. Ghana: Paliament of Ghana. 
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Finance is tasked to prioritise at most four areas necessary to achieve maximum impact of the 
revenue use
15
.  
The use of the Budget allocation amount poses the biggest threat to misuse and corruption. It 
is often through budget related expenditures that oil revenues go missing in oil economies 
since budgets are less transparent in oil economies (Heuty and Carlitz, 2009). It would be 
necessary for the citizens to, for example, monitor how this money is spent. While the 
petroleum law has been explicit in defining the areas of allocation, tracking the revenue 
within the budget framework can be problematic. The amount adds up to a pool of other 
revenues and its independent tracking can be difficult. This is linked to another level of 
transparency and accountability. That is budget transparency. 
Transparency in Ghana’s budget has dipped from 2010 to 2012 according to the Open Budget 
Survey (International Budget Partnership, 2012). What is significant here is that it is the same 
period oil revenues were introduced into the economy
16
. The most current assessment of 
transparency in Ghana’s Budget process by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) in 
2012 scores the country at 50% in its Open budget index (International Budget Partnership, 
2012) a drop from 54% in 2010. Ghana was scored a grade E
17
 in the subcategory “citizens’ 
Budget”18 relative to information disclosure. The country report by IBP recognises the 
challenge for citizens to hold the government accountable for the management of the public 
purse (International Budget Partnership, 2012). This is worrisome especially when a 
substantial amount of the oil revenues is used as ABFA. The pursuit of transparency and 
accountability is vital in this regard. 
2.3 Vehicles of Transparency and Accountability. 
The central pillar for the demand for transparency and accountability is the citizens on whose 
behalf the petroleum resources are being managed by the government or public office 
holders. This notwithstanding, the role and ability of ordinary citizens to demand 
transparency and accountability is complimented and moderated by existing institutions and 
legal frameworks. This section thus looks generally at the role and impact of various 
                                                             
15
 The minister states those four priority areas when he is presenting his programme to parliament on how he 
intends appropriating the amount 
16 The relationship between the fall in transparency and introduction of oil revenues is only an observation and 
not an established correlation or causation. 
17 Grading scheme: An average score between 0-20 (scant information) is graded as E; 21-40 (minimal) is graded as D; 41-
60 (some) is graded as C; 61-80 (significant) is graded as B; and 81- 100 (extensive) is graded as A. 
18
 A Citizens Budget is a nontechnical presentation of a government’s budget that is intended to enable the public — 
including those who are not familiar with public finance — to understand a government’s plans. 
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mediums through which transparency and accountability could be achieved. The presentation 
here is purposely general and provides a background for the analysis and discussions in 
subsequent chapters.  
2.3.1 Legal Frameworks 
Legal framework provides legitimacy for a demand for transparency and accountability. They provide 
the affirmation of the right of people to information and also provide a regulation on the behaviour of 
public officers. Among such legal frameworks existing in Ghana are the National constitution and 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act. 
2.3.1.1 National Constitution 
The constitution of Ghana grants the people the right to benefit from the natural resources. 
That is they (citizen) are the rightful owners, while the government merely manages the 
resource base and revenues for them. This is defined in Article 257(6) of the 1992 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana which states explicitly that every mineral in its 
natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, rivers, streams, water-courses 
throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic zone and any area covered by the territorial sea 
or continental shelf is the property of the Republic of Ghana and shall be vested in the 
President on behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana’. This law defines the sovereign 
ownership of all natural resources within the territories of Ghana. Thus, the oil and gas 
resources found offshore are the property of the people of Ghana. The citizens are the 
principal stakeholders in the management of the wealth that would be derived from its 
exploration. 
The law impliedly gives not only right of ownership but also a right to know how the 
windfalls of these natural resources are managed on their behalf by the government. As the 
principal owners they reserve the express right to know how their appointed agents (i.e 
Government) are managing the derived revenues. This is a fundamental basis for the demand 
for transparency and accountability. The citizen’s right to accountability and proper 
management of their oil revenues is further grounded in the Petroleum Revenue Management 
law. 
2.3.1.2 The Petroleum Revenue Management Act, ACT 815 (PRMA) 
By far the most significant legislation relative to transparent and accountable management of 
the Petroleum resources is the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, ACT 815. The law 
enacted in 2010 deals extensively with the management of the oil and gas windfalls in a 
transparent manner. The law explicitly outlines both the petroleum revenue streams and how 
18 
 
it must be distributed as discussed previously. Historically, this is the first law that explicitly 
touches on the issue of transparency in the petroleum sector since exploration activities began 
in 1896. 
The law aims at providing the framework for the management of the petroleum proceeds in a 
“responsible, transparent, accountable and sustainable manner for the benefit of the 
citizens of Ghana….” (PRMA 2011 p1). The law is considered to have met international 
standards and best practices (MoFEP, 2011). It was a product of broad consultative work 
among various stakeholders and borrows from related laws in Norway, Botswana, Trinidad 
and Tobago and a host of other countries (Amoako-Tuffour, 2010b). Key features of the law 
that makes it an important tool for transparency and accountability include: 
 Well specified and transparent rules for the transfer of oil revenues 
The law clearly outlines all the sources of government petroleum revenues. This provides the 
basis for the public to know exactly through which means revenues are being generated to the 
state. The law specifies that all revenues must be paid directly into the Petroleum fund by the 
companies liable to make such payments after an assessment by the Ghana Revenue 
Authority. The elimination of third parties collecting such revenues on behalf of government 
or deposits being made into various accounts ensures that monitoring and possibility of 
public officials diverting the funds into personal accounts is reduced if not eliminated.  
 
 
 Specific Reporting and public disclosure Standards 
To ensure public oversight, the law provides extensive requirements on government officials 
to disclose information about management of the revenues. Among others, the Minister of 
Finance, for example, is required to publish all receipts in at least two state newspapers at the 
end of each year. Theoretically therefore, citizens by this law should have the necessary 
information about the flow of monies from the oil companies to government. In practice, 
however, citizens’ ability to access such information is moderated by other factors such as 
accessibility, literacy, interest among others. 
 
 Well specified expenditure regime 
The law clearly provides the mechanisms for the coordination of the revenue funds and the 
budget. This is in conformity to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) guide on resource 
revenue management (International Monetary Fund, 2007). How much of the revenue is to be 
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channelled into the budget and for what purpose are clearly defined by the law (see previous 
sections)  
 
 Independent watch dog institution for Government oversight 
 In the interest of greater transparency and public scrutiny of the management of the revenue 
flows, the law established the Public interest and accountability Committee. This aligns 
Ghana with the IMF’s Guide requirement for a national audit office or independent office to 
monitor and report discrepancies in the management of the revenues. The PIAC in effect 
would be an oversight institution that could serve as the eyes and ears of the citizens. It is 
also required to make public information about its monitoring of the revenues. 
 Transparency and Accountability Policy tone 
The law also essentially sets the policy tone for the need to ensure a transparent and 
accountable            management of the petroleum wealth. This is made explicitly clear in the 
opening preamble describing the law as a framework for a “responsible, transparent, 
accountable and sustainable manner for the benefit of the citizens of Ghana….”(PRMA 
2011 pg1). The law follows this up with a subsection dedicated to the issue of Transparency 
and Accountability and actually makes transparency a fundamental principle stating that the 
“management of petroleum revenue and savings shall always be carried out with the 
highest internationally accepted standards of transparency and good governance”(PRMA 
2011).Invariably this makes transparency and accountability in the management of the 
revenues not a choice for public officers but an obligation. 
 
2.3.2 Institutions 
Key institutions moderating the achievement of transparency and accountability include the 
PIAC, the Media, Civil Society Organisations and the Ghana Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (GHEITI).   
2.3.2.1 Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) 
This committee is a key institution serving as a watch dog over the management of the 
country’s petroleum revenues. The committee is to provide an oversight on behalf of the 
people over the government’s management of the oil resources. The PRMA Act 815 under 
which the committee was set up clearly outlines the objective of the committee to include: 
 Monitoring and evaluating compliance with the Act by the Government and other 
relevant institutions in the management and use of petroleum revenues, 
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 Providing a platform for public debate on spending prospects of petroleum revenues 
in line with development priorities; 
 Providing an independent assessment on the management and use of revenues 
 (Public Interest and Accountability Committee, 2011). 
 
The committee, in order to be effective is made independent of government.  It is made up of 
thirteen members comprising of a representative of independent policy and research think-
tanks, a nominee of CSOs and CBOs and eleven other nominees of professional, religious 
and traditional authorities. The non inclusion of a government official or politicians on the 
committee is significant and reflects the group’s independence. 
 
The PIAC holds the link between the people and the management process of the oil revenues. 
Its ability to provide up to date and accurate information to the public would provide the most 
effective and formal access to information. Its first annual report was produced following the 
inauguration of the committee in September 2011(Public Interest and Accountability 
Committee, 2011).  
 
The political will shown by the government to set up the committee within the short period 
after the law was passed cannot go unrecognised. However, the committee has its own share 
of challenges faced by many other institutions that rely on the state for funding. The state is 
yet to commit to it the needed resources
19
. Currently it has no secretariat of its own and had 
had to rely on an interim one provided by Revenue Watch Institute’s Regional Office in Accra 
and funding from foreign donors. (Public Interest and Accountability Committee, 2011). 
 
Aside the committee’s funding predicament, it also lacks the biting teeth of prosecution. The 
committee as it is now can only make recommendations to government and stimulate public 
debate by making its reports available to the public. Government is not enjoined by law to 
adhere to their recommendations. Nevertheless, the mere formation of the committee as 
prescribed by the law is a victory for transparency and accountability. 
 
2.3.2.2 The Media as Agent of Transparency 
Access to accurate and reliable information undoubtedly is a key component of transparency 
in the management of natural resources. Thus, Ghanaians’ ability to hold the government 
responsible and demand for accountability in the management of the oil resources is largely 
                                                             
19 Based personal interview with the Deputy Minister of Finance in August 2012. 
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dependent on the media’s ability to provide the needed and timely information. Whiles 
government has the prime responsibility of providing the citizens with information, the 
media’s ability to provide reliable, independent and accurate information cannot be over 
emphasised.  The media as being considered here is seen as a moderating factor in the relay 
of information to the citizenry upon which they can hold officials accountable. 
 
The National Media Commission of Ghana as at the last quarter of 2011 had licensed 247 
radio stations and 28 TV stations (National Communications Authority, 2011).  Likewise, 
there are many newspaper houses with some publishing daily and others weekly. As at 2006, 
the total number of newspapers according to the Country’s Media Commission stood at 106.  
Access to information over the internet is made possible through Internet service Providers 
who service homes, offices and commercial cafes. While the use of the internet as a source of 
information is growing and unrestricted, the rate of access is however low with only 10 
percent of the population having access (The Ghanaian Times, 2011). For those who could 
afford smart phones and other devices, they could access information over the internet 
through the services of their Mobile Telecom Operators.  
 
In terms of press freedom, Reporters without Borders in 2011 ranked Ghana 41
st
   in the 
world
20
 and fourth in Africa (Reporters without Borders, 2012). In effect the access to mere 
information by the Ghanaian citizenry in general and the climate for freedom of expression is 
relatively healthy. 
2.3.2.3 Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI)  
Ghana was among the first countries to engage in the EITI process. It joined EITI in 2003 and 
was validated as fully compliant in October, 2010 (Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative, 2010). The implementation of the program in Ghana when it began was limited to 
the mining sector, but is currently being extended to the petroleum sectors
21
. The Ghana 
Extractive Industries Initiative (GHEITI) secretariat has the responsibility to implement the 
program.  
The National Steering Committee (NSC) is responsible for the running of the initiative and 
among its core functions is dissemination of information about the extractive revenues of 
government and payments made by the companies (IDL Group, 2010). The National Steering 
                                                             
20 Out of 179 countries under consideration 
21 Petroleum sector was obviously excluded as Ghana was not yet producing oil and gas. 
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Committee (NSC) is made up of 23 members from multi-stakeholder groups
22
 (GHEITI, 
2011b). With the discovery of petroleum in 2007 and subsequently the commencement of 
production in 2010, the NSC was expanded from its initial 10 member composition to 23. 
The new composition was to make sure stakeholders of the oil and gas sector are represented 
on the committee as GHEITI sought to extend the program to cover that sector as well 
(Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 2010). Thus the newly expanded 
committee has included representatives from both petroleum companies and oil related civil 
organisations. 
An important feature of the new expanded NSC is the inclusion of a representative from the 
District Assembly within the oil catchment area. This inclusion in a way represents 
devolution of the process to the district level. It likewise has an implication for the 
dissemination of information as will be discussed in later. The transparency institution has 
over the years been making information available to the public in diverse ways. Chapter six 
analyses the impact of this information dissemination and how it has impacted on getting 
people informed about resource governance. 
2.3.2.4 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
Civil society organisations in Ghana have been actively involved in various aspects of the 
management of the oil resources. They have done so through policy recommendations, 
contributions to legislative bills, whistle blowing, research and publication. These groups 
with varied backgrounds have become integral stakeholders in the management of the new 
found oil and gas resource. CSOs have also a role to play in championing transparency and 
accountability. They could be critical in the supply of relevant information to the citizens and 
also take on the government as stakeholders. 
 
Even though many CSOs have contributed in diverse ways in monitoring developments in the 
industry, the most influential and notable group till date has been the Civil Society Platform 
for Oil and Gas. The group is made up of over 115 members drawn from CSOs, academia, 
research institutions, policy think-tanks and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). They 
are funded by Oxfam America, Revenue Watch Institute and the World Bank. 
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 The MSG includes representatives from Government, Extractive companies, District assemblies and Civil 
Society Organisations. 
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The group has been engaging with the government to ensure legislations are enacted that 
would guarantee transparent management of the oil wealth. The group, together with Publish 
What You Pay Ghana and Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC), played 
important role in the formulation of the Petroleum revenue management law. It was through 
their recommendation and lobbying that lead to the inclusion of the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee in the PRMA ACT 815(Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). 
2.3.3 Citizens and Civic Responsibility  
It has been previously established that the citizens are the principal owners of natural 
resources whiles governments are agents acting on behalf of the people as defined by the 
national constitution. To ensure effective management of the Ghanaian petroleum revenues, 
citizens have an important role to play. That is, they have to hold public officers accountable 
for their management of the resources. Sandgren (2008) for example argues that in order to 
make progress against corruption, there must be “pressure from the bottom”. Also, Mungiu-
Pippidi (2003), points out that a “competent and demanding public” is necessary to make use 
of any accountability channels in existence or make a demand for it if not in existence.  
 
Thus, in order to practicalize the transparency and accountability demand in Ghana’s 
petroleum management, there is a need for a citizenry who are civic competent. Mungiu-
Pippidi (2003) defines civic competence as a citizen’s awareness of his or her rights and a 
corresponding active attitude in ensuring those rights is respected. The later provides some 
indicators of such a society as involving individuals who are younger, educated, relatively 
well-off, residing in urban areas and politically more sophisticated.  Some of these indicators 
would be used as reference points to discuss in general the Ghanaian citizenry’s contribution 
to achieving transparency and accountability in the management of the oil resources. This 
would also inform some of the discussions in later parts of this research relative to the people 
of Cape Three Point. 
 
Education and Literacy levels 
Svensson (2005) have shown that countries that are crippled by corruption likewise have a 
significant lower level of human capital measured by the number of school years of the 
population above 25 years. Where the level of literacy is low, the ability of the people to read 
and understand publications about how much oil revenues the government is receiving and 
how it is being spent would be difficult. This in turn would make it difficult for the people to 
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hold the public officers accountable. Ghana’s illiteracy level according the World Bank in 
2009 is 67% (World Bank, 2011). Whiles the level is significantly above average and higher 
compared to other sub-saharan African countries it falls short of the desirable 100%. 
According to the Ghana statistical service, in 2008, as much as 31% of all adult Ghanaians 
have never been to school, with only as little as 13.6% having secondary or higher level 
qualification (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008). These statistics are even worse as one move 
into the rural areas such as Cape Three Point. 
 
Political Activism 
In terms of political activism, the consideration here is whether or not Ghanaians are willing 
to get involved in demanding for accountability. Whiles majority of Ghanaians are willing to 
participate in electoral processes every four years, their attitudes towards holding public 
officers accountable on specific issues appear to be different. According to the Afrobarometer 
of 2012, on the issue of popular demand for accountability, 62 % of people surveyed said 
they would not join others in raising issues (Afrobarometer, 2012). In a like manner on the 
same issue, 83% of the people said they would never attend a protest march or demonstration. 
Even more critical is that very few Ghanaians are interested in engaging with elected officials 
in demand for accountability.  According to the survey, majority responded as “never” 
contacting any official of government (89%), MP (86%), political party official (85%) and 
local government councillor (68%) in the past year (2011) (Afrobarometer, 2012). This calls 
into question the willingness of the people in demanding for transparency and accountability. 
This could have indirect impact for example on the work of civil society organisations in 
demanding for transparency. The needed support and will of the people to drive their 
campaigns could be lacking. According to Sandgren (2008) the success of any effort towards 
the fight of corruption depends on the attitude of the public.  
 
Living standard 
A country is poor because it is corrupt, but is also corrupt because it is poor (Sandgren, 2008). 
It’s been identified that countries that have chronic poverty are natural breeding grounds for 
systemic corruption due to social and income inequalities (Chetwynd et al., 2003). Where the 
people are poor their ability to demand for accountability could be greatly influenced.  
According to World Bank country data, 28.5% of Ghanaians live under the poverty 
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line
23
(World Bank, 2011). This coupled with a high unemployment rate can pose a challenge 
to the fight for transparency and accountability by the citizens.  
 
Cultural values 
Another emerging aspect against the fight for accountability has to do with the type of 
cultural dimension existing in a country. Several features of individualistic culture and 
collectivist
24
 culture have different effects on corruption and accountability (Pillay and 
Dorasamy, 2010). Is been noted for example that obedience, loyalty and conformity are 
important features of collectivist cultures which inhibits whistle blowing and rather leads to 
pervasiveness of corruption (Triandis, 1994) . Mbaku (1996) have argued that civil servants 
in Africa engage in corruption due to pressures from their extended families and their 
behaviour is to benefit their family, their ethnic or social group. It appears therefore that the 
needed societal vigilance and ability to blow the whistle when public officials appropriate 
natural resource windfalls would be limited especially if the culprit belongs to one’s social 
group or family.  Ghana like many other African countries is a collectivist society and could 
suffer from this defect in collectivist cultural norm in the fight to protect the oil purse. 
 
The above discussions have been intentionally made general and broad and sought to lay a 
foundation for subsequent chapters that looks more specifically at the situation as it pertains 
to the Cape Three Point Community. It is only to serve as background information. 
2.4. Current Trends in Transparency in the Petroleum Sector 
This section provides general background information about the level of transparency and 
accountability in the industry. This information is based on the independent analysis of the 
Institute of the Economic of Affairs (IEA), Ghana. 
The Institute of Economic Affairs Ghana (IEA), a public policy institute plays significant role 
in the oil and gas sector through its numerous publications
25
. The institute has initiated what 
it calls the P-TRAC Index report. It is an annual report seeking to “promote transparency and 
Accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil and gas resources…” (Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2011p2). Its maiden report in 2011 provides an idea about Ghana’s 
                                                             
23 National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National 
estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys. 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana 
24 In collectivists culture group interest prevails over individual interests and the opposite is true for 
individualistic cultures. 
25  To view some of these publications, see http://www.ieagh.org/index.php/publications 
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performance so far in Revenue transparency, Contract transparency, Expenditure 
Transparency as well as management of the petroleum funds. For the purposes of this 
research however, only data on Revenue and Expenditure transparency would be presented. 
The rationale for the introduction of this data is to draw a picture of how far Government has 
performed so far based on the independent analysis of the institute. In later chapters, I would 
reflect on how this picture contrasts with the views of the people of Cape Three Point.  The 
figure below provides results for revenue Transparency. 
Fig 5: P-TRAC Index Scores for Revenue Transparency (%)  
 
Source:(Institute of Economic Affairs, 2011) 
On the average, the country was rated above average with a score of 64.3% based on factors 
such as availability, frequency and quality of data provide by the relevant state institutions.  
Specifically, high scores were recorded for quality and availability of information. This 
notwithstanding, whether the citizens can access, interpret and use such information is the 
other side of the coin being examined by this research.   
Figure 4: P-TRAC Index Scores for Expenditure Transparency 
 
Source : (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2011) 
For expenditure transparency, state managers of the resource are scored similarly high with 
an overall average of 63.9 %.  Quality of information is rated highly but again, are such 
technical reports easily understood by the ordinary Ghanaian or not? In any case are they 
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interested in reading such reports? Do such reports or indexes of transparency confirm the 
reality on the ground? These are some of the questions that this study addresses.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Theoretical and Conceptual Background 
 
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of the study. This research 
explores whether or not in achieving transparency and accountability in Ghana’s oil industry, 
information provided by the government is accessible to the people and if the citizens have 
the capacity to construct knowledge and take action on the information provided. 
Transparency and Accountability has been recognized as one way of resolving the resource 
curse. At the heart of it however is information accessibility. 
The highlight and argument presented is on the linkage or information asymmetry between 
the state and the citizens. Governments have the duty of providing information to the public 
as a way of accounting for their stewardship of resources. Citizens on the hand must be able 
to receive and act on the information provided. Their ability and resources to do so form the 
core of this research. The chapter discusses various concepts and identify theoretical 
arguments that link together information asymmetry, resource governance and resource curse. 
The key issue narrowed on is the ability of citizens to receive, process and act on the 
information provided which is an important component of achieving transparency.   
3.1 Natural Resources and Development: The resource Curse Hypothesis 
The possession of natural resources by a country should be a good thing and serve as a 
catalyst for their socioeconomic development. Going by the logic of “Big Push26” theorists as 
argued out by the likes of (Murphy et al., 1988) and (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1963) resource 
booms in poor countries should translate into development (Sachs and Warner, 1999). 
Paradoxically, the blessings of nations with natural resources have strangely become rather 
problematic and often form basis for political and economic misfortunes for such countries
27
. 
It is rather the case often that countries with limited resource endowments have performed 
much better as in the case of the Asian Tigers
28
 (Boschini et al., 2007). The term ‘Resource 
Curse’ coined by Auty (1993) describes the phenomenon of countries failing to benefit from 
their natural resource endowments. 
                                                             
26
 The theory asserts that poor countries require some sort of large demand expansion to expand their 
markets and attract entrepreneurs. Thus, anything that can stimulate that the demand including discovery of 
minerals and rise in price of natural resource commodities is good enough Sachs, J. D. & Warner, A. M. 1999. 
The big push, natural resource booms and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 59, 43-76.  
27
 Eg Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia etc  
28 Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan 
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Based on research spanning decades, there is a growing literature and overwhelming 
evidence pointing to a negative relationship between natural resources and poor economic 
performance (Auty, 1986, Auty, 1993, Auty, 2001, Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, Lal and Myint, 
1996, Stevens, 2003)  Sachs and Warner (1995) for example found that resource abundance 
had negative impact on economic development based on cross-country data of 20 countries 
used for their study. They went on to show how countries with resource endowments actually 
had a slow pace of development compared to less endowed countries between 1971 to 1990 
the period used for their study. 
The curse is not limited only to the negative economic impacts, but has been found by other 
studies to transcend into other areas of countries that posses them. It has been found, for 
example, to be associated with armed conflict (Lujala, 2009, Lujala et al., 2005, 2010, Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004, Ross, 2004), Poor educational investment (Gylfason, 2001), disruption of 
democracy (Collier, 2007, Tsui, 2005) and poverty (Ross, 2003). Ross (2012) singles out 
petroleum wealth as the root cause of the socioeconomic and political problems in the Middle 
East. The negative effects of natural resources have actually driven some to argue that the 
resources should not be tapped but rather made to remain in the ground (Humphreys et al., 
2007). 
Even though the resource curse hypothesis paints a gloomy picture, there are however a few 
countries that nevertheless have defied the curse and have turned their resources into a 
blessing for their citizens. Often Norway is cited as a global example (see Larsen, 2004). 
Likewise, Botswana with its diamond resources have had an average growth rate of 7% over 
the last 2 decades (Humphreys et al., 2007). Economic models by Findlay and Lundahl 
(1994) and that of Murshed (2001) show that resource booms do not necessarily lead to 
economic downfalls and adverse impacts but could be well managed through effective policy 
frameworks (Murshed, 2004). This has prompted other researchers to question the 
acceptability of the resource curse hypothesis. Opponents of the resource curse hypothesis 
have often premised their arguments on deficits in methodology (Wright and Czelusta, 2002, 
Maloney, 2002).  
Granted that some few countries have been exceptions to the rule and escaped the curse, the 
evidence in support of the hypothesis however is overwhelmingly favourable (Rosser, 2006). 
Also, it has been argued that the resource curse is not absolutely cast in iron, but rather based 
on a recurrent tendency (Rosser, 2006, Stevens, 2003, Auty, 2006). In effect, the possession 
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of natural resources in itself is not the problem but rather the ability of the managers, in most 
cases governments-be it legitimate or otherwise, to transform the resource wealth into 
economic development. 
The problem of resources and development can be considered as a governance problem. 
Hitherto, most researchers had seen the curse to be of economic origin and explained it in 
terms of revenue volatility (Mikesell, 1997), poor terms of trade (Brohman, 1996) and the 
Dutch disease (Usui, 1997). The consequent economic solutions prescribed however have 
most often failed  as a cure as increasingly the cause of the curse is seen as being more of 
political nature rather than economic. It has been argued that the introduction of large 
resource rents redirects attention from long term development goals to rent-seeking activity 
and patronage (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). The political aspect involving the role governments 
and their agencies play in the management processes of natural resources has been the focus 
and highlight of current debates and research in recent times. 
Rent-seeking is where agents employ their skills and time to acquire a share of resource rents 
(revenues) to the disadvantage of the larger public (Kolstad and Wiig, 2011). Patronage on 
the other hand involves the use of public revenues (often resource revenues) to secure 
political power. This is achieved by paying off supporters and misallocating funds (Kolstad 
and Søreide, 2009, Kolstad and Wiig, 2011) to areas and sectors where they are less needed 
(but can garner electoral votes). Rent seeking becomes greater when wealth is concentrated 
within the public sector or the hands of few (McMahon, 1997), or channelled through the 
hands of bureaucrats (Stevens, 2003). Such bureaucrats according to Mbaku (1996) belong to 
the dominant political group. Leite and Weidmann (1999), differentiating between point 
resources (oil, minerals) and diffuse resources, argue that the former has a negative effect on 
institutions because of its greater tendency to induce corruption and rent seeking. This 
problem is particularly critical for a country such as Ghana that has discovered oil and would 
have large oil rents (revenues) being introduced into its economy. This is especially so when 
the country has little to show for revenues generated from its vast minerals in the past.  
The potential and real threat of renting seeking and mismanagement of resource revenues is 
not peculiar only to Ghana. Corruption, patronage and rent seeking within political 
institutions are the bane of most resource endowed countries that have failed to turn their 
resources into a blessing (Kolstad and Søreide, 2009). For example, Nigerian ex-president 
Abacha is believed to have looted as much as US$3 billion of that country’s oil revenues 
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(Ayittey, 2006 cited in, Humphreys et al., 2007 p11). A study in Cameroun found that 
whereas 46 percent of that country’s oil revenues between 1977 to 2006 were transferred to 
the budget, a remaining huge chunk of 54 percent could not be traced (Gauthier and Zeufack, 
2011).    
Karl (2007) argues that the resource curse is political and not economic in nature. Using the 
‘honey pots’ metaphor, she draws the apt link between the collective rent seeking behaviour 
of domestic and foreign actors and the oil trap that threatens the fundamentals of petro states. 
For her, oil rents provide the largess that political actors loot to benefit themselves and their 
cronies, as well as to perpetuate themselves in power. This often is a result of most resource 
endowed countries being weak, which makes it impossible for institutions and bureaucrats to 
counteract the rent seeking behaviour of governments (Karl, 2007).  
It has become evident that abundant natural resources stimulates rent seeking while at the 
same time reducing the motivation for citizens to demand accountability from their 
governments (Isham et al., 2005, Karl, 1997, 2007, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003, 
Uzoigwe, 2012). Example of citizens’ inability to demand accountability is often very 
obvious in oil dependent states where the citizens are not taxed. According to Ross (2012) 
governments funded through tax are under the check of their citizens, while those deriving 
funding from oil, for example, are less likely to face public scrutiny. The underlying principle 
behind taxation is for citizens to demand and governments to provide information on how tax 
monies are spent (Ross, 2012). However, this relationship is lost when the state depends on 
natural resources rather than citizens for taxes. The lack of transparency and accountability 
from governments to their citizens is detrimental to any efforts to avoid the resource curse.  
Collier (2007) identifies the lack of transparency as a barrier to effective management of 
natural resource windfalls. The need for accountability through the provision of timely and 
effective information to citizens who are the resource owners can be conceptualised and 
understood within the Principal-Agent Model or what is usually seen as the agency problem. 
3.2 The Agency Problem: Principal-Agent Model and Natural Resource 
Governance 
An agency relationship is a “contract under which one or more persons [principal] engages 
another person [the agent] to perform some services on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision- making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 as 
quoted in, Mishra et al., 1998). The Principal-Agent model derived from agency theory 
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explains the complex relationship that exists between two individuals, each trying to 
maximise his benefits. A lack of information flow between the agent and the principal leads 
to what is called an agency problem. 
Such a relationship presented by the model is not only limited to business organisations, but 
is typical and common to most social interactions (Uzoigwe, 2012, Ross, 1973) including 
resource governance. The “principal” from the model can be equated to citizens. They are the 
rightful owners of natural resources existing in their countries based on political theories and 
legislations in most countries. In Ghana, for example, Article 257 clause 6 of the national 
constitution makes it explicit that “ every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon any 
land in Ghana……… is the property of the Republic of Ghana and shall be vested in the 
President on behalf of, and in trust for the people of Ghana. The governments on the other 
hand are the agents tasked to manage the natural resources. 
The relationship between the two in principle is based on mutual benefits. The principal 
engages the services of the agent because the former cannot provide the services herself, 
while the agent, on the other hand, benefits in terms of rewards for his services (Prat, 2006 
p92). The rewards could be political power or income. While the relationship between the 
two looks pretty straight forward, in reality this is not the case as: 
 The goals and desires of the principal and the agent are mostly different and 
conflicting. For example citizens naturally would want to see the benefits from 
natural resources translated into socioeconomic development. Agents rationally 
also have self-serving behaviour or interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). They would 
often be interested in serving personal interests as opposed to the interests of the 
citizens in general (Stiglitz, 2002). Thus, the real likelihood of agents, which is 
government and other state actors grabbing resource rents, is higher when the 
opportunities are created. One way of creating such opportunities is limiting 
information.  
 The agent possesses more information than the principal about the organisation, 
which potentially gives the agent an advantage. For citizens to monitor and 
regulate the behaviour of governments they must have information about, for 
example, revenues being generated from the resource exploitation. However, 
because it is the government that posses and controls this information, the citizens 
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are disadvantaged. Prat (2006) points out that agents stand to lose some of their 
rents should disclosure of information increase.  
 It therefore becomes difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing in the absence of information the principal ought to have 
provided (Eisenhardt, 1989). This represents the crux of the agency problem as 
often referred to as resulting from information asymmetry. 
Stiglitz (2002, 1999) argues that a natural information asymmetry similar to what we see 
between business managers and shareholders exists likewise between governments and those 
they ought to serve. The agency problem arises as a result of information asymmetry that 
characterises the relationship between the principal and the agent. In the case of natural 
resource governance, the agent serves his personal interest and achieves his goals by 
withholding information from the principal (the public). This leads to information 
asymmetry. The principal, on the other hand, requires more information to monitor the 
behaviour of his agent in order to ensure he is doing the right thing. However, the cost of 
acquiring such information is high. To achieve this, the principal would have to invest in 
expensive information systems
29
 (Eisenhardt, 1989) or increase the rewards (such as income, 
political power) for the agent for every additional observable variable he provides (Prat, 
2006).  
The relationship between citizens and their government, when it comes to management of 
natural resources, is bridled with the agency problem due to imperfections in information 
flow (Stiglitz, 2002). When governments or bureaucrats release information it has the 
potential of reducing their ability to appropriate rents (Stiglitz, 2002b). Governments are 
capable of influencing public opinion or creating rents for themselves through secrets 
(Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Consequently, the ability of public servants to withhold 
information creates opportunities for them to grab rents.  When large resource rents are made 
available, there is a significant motivation for rent-seeking by governments as opposed to 
their fight against corruption (Pitlik et al., 2010) and any form of citizen engagement in the 
management process. It serves the interest of citizens to thus control or capture information 
when it comes to managing natural resources. It is based on the information they have that 
they can act to hold their governments accountable.  
                                                             
29 In case of businesses this could be budgeting systems, reporting procedures, boards of directors and 
additional layers of management. Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The 
Academy of Management Review, 14, 57-74. 
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One of the key problems facing resource dependent countries today is therefore corruption 
and rent seeking by rulers, as well as the inability of the citizens to hold their governments 
accountable. Oil producing countries in the third world have become less democratic and 
more secretive since 1980 (Ross, 2012). Citizens of most resource endowed nations have 
limited information about revenue flows in the extractive industry in their countries and thus 
the resource curse would persist as long as the information asymmetry exists (Soros, 2007).  
Within democratic jurisdictions where resources are extracted (for example in Ghana), 
citizens have the option and right of holding their leaders accountable by voting to retain 
them in power or otherwise based on how they have managed such resources. However, even 
within such democratic environments, voters would base their choices on information 
available to them. Thus, leaders have even greater incentives to withhold information or 
create secrets which have the tendency of discouraging citizens from holding them 
accountable through the ballot. The lack of information to citizens makes it impossible to 
punish ruling government by replacing them with an opposition (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). 
Thus the ability of governments to create secrets about resource revenues (and other aspects 
of the extractive process) effectively disenables the resource owners’ (i.e. citizens) from 
holding them (government) accountable.  
3.3 Transparency as a Solution 
One way of resolving or reducing the resource curse vis a vis the agency problem is by 
removing the information asymmetry between the principal (citizens) and the agent 
(government). According to Stiglitz (2002), availability of information reduces the 
consequences of the agency problem.  
Karl (2007) provides a clear and firm solution which involves a far reaching fiscal social 
contract based on transparency-one that creates incentives to change the rent seeking 
behaviour of all actors both international and domestic, involved in the oil game”(p. 256).  
According to Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) the social contract existing between the state and 
the citizens, whereby the citizens give political power to the governments and demand 
accountability and transparency in return, is fundamental to development. Citizens 
consequentially entrust the natural resources in the hands of the government once they elect 
them into power. The citizens, on the other hand, have a right to information and 
transparency (Stiglitz, 1999) about how the government manages these resources. It is 
through this mechanism that citizens can hold the government in check. 
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The strong belief in the citizens or public holding to account the government was illustrated 
by Bentham (1999) 
the greater the number of temptations to which the exercise of political power is exposed, 
the more necessary is it to give to those who possess it, the most powerful reasons for 
resisting them. But there is no reason more constant and more universal than the 
superintendence of the public (Bentham, 1999 p29) as quoted in (Lindstedt and Naurin, 
2010 p303)
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Consequently, an emerging global consensus to resolving the problem of resource curse has 
been the promotion of Resource Transparency. Resource Transparency has been defined as: 
“the public disclosure of necessary, reliable and accessible information about all the activities and 
processes involved in the natural resource wealth management chain from discovery and 
exploitation, to the revenue collection and expenditure” (Uzoigwe, 2012). 
Transparency is seen as a tool likely to curtail corrupt behaviour (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). 
Studies have shown that more transparent governments would be less corrupt and have better 
human development and strong fiscal discipline (Ross, 2012, Bellver and Kaufmann, 2005, 
Hameed, 2005).  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) notes that, the availability of 
information publicly about resource revenues and expenditures can halt corruption in 
resource dependent countries. This line of thought is not only replete in the literature but also 
has been part of global policy and practice in resource governance. For example, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) being pursued vigorously globally is 
largely underpinned by the resource transparency philosophy. Institutions such as the 
Revenue Watch Institute, Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Open Government Institute (Soros 
foundation), and Transparency International among a host others have galvanised and 
promoted in diverse ways the goal of resource transparency. 
3.3.1 Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
Over the last decade or more, there has been an upsurge of awareness of importance of  
transparency and accountability in the management of extractive resources and this has led to 
a number of Transparency and Accountability initiatives (TAIs) both at the international and 
national levels (McGee and Gaventa, 2010).  The Extractive Industries Transparency 
                                                             
30 Emphasis mine 
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Initiative (EITI) is one these initiatives that has received much endorsement and being 
implemented in many countries
31
. 
EITI aims at strengthening extractive resource management by improving transparency and 
accountability through verification and full publication of extractive companies’ payments 
and government’s revenues from oil, gas and mining (McGee and Gaventa, 2010). It 
promotes revenue transparency through the development of robust mechanisms for 
reconciling payments made by extractive companies and government revenues at the national 
level (EITI, 2012). The initiative is a voluntary initiative, supported by a coalition of 
companies, governments, investors and civil society organizations.   
While transparency is demanded along the entire value chain of the extraction process, the 
main focus of EITI lies in the revenue aspect.  The underlining agenda of EITI is a disclosure 
of payments from extractive companies to host governments and governments’ disclosure of 
its revenues from the industry. The disclosure of information about payments and revenues is 
assumed to lead to less corruption and better governance (Held and Hale, 2011). 
The EITI potentially provides a culture of public oversight over company payments and 
government revenues making corruption difficult (Darby, 2008). This is achieved through the 
regular publication of revenues generated from the extractive industries.                            
The EITI as a transparency and accountability mechanism essentially is comprised of two 
main elements (EITI, 2012). First, extractive Companies disclose what they pay to their host 
government and the host government likewise discloses what they receive from the 
companies.  These disclosures are then validated or reconciled by an appointed independent 
administrator (aggregator) who compares the information. The second aspect involves an 
oversight of the disclosure process by a multi-stakeholder group and a publication of the 
revenues in an EITI report. The published EITI report contains a reconciliation of what the 
companies say they pay and what the government say it has received (EITI, 2012). The report 
must be made public and accessible through various means. 
 
The multi-stakeholder group serves as a system control or oversight of the implementation 
process. It is made up of representatives of the extractive companies, government and civil 
                                                             
31 Currently in thirty seven countries 
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society organisations
32
. The involvement of civil society organisations and regular 
publication of information should lead to the building of trust among the public and the 
government and consequently reduce risks of conflicts due to mistrusts (Darby, 2009). 
3.3.2 EITI Objective 
Six succinct core criteria have been developed to guide the EITI implementation process
33
.  
The first and perhaps most important criteria is a regular publication of all oil, gas and mining 
payments by companies to governments to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, 
comprehensive and comprehensible manner (EITI, 2005). 
The key objective is that a wide section of the public in the implementing country must be 
able to access the final outcome of the EITI process (the published report) in a manner that is 
not only comprehensive, but also comprehensible. The average member of the public should 
be able to access the report, be able to read and understand it and also, above all, obtain that 
relevant information about the management of the petroleum and/or mineral resources 
revenues. In effect, in countries such as Ghana where it is being implemented, the assumption 
would be that the citizens should have access to the reports and be able to read and 
understand it. In a developing country like Ghana and many others, this may not be as 
straight forward as it appears. How the report is communicated, literacy levels, interests and 
attitudes of the people are critical bench marks for the full benefits of EITI to be achieved. 
3.4 The concept of Transparency and achieving resource Transparency 
Transparency has long been recognised by many as an important element in the sustainable 
development of any state and there is an emerging consensus from both academic and 
political thoughts on the importance of transparency (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009) as a public 
good. The concept has gained prominence in policy debates in recent years. By way of 
growing emphasis, the word “transparency” was voted as the word of the year in 2003 by the 
Webster’s new world college dictionary (Piotrowski, 2010).  
Transparency as a concept has a long history in governance and possibly predates the 
twentieth century (Hood, 2006). According to Hood (2006) the notion of transparency goes 
far back to the scholars Rousseau, Bentham, and the French Revolutionaries. 
Within the governance doctrine (the earliest field the concept emerged from), transparency is 
characterised as “clearly established and published rules and procedures rather than ad hoc 
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 Other members such parliamentarians and the media can be included. 
33 See Eiti 2005. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Source book. 
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judgements or processes; methods of accounting or public reporting that clarify who gains 
from and who pays for any public measure” (Hood, 2006 p5). Within the governance 
framework therefore, transparency is seen as a public good required to provide the public 
with access to information about state affairs, while eschewing any form of secrecy and 
arbitrariness. A ‘transparent government’ in effect would be one whose activities are clear in 
all aspects to the people governed (Hood, 2006).  
As a measure of transparency and accountability in governance we have seen the 
proliferation of various indexes such as corruption perception Index, open budget index, 
media transparency index, the World Bank’s twin indexes-Economic and institutional 
transparency index and political transparency index among others. Likewise the IMF has also 
introduced various transparency and information disclosure codes
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 to govern activities of 
multinational companies and national governments. The dedication of an entire institution 
such as Transparency International to the promotion of this concept perhaps emphasises the 
ground so far covered.  
It is within this growing wave of transparency that Resource Transparency has developed. 
The EITI discussed previously is also an example of the actual implementation of 
transparency in the resource sector. The belief is that rent seeking activities and endemic 
corruption that has most often engulfed resource dependent nations can be reduced through 
transparency as governments become more accountable through transparency reforms. As 
argued by Stiglitz (2002), the lack of information or the creation of secrets leads to rent 
seeking from natural resources. The clarion call over the years therefore has been for more 
release of information from governments in charge of managing these resources such as oil. 
Governments in resource endowed countries must make accessible information about the 
revenues being generated from the exploitation of resources and how the revenues are being 
distributed or spent. The accessibility of such information would enable the public to hold 
them accountable. Resource transparency in effect also goes with accountability. 
Cavill and Sohail (2004) define accountability as “when agent A is accountable to agent B, 
then agent A is obliged to inform Agent B about agent A’s actions and decisions to justify 
them and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”. For management of 
natural resources, governments (here Agent A) must inform citizens (here agent B) who are 
the rightful owners of the resource. This implies a two way process involving both the 
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citizens and governments playing crucial roles to protect the resource purse. The key defining 
feature about accountability is that, there must be avenues for the citizens to punish 
government officials for misconduct. In democratic countries, this can be seen by way of 
Courts of law, Ombudsman or elections. The link between resource transparency and 
accountability is simply that governments must make accessible information to the public 
(transparency side) and there must be avenues to hold them to account (punish) for 
misconduct (accountability side). 
The actual implementation of transparency and accountability however remains problematic 
globally (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010).  There are gaps between the conceptual and 
theoretical explanations offered above and the actual achievements or implementation. The 
rest of this chapter is devoted to identifying some of these gaps which this research sought to 
address. To achieve resource transparency and possibly accountability there is the need to 
understand first of all who posses and releases the information and the intended outcome of 
the information released. The intricate question one needs to ask is whether the disclosure of 
information necessarily implies transparency. 
3.5 Information Disclosure and Transparency 
In this subsection, I would bring to the fore arguments to explain the often mistaken notion 
that information disclosure implies transparency or accountability.  Achieving transparency 
goes beyond mere information disclosure. The research questions derived from these 
arguments are explored and answered in chapter six and seven by way of evidence from 
fieldwork in Cape Three Point.   
Disclosure of information has most often been misunderstood as transparency. The idea has 
been that reducing the information asymmetry between the agent and the principal implies 
the release of information, which hitherto was lacking in the Principal-agent relationship. 
While the disclosure of information within the model as it pertains to business organisations 
may be a straight forward issue, the same is not applicable to state governance and for that 
matter management of natural resources. While citizens recognise their right to information, 
their ability to access, process and act upon the information to hold governments accountable 
has been the missing link in translating information disclosure into transparency. This 
important hurdle to achieving “real transparency” has been less emphasised in the debates 
and strategies towards achieving transparency in the resource sector. The focus often has 
been promotion of greater media freedoms and bringing pressure to bear on governments to 
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disclose information about their activities.  The mere disclosure of information can be 
described best as theoretical transparency. 
Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) identifies two types of transparency to explain who controls 
information flow and the outcomes we see when it is disclosed. These are Agent controlled 
transparency and Non-agent controlled transparency. According to these authors, both types 
of transparency could have different impacts in the control of corruption.  
Non-agent Controlled transparency involves the investigative and reporting activities of a 
free and independent media. The key feature of this type of transparency is that information 
about the agent is disclosed by a third party who most often could be the media, NGOs or 
whistle blowers. This type of transparency can produce accurate and reliable information 
independent of government influence, which could lead to the exposure and punishment of 
corrupt officials. Another positive side of this information collected and disclosed by 
“impartial” agencies, such as EITI, is that people may have higher confidence in that 
information.  The problem however is that, the independence of the media is not guaranteed 
as we see in most countries. Political patronage has the tendency of influencing the 
objectivity of the media. Stiglitz (1999) makes the point that the media plays a significant 
role in the “conspiracy of secrecy”. For example, in Ghana, even though the media is often 
cited as one of the most independent in the world, it is very partisan (political bias) and often 
reportage is skewed to favour one political party (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012).  
Shiller (2002) and Herman (2002) have demonstrated how media influence is capable of 
providing a biased version of issues. 
Agent controlled transparency, on the other hand, according to Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) 
refers to the release of information by the agent as may be required by laws or other external 
requirements
35
. Governments are forced to release information as a result of laws requiring 
them to. Such sunshine laws or requirements may have been adopted by governments as a 
result of external influence or simply to increase the legitimacy of the government (Lindstedt 
and Naurin, 2010 p305). For example, the Petroleum Revenue Act (PRMA) ACT 815 of 
Ghana puts a responsibility on the government to make available information about the 
revenue flows within the petroleum extraction industry. This type of transparency has the 
potential of reducing corruption in the resource sector as the agents are obliged by law to 
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 This could be for example conditions imposed by donor countries and institutions on resource dependent 
countries. Likewise it could be international agreements such the Kimberley Process for example. 
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behave properly. This however does not concisely cure the rent-seeking problem. Two 
problems are inherent in this transparency process.  
First the information released by the agent (government) is subject to manipulation and 
distortion to serve its interest (Stiglitz, 2002). The provider of the information has a strong 
influence on the type of information provided (Djankov et al., 2001). Rationally a corrupt 
government would not release vital information that exposes its corrupt management of the 
state’s resources, since it risks facing punishment from the people (for example losing 
elections). Assuming however that the agent adheres to moral ethics (which mostly would not 
be the case) and provides accurate information, the end users of the information, the principal 
(citizens) also have a significant role to play. 
This presents the second problem of the agent-controlled transparency process and indeed 
actual achievement of transparency. The ability of the principal to access, process and act on 
the information released is most paramount. If the principal is unable to access the 
information or process the information she receives, then the argument is that Resource 
Transparency has not been achieved. This opens up the debate as to whether the mere 
provision of information by governments (e.g. about revenue flows) about how they are 
managing the resources is enough to be considered as transparency and good governance. 
The argument here as suggested by other researchers (see (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010) is that 
availability of information merely is not enough to constitute transparency, at least the one 
capable of halting the resource curse. The disclosure of information constitutes the building 
blocks of transparency, but not transparency in itself.  
Whereas information availability is necessary it does not constitute transparency, but rather 
could best be referred to as openness or open governance. Openness within governance 
doctrine implies “government operating based on published rules as opposed to arbitrariness” 
(Hood, 2006p14). While governments could be open to their citizens by publishing their 
activities, transparency in its strictest sense goes beyond openness or simple disclosure of 
information. The information must actually be accessible and acted upon by the public. In the 
management of natural resources it is not enough to be open or make information available. 
A cursory look however at the strategies of various transparency and accountability 
initiatives, one would realise that the emphasis has been on information disclosure. For 
example, the IEA-PTRAC survey (discussed in chapter) that measured transparency in 
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Ghana’s oil sector failed to take into account whether the citizens actually received 
information provided by the government.  
The end usage of the released information by the citizens or the principal is the most 
important ingredient in achieving transparency. Both Larsson (1998) and Birkinshaw (2006) 
urges the need to move transparency beyond openness by making information simple and 
comprehensible as well as removing all other obstacles.  Transparency as simply disclosing 
information to the citizens will do little to impact corruption (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010 
p305). 
3.5.1 Nominal vs. Effective Transparency: The Research Questions 
Heald (2006), recognising the seeming misconstruction of openness with transparency, 
provides two alternative clearer concepts. He draws the distinction between Nominal 
transparency and effective transparency. For him, effective transparency would involve the 
ability of the consumers of the information to process the information. This could be likened 
to informed citizenship where the citizens could base their electoral choices on information 
available and understood by them.  
Nominal transparency on the other hand is a mere making available of information which in 
itself is simply a characteristic of government (Heald, 2006p34). According to him the gap 
between nominal and effective transparency is transparency illusion. Such illusion could be 
seen when measures of transparency is increasing on transparency indexes but in reality there 
is no transparency. Thus, is possible for governments to be scoring very high on transparency 
and accountability indices whiles in actuality that may not be the case.  
The arguments by Heald (2006) are supported by other authors. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) 
argues that if transparency were to eradicate corruption “the information made available 
through transparency reforms must stand a reasonable chance of actually reaching and being 
received by the public” (p 302). Ross (2012) also affirms that to achieve transparency, the 
information provided must be accurate and complete. Such information must have undergone 
independent audit and importantly made extensively public at no cost to the public.  To be 
able to measure how effective any transparency efforts are in resolving the resource curse it is 
important to know for example how the information reaches the people, what are their 
information access points and how effective they are. In any case, do people actually receive 
the disclosed information? The first three research questions of this study positioned within 
this remit are: 
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1. To what extent has Ghana EITI given these people access to information on how their 
oil resource revenue is being managed? 
2. Do the people of Cape Three Points have access to information on the revenue flows 
from the oil companies to the state? 
3.  If they do, how do they have access to the information on how the government is 
utilising these oil revenues? 
Heald (2006) further suggests that for transparency to be effective there must be external 
“receptors capable of processing, digesting and using the information” (p. 35). Kolstad and 
Wiig (2009) also emphasis that, apart from access to information, the capacity and incentives 
to process the information provided is important. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) argues that 
transparency must be beefed up with the building up of people’s capacity. Capacity in this 
case could be the educational level of the people (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). The level of 
education of the people would influence their ability to comprehend the information provided 
and act on it. This calls into question the level of literacy in resource rich countries. When the 
level of literacy or education of the citizens are higher the assumption is that their capacity to 
understand, process and act upon the information to hold their leaders accountable will be 
higher.  Following from this the fourth research question is posed: 
4. Do the people of Cape Three Point posses the capacity to process any information 
provided about the management of the petroleum revenues? 
In the presence of available information and even adequate capacity, the willingness of the 
people to access the information and act upon it is also essential. Where political patronage 
exists the people may not be willing to demand accountability from the leaders. As pointed 
out earlier, non taxation in oil economies often provides a lack of incentive for people to 
demand accountability from their leaders. The motivation of the people to avail themselves of 
knowledge about how their resources are being managed is therefore necessary to force the 
governments to do the right thing. Whether citizens are willing to demand accountability in 
the first place is also a critical part of the transparency puzzle. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) 
identifies a lack of demand as one of the factors why information may never reach citizens 
even if it is available. When people feel or believe that certain issues of the state are not of 
interest to them, they would not be enthusiastic about obtaining the information to hold 
leaders accountable even though such information may be available. Thus the fourth research 
question: 
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5. Are the people of Cape Three Point willing to demand accountability from 
government on how the petroleum revenues are being used? 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presents relevant aspects of the resource curse problem pertaining to most 
resource dependent countries. It has been identified that the most important cause of the 
problem is the political aspect involving corruption and rent seeking rather than economic 
aspects previously emphasised. 
The rent seeking and corruption within the extractive sector can be conceptualised as relating 
to information asymmetry created by governments as modelled in the Principal-Agent model. 
An emerging consensus as a solution is to ensure transparency within the sector hence the 
concept of resource transparency. To achieve resource transparency, however, first there is a 
need to differentiate between transparency and mere information disclosure, which often has 
created a misconception. It is argued that for information disclosure to translate actually into 
transparency, the citizens have a significant role to play. The study thus explores the 
information access points, willingness and capacity of citizens to receive process and act on 
available information.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Methodology 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodological framework used in conducting this research. It 
provides details of the participants and means through which the data was collected during 
the fieldwork, analysed and presented. Thus, this chapter highlights the methods used and a 
critical reflection on aspects such as validity, reliability, power relations as well as a 
discussion of some limitations during fieldwork.  
4.1 Choice of Research Methodology 
Research provides a means for knowledge acquisition or inquiry into various facets of human 
life within diverse disciplines. Research methods according to Powell and Myers (1995) 
provide the avenue through which one acquires and constructs knowledge within any 
discipline. The robustness of the research method used goes a long way in making such 
knowledge acquired acceptable or otherwise.  Powell and Myers (1995) assert that for any 
area of knowledge acquisition, the methods used must be relevant and rigorous to ensure 
legitimacy of the work produced. 
As conceptualised by Kitchin and Tate (2000), methodology of a research involves “a 
coherent set of rules and procedures which can be used to investigate a phenomenon or 
situation”. In conducting geographic research, often two broad methodological processes, 
qualitative and quantitative are available to choose from. Quantitative methods are 
distinguished from qualitative methods in terms of the former generating data that can be 
empirically analysed by employing numerical techniques (Lindsay, 1997).  
Both methods have their inherent strengths and weaknesses they bring to bear on any piece of 
research. Creswell (1994) points out that choice of a research method is informed by what the 
researcher is interested in investigating or knowing. Qualitative research methods produce 
data that is rich in information and can enable a researcher to make conclusions about social 
processes in particular settings (Neuman, 2005). This study thus used qualitative methods to 
explore how transparency and accountability is achieved in Ghana’s oil industry from the 
perspective of the people of Cape Three Point. The use of qualitative methods provided a 
platform to gather vital information about how information is accessed in this community, 
people’s perspectives on how transparent the oil revenues have been and how their 
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perceptions have been shaped by their socio-cultural environment, attitudes and economic 
status. 
 
4.1.1 Rationale for choice of method 
Research is about finding knowledge and the choice of methodology should be based on the 
most appropriate method that leads to finding the required knowledge (Kitchin and Tate, 
2000) and should also be capable of answering the tentative research questions. With this in 
mind, researching the issue of transparency in revenue management from the perspective of a 
local community such as the Cape Three Point, would require an in depth interaction with the 
people that can produce quality data.  
Research using qualitative methods has over the years become a dominant approach to social 
research and as pointed out by Crang (2002) “qualitative research has not only arrived but 
gone far”(p647).  Its use within social sciences has similarly been on the rise since the 1980s 
(Huberman and Miles, 2002). Within the field of geography, the increasing trend in the use of 
qualitative methods has been the focus of many books on qualitative and mixed 
methods(Brannen, 1992, Eyles and Smith, 1988, Flowerdew and Martin, 2005, Lindsay, 
1997, Winchester, 2000). Its use in a research has become common practice and therefore 
requires less justification (Limb and Dwyer, 2001) and thus very relevant for this study. 
 
Qualitative research according to Winchester (2000) is about obtaining information about 
human environments and their experiences. In doing qualitative research, one is able to 
describe social phenomenon that occurs naturally. People’s experiences, feelings and 
opinions on a particular subject matter can be elucidated. This a researcher can do through a 
closer interaction with the people studied through data collection techniques, such as 
observation, interviews, focus group discussions and photography.  
  
Winchester (2000) argues that qualitative research answers two fundamental questions 
concerning either social structures or individual experiences or both. According to him, 
social structures are internally related objectives or practices and, within the field of 
geography, could be social, cultural, economic, political or environmental. The focus of my 
research falls within this scope. The relationship involving the citizens on one hand and the 
government on the other is one involving social structures. These structures exist, for 
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example, in terms of government providing information or otherwise to the citizens relative 
to oil revenue accountability and transparency. Within this same socio-political structure are 
citizens whose role is to hold the government accountable. The use of qualitative methods 
would help uncover and bring an understanding of the processes underling this structure. 
Such processes to be uncovered include how government disseminate information and how 
the citizens receive and act on such information. The relevance of choosing qualitative 
methodology therefore cannot be over emphasised.  
 
The second question according to Winchester (Winchester, 2000) that qualitative research 
tackles is about individual experiences. In examining the issue of transparency and 
accountability, there is the need to move from generality to the particular. That is, rather than 
writing about general impacts of transparency initiative, it is important to examine what 
people’s experiences in the actual implementation of such initiatives are. For example, we 
need to find out if the people actually benefit from such initiatives and how their economic, 
geographic location and cultural experiences influence their ability to benefit or not. The use 
of qualitative method in this study thus enables me to get closer to the people to examine 
their experiences regarding transparency and accountability in resource governance.   
 
The use of qualitative research methods in my study is also based on the fact that it is a better 
method to generate data for the type of research questions posed.  That is, qualitative methods 
are more suitable to answer my research questions than quantitative methods. This is 
precisely because my research questions fall within the category of “how” rather than “How 
many”. For example, am interested in knowing how the people of Cape Three Point have 
access to oil revenue information, how Ghana EITI has impacted on them in terms 
disseminating information. These types of questions examines processes and as such do not 
necessarily require numerical counts or quantitative data in order to be answered. 
  
Furthermore, employing qualitative techniques provides context and a voice to local people 
affected by natural resource exploitation. Qualitative techniques give deeper insights into 
processes that construct our social worlds, and by using techniques such as interviews, 
discussions and participant observations, the feelings and knowledge of others can be 
explored (Limb and Dwyer, 2001). The time I spent with the local people gave me an insight 
into their access to information and their perceptions of how government is managing the oil 
revenues. Additionally, observing their body language, moods and reaction to the various 
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themes raised in our discussions provided a vital and holistic picture of their situation, one 
that could not be obtained through quantitative methods.  
4.2 Types of Data: Secondary and Primary Data 
This study was largely based on both primary and secondary data collected from multiple 
sources. Secondary data includes data derived from various existing databases of 
organisations and previous studies undertaken by other researchers. Some of these secondary 
data sources used included the World Bank, Legislative Acts of the Ghanaian Parliament, 
Ghana National Petroleum Company, Ghana Institute of Economic affairs, the Afrobarometer 
among others. Data obtained from these sources are largely used as either background 
information, or to compliment the primary data. Data obtained from these sources were 
evaluated based on the sources independence, reliability and relevance.   
Primary data formed the main information for analyzes and discussions of this research. The 
data was generated based on two months of fieldwork conducted in Ghana and specifically 
the Cape Three Point Community. I obtained the primary data from several sources that 
included local community residents, the traditional authority, and key government and EITI 
officials. To be able to obtain this data in a holistic and complete manner, bearing in mind 
time and limited financial resources available, interviews and observation was utilised. The 
key aim for the use of the two varied techniques to collect data from multiple sources was to 
generally strengthen the validity of the research.  
4.3 Data collection and Sampling techniques 
The research, apart from using two varied but complementary techniques to collect the 
qualitative data, also used different categories of samples or informants. Before describing 
the specific techniques and processes involved, details of the informants and sampling 
methods used are discussed. 
4.3.1 Samples and Sampling techniques  
The research informants can be categorised into three groups. These include the Cape Three 
Point community residents, government officials and Ghana EITI officials. This is shown in 
Table 2 below. The thirty informants selected from the community served as the primary 
informants for the research whiles those in the other three categories served as key 
informants. The option of using multiple units or groups of respondents provided not only an 
advantage of multiple data, but also gave an opportunity for comparison. The multiplicity 
provides an opportunity to obtain a holistic picture and effective use of available time.  
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Table 2: Summaries of respondents and sampling techniques 
Respondent Categories Sample 
Size(units) 
Sampling Technique Data Collection 
technique 
Community Informants 30 Theoretical Sampling Structured 
Interviews/Observation 
Ghana EITI Official 1 Purposive Semi-Structured 
Interview 
Government Official 1 Purposive Semi-Structured 
Interview 
Traditional Leader 1 Purposive Semi-Structured 
Interview 
 
The sampling techniques used in selecting the respondents of each broad category varied in 
each instance. The choice of subjects, their number and procedures used in selecting them are 
critical to the validity of any research work. Glesne and Peshkin (1992) observes that in doing 
research it is practically impossible to interview everyone or observe everything. The number 
and choice of samples in this research was critical to ensure trustworthiness of the research 
findings.  To ensure validity and trustworthiness of results with regards to samples, Crang 
and Cook (2007) proposes the use of theoretical sampling and saturation in such research 
situations. That is enough respondents should be interviewed or observed until the point 
where no new information is being obtained. 
During the fieldwork in Cape Three Point, informants in category 1 (see table 2) were 
sampled based on the idea of theoretical sampling. This was done by selecting households 
within the community. The process involved selecting every other house beginning from the 
main entrance to the community all the way to the fishing beach at the end. In each 
household, one individual is selected to serve as an informant. The chosen person in most 
cases was the head of the household, but in cases where the head is not available any adult 
individual was used. In all thirty individuals including both males and females were used.     
The overriding principle applied here was theoretical sampling mentioned previously. 
Sampling for new households was terminated when enough information had been collected 
and it appeared no significantly new information was forthcoming. Robson (2002) notes that 
a researcher can continue gathering information until a point of diminishing marginal returns, 
that is when you are not adding to what you already have. It has been suggested, for example, 
by writers such as Berg and Lune (2004) that a criterion for fieldwork being conclusive is 
when theoretical saturation is reached.  
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However, for the other categories involving the key informants, a purposive sampling 
technique was used. This type of sampling in principle is based on the investigator’s interest 
or what he deems relevant in obtaining his data  (Robson, 2002).  
Purposive sampling was used to select informants from who a detailed and rich data relevant 
to a research can be obtained (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005). When collecting qualitative 
data, “the number of people we interview, communities we observe, or texts we read is less 
important than the quality of who or what we involve in our research” (Bradshaw and 
Stratford, 2010 p6). The principle thus used in selecting the informants for these categories 
was based on who could provide rich and relevant data. For these data collection units, the 
number of informants was not a factor for consideration. This is because the aim was not to 
obtain data that reflected the views of members of those data collection units (or institutions). 
Rather, information that reflects the state of affairs and policies of the institutions was the 
prime concern. It was therefore necessary to identify and select the respondent that could 
serve the purpose of the research most. The rationale for choosing each of these respondents 
and the details of the data collection techniques and process are discussed below. 
4.3.2 Interviews 
Interview is a data collection technique that involves an interaction between an interviewer 
and a participant or interviewee (Yin, 2011). Crang and Cook (2007) observes a distinction 
between treating interviews as a collection of unbiased data, on the one hand, and interviews 
being a means of constructing inter subjective understanding on the other. Irrespective of how 
it is conceptualised, the underlining notion is that interview involve a conversation leading to 
gathering of data for a study. (Robson, 2002) affirms that interviews potentially bring rich 
data to the fore.  
Interviews could take the form of structured, semi-structured or unstructured. These different 
forms of interviews are linked to the depth of data one seeks (Robson, 2002). In this research, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted and were carried out face to face. Semi-structured 
interviews involves the use of key questions that predetermines the areas of issues to be 
explored and at the same time given room to the researcher to ask follow-up questions for 
clarity or details of a response (Gill et al., 2008).  
4.3.2.1 Semi-structured Interviews with Community Respondents 
A semi-structured interview was conducted in the community to elucidate information on 
various themes. The interview with each of the thirty primary informants in the community 
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lasted usually between forty-five minutes to an hour. On the average about five to six people 
were interviewed a day. The interviews were conducted face-to-face and in the homes of the 
respondents 
To be able to interview the community people, an interview guide containing open-ended 
questions was used to facilitate the interview process. These interview questions were used to 
solicit information from the respondents on various issues.  Examples of open ended where 
framed like: 
 How do people in this community have access to information? 
 Have government officials come to talk to the village about the oil revenues? And if 
they have, often? 
 How do you expect transparency to have impact on your grievances? 
 What do you think the government and the oil companies can do to make information 
about the oil revenues more accessible to you and the community? 
These questions allowed the respondents to provide in-depth responses and have the 
opportunity of sharing their experiences and feelings without being limited. Designing the 
interview questions as described above brought to bear a structure and standardisation. It 
ensured that relevant issues are not glossed over during the conversation. Above all the use of 
the prepared questions prevented me from being drowned in transcribed data during analysis. 
Using the questions enabled me to easily develop codes and categories during the analysis 
stage. 
The questions for the interviews were written in English as it is the language I am most 
proficient in. It was, however, anticipated and proven that most of the informants in the 
community were not proficient in English compared to their local “ahantan” and “nzima” 
spoken dialects. While the service of an interpreter was anticipated to be required, it became 
apparent during the fieldwork that most of the local people spoke the “fanti” dialect, which I 
was equally capable of speaking. Thus the “fanti” dialect was used as a means of 
communication during the interviews.  
The above notwithstanding however, I made notes of their responses in my field note book in 
English for later analyzes as well as recording the interviews.  The duality of language in the 
process of the interview and note taking obviously could lead to misinterpretations and 
misrepresentations in the final analyzes and invariable affect the research’s validity. To avoid 
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this, I took strenuous efforts to paraphrase and ask for confirmation from the interviewees if 
my understanding of their opinion accurately reflects what they tried putting across. Although 
time-consuming, this back and forth process of respondent validation (Yin, 2011) ensured 
accuracy of the data obtained. It also enriches the interaction, since the respondents through 
this realised that I was actively listening to them and regarded their opinions highly. This in a 
way made them more open and enthusiastic about the research.  
4.3.2.2 Semi-Structured Interview with Traditional Leader/Chief 
At the community level an in-depth interview with the traditional chief was conducted. The 
rationale for the choice of this category of key informant was based on the fact that these 
chiefs are in constant touch with the political authorities and at the same time their subjects. It 
is a belief within the Ghanaian setting that traditional chiefs represent the embodiment of the 
hopes and aspirations of their subjects. Traditional leaders, along with their other colleagues 
at the regional level, have, for example, in the past agitated for the payment of ten per cent of 
all oil revenues to the region. It was therefore vital to get their opinions on how they gain 
knowledge of how the oil revenues are being managed. For this research, this group of 
interviewees are not considered as experts when it comes to resource curse and issues of 
transparency however, they represent the embodiment of the people. Their perspectives 
brought richness and contributed partly to the completeness of the data as key stakeholders. 
The chief of the Cape Three Point Community gladly accepted to be interviewed for the 
research. Before interviewing the traditional chief, I made initial inquiry from his household 
with regards to customary demands that needs to be performed before seeing him. Having 
performed the customary demands the chief became available for interaction. During this 
initial interaction, he was made aware of the purpose of the visit to his community. The chief 
showed much interest in the research and scheduled a time for the interview proper.  
The interview with the chief was in depth, semi-structured and lasted for a little over an hour. 
It was conducted in his home. The interview began with a small talk about issues such as 
community life, hierarchical system of the chieftaincy system in their area and their 
relationship with governance process vis a vis the District Assembly system.  
The interview proper was conducted using an interview guide I had prepared before the visit. 
The chief was very open and frank, as the issue of the oil and gas appeared to be important to 
him. He took time to express his opinions on the various subject matters raised during the 
interview. The issues discussed ranged from how much interaction he had had with the 
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government, community grievances with oil related developments, consultations with 
government and knowledge of oil revenues.   
4.3.2.3 Semi-Structured Interview with Ghana EITI coordinator  
The Ghana EITI secretariat implements the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 
Ghana. The secretariat represents one of the key stakeholders in achieving transparency and 
accountability in the extractive industry in Ghana. Their role as key informants in this 
research therefore cannot be over emphasised. This interview aimed at knowing the 
perspective of the experts on how the processes of EITI intended to ensure transparency in 
the natural resource sector impacts on rural communities mostly affected by the exploitation 
of the resources such as Cape Three Points. The interview was in depth and based on an 
interview guide prepared earlier. A sample of the interview guide is included as Appendix 3. 
The interview was recorded for later transcription with prior consent of the respondent.  
Among some of the issues discussed were the institution’s communication channels and its 
impact on information dissemination.  
4.3.2.4 Semi-Structured Interview with Minister for Finance 
Another stakeholder whose position was of absolute importance to the subject matter of the 
research was the government of Ghana. They are by law responsible for the management of 
the petroleum resources hence have a significant role if not the most important in dispensing 
transparency and accountability to the people on whose behalf they are managing the 
resource. As pointed out in previous chapters of this research the petroleum Revenue 
management law tasks the government through its agencies to ensure transparency and 
accountability.  
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was selected as the best option for 
information. The choice was useful to the study because this ministry is directly involved in 
the revenue management aspect of the industry and could possibly contribute to any policy on 
transparency and accountability. Furthermore, this Ministry houses the Ghana EITI 
secretariat and therefore has a direct input in information dissemination as far as the oil 
revenues are concerned.   
For the interview, one of the deputy
36
 Ministers of the Ministry was contacted through his 
secretary. An official appointment was booked for the interview. Whiles I did not encounter 
                                                             
36
 At the time of conducting the interview he was a deputy Minister however at the time of writing he had 
been made the substantive Minister of the Finance Ministry. 
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an earlier anticipated bureaucratic difficulties in booking the appointment, honouring the 
appointment rather was problematic due to a number of challenges. Key among these 
challenges was the death of the sitting President of Ghana during this period. 
The interview with the deputy Minister despite the initial challenges was honoured and was 
informative. The interview was conducted in his office using an interview guide and recorded 
for later transcription and analysis. A sample of the interview guide showing the various 
themes discussed is included in appendix 3. 
4.3.3 Direct Observation 
Qualitative observations involve the taking of field notes on behaviours and individuals in the 
research field (Creswell, 2009). Observation as a data collection strategy is very useful as it 
provides the opportunity for the researcher to perceive at first hand with his own senses 
without any filtering of information (Yin, 2011), as opposed to other strategies.  
The use of observation in this research provided another angle for answering the research 
questions with adequate verifiable data. As pointed out by Kearns (2000) observations 
provide complementary evidence or as Robson (2002) notes can be supportive to data 
collected through other means. Through observation, I was able to directly verify some of the 
things the respondents in the community were saying. It served as a means of collaborating 
and validating what the people told me.  
The overriding aim was to have a firsthand experience of how the local people had access to 
information. This approach contributes to the validity of the research. This is because I could 
directly verify the claims of the community respondents on the issue of access to information. 
For example, when most of the respondents said they do not have access to online or 
newspaper information I similarly observed same since I could not find any newspaper 
vendor to purchase one. Before visiting the village I had a checklist of key things to observe 
during the fieldwork. These included how the people were in contact with the outside world, 
their means of getting information, and their daily life activities.  
I personally tried gaining access to oil related information to see how difficult or easy it was. 
The observations I made during the period were recorded in my field notebook for later 
integration into the other data. The observations also broadened my appreciation of the issues 
from the community perspective, thus shaping my conversations with the community people 
and later the interview with the government and GHEITI officials.  
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As part of the observation process, I made attempts at accessing information through the print 
and electronic media on a daily basis, while staying in the village. The only radio station 
accessible to the community Ankobrah FM was monitored regularly for type and quality of 
information provided in their broadcasts. The village is yet to be connected to the national 
electricity grid hence obviously viewing of television was impossible. Attempts to purchase 
newspapers proved futile just like accessing the internet. Likewise when I tried contacting 
people outside the community, it was practically impossible as my mobile phone’s 
connectivity was unstable and most often unavailable. My experience in accessing 
information from the community brought to bear the reality of living in two separate worlds, 
urban and rural.    
4.5 Characteristics of Informants 
In conducting this research, the primary data as mentioned was based on the observations and 
interviews. For the interviews, in all thirty-three (33) informants were used, out which thirty 
were primary informants and the other three key informants. Obviously there were 
differences in the characteristics of the primary and key informants with regards to their 
socioeconomic status and knowledge levels. These differences impacted on the kind of 
information they provided. For example while most primary informants related accountability 
to development projects at the community level, key informants related it to legal and 
institutional framework. Understanding their background characteristics therefore is critical 
to understanding the research findings. 
4.5.1 Primary Informants 
The thirty primary informants were mainly residents of the Cape Three Point community in 
the Western region of Ghana. They comprised of thirteen (13) males and seventeen (17) 
females. The ages of these informants ranged between 20 years to over 50 years. Specifically, 
7 informants were in the age range of 20-30 years, 10 between ages 31-40 years, another 8 
were in the age bracket of 41-50 and the remaining 5 were over the age of 50. Out of these 
thirty informants, only seven (7) were unmarried and all lived either in their personal homes 
or family homes. 
In terms of educational level, most of them have had little or no education. Those in the 
younger age bracket between 20 to 30 years however have had some basic education. The 
older age groups mostly have had no education. This notwithstanding, literacy level among 
all the age groups was very low. A number of them pointed out their inability to read or write 
58 
 
hence initially hesitated in participating in the research. They were reassured that they would 
not be required to read or write anything during the interview process. 
Because the community is a coastal one, a number of these informants were engaged in the 
fishing sector. Most of the males made livelihoods out of going to the sea to fish whiles the 
female counterparts were either fishmongers or engaged in selling the fishes.  Chapter six 
presents a more vivid description of the Cape three Community that gives a better 
understanding of the social circumstances of these informants. 
4.5.2 Key Informants 
The key informants were made up of three male interviews. These were the traditional chief, 
the deputy government minister and the Ghana EITI coordinator. All three of them were 
above the age of forty (40). 
The traditional chief of the community resides in the community and shares the same 
characteristics as the primary informants. He is however a key informant because he occupies 
a position of authority and has direct interaction with government officials. It was therefore 
expected that he would provide a more in depth perspective with regards to his interaction 
with government as head of the community. 
The other two key informants reside in the capital city Accra and have higher levels of 
education. Each of them have had education up to the postgraduate level and have vast 
working experiences in management. The EITI coordinator for example has been with the 
transparency initiative since its inception. Thus, his perspective on the issue of transparency 
and accountability was of paramount interest to this research.    
4.6 Data Analysis and Presentation 
A suitable approach to conducting qualitative data analysis is to begin in the field during the 
data collection process. This is useful not only because the data is “fresh” and easily 
remembered but also it shapes the results by providing the flexibility in choosing subjects or 
useful data collection sources as well as developing your concepts along the way (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009). Thus, much of the data generated from the 
interviews conducted were transcribed and subjected to some level of analysis (such as 
categorizing, coding and establishing patterns) immediately.  
Dunn (2000) has identified two ways of analysing interview data to be Manifest Content 
analysis and Latent Content Analysis. According to him, while the Manifest approach 
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involves a tally of number times some words appear in an interview transcript, Latent on the 
other hand involves searching the interview document for themes. The Latent content 
analysis was used for analysing the interview and observation data generated in this study. 
The process evolved from transcribing, developing codes, categorizing and reviewing the 
data by themes. 
The first step was to generate a text data by transcribing all the interview recordings. Having 
obtained a printed copy of the transcript, I handwrite at the margins also relevant notes of 
observations logged in my field notebook. This formed the complete text data for my 
analysis.   
The second stage in the analysis was to develop codes that could be assigned to various 
sections of the data. Codes according to Robson (2002) are symbols applied to a portion of 
text to classify or categorize it. The codes were developed with the help of the interview 
guide used for the interview. This is because as mentioned, the guides were well structured 
and pointed to thematic areas of the research. The coding assisted in reducing the large text 
data into smaller form and established a system of patterns and relationships. Most of the 
coding was done with a mind to answering the research questions. After selecting the codes, 
all texts that are similar are assigned same codes and categorized after. 
A further process in the analysis process was to construct a matrix table. The table allowed 
me to cross reference my different respondent categories with the various themes that 
emerged out of the data. Table 6 below is a sample of the matrix table used. 
Table 3: Analysis Matrix 
Respondent/Theme Information 
accessibility 
Impacts Attitudes Grievances 
Government     
Local people     
EITI/Institutions     
Externalities/environmental  
factors 
    
 
Summaries of the text data are extracted and filled into the matrix table. This allowed for 
comparison to identify similarities and differences within the system. From my analysis 
matrix table I could easily see how the opinions of say government differed from those of the 
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respondents in the Cape Three Point community. Also, I could identify what channels 
Government or EITI is using to communicate information and how these channels are similar 
or different from how the people access information. The emerging differences, convergences 
and possible reasons for that occurrence were interesting going through the data. The data 
analysed into the matrix table forms the basis for developing a storyline in the final results 
and discussions.  
4.7 Rationale for choice of Study Area 
The choice of Cape Three Point for the study presented an opportunity to study the issue of 
transparency as a strategy in avoiding the resource curse in the emerging oil and gas industry 
in Ghana. The choice of this village for the research stems from three reasons: 
Firstly, the village lies in the heart of Ghana’s petroleum resources as it is located a short 
distance away from the oil rigs offshore. The advent of the oil industry in the country has led 
to the increasing appropriation of the lands of the people for development of infrastructure 
and other related investments in support of the emerging oil and gas industry. Also, if 
someone should be interested in finding out about the revenues, it should be the communities 
closest to the source especially because in the case something goes wrong and there is an oil 
spill, it is them that will be hit hardest. 
Secondly, it is becoming clear that the fishing industry, which forms the basis of the 
livelihood of the local people, is being threatened by the emerging oil industry. Complaints of 
reduced fishing stocks and restricted fishing zone have abounded with the emergence of the 
industry. This has lead to heightened expectations of the oil revenue being used to develop 
the area significantly and provide alternative livelihoods.  
The third and perhaps the most important reason for the choice of this community relates to 
the demand from traditional leaders of these oil affected communities that 10 per cent of all 
oil revenues should be allocated for the development of the area. In as much as this demand 
may be justifiable, it would be important knowing how these traditional leaders and their 
people have access information about how much revenues are being generated and how it is 
distributed or used. 
 Lack of adequate information or perceived corruption in the management of the revenue has 
the potential to lead to grievances among the inhabitants. This has implications that include 
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civil conflicts. Such implications has been extensively researched on by other authors (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2012, Lujala, 2009, Lujala et al., 2005, Lujala, 2010, Lujala and Rustad, 2012). 
Studying this village gave an in-depth understanding of how local inhabitants access 
information with regard to the oil resources and the meaning they construct out of it. Results 
from this study can also be related to other communities facing similar issues.  
 
4.8 Evaluation of the Methodology  
4.8.1 Trustworthiness, Validity and Reliability  
The need for every research to meet the criteria of validity, reliability and trustworthiness is 
paramount. These concepts, however, mean different things in qualitative research and 
quantitative research (Creswell, 2009). Some of the measures employed during the process of 
data collection and analysis to ensure this research is not only trustworthy but reliable and 
valid to a large extent are discussed subsequently. 
Trustworthiness is more central to qualitative methods. The underlying presumption of 
qualitative data is that texts potentially have multiple meanings and hence its interpretations 
in some ways could be subjective hence the issue of trustworthiness (Graneheim and 
Lundman, 2004). A discussion of trustworthiness in qualitative research takes into account in 
most literatures the concepts of credibility, transferability and confirmability (Graneheim and 
Lundman, 2004). 
 
Credibility as a criterion for trustworthiness pertains to how the methods and procedures 
employed address the focus of the research (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004) and can be 
likened to internal validity (Rolfe, 2006). To ensure credibility in this research the choice of 
research design was important. The use of multiple sources of respondents and data collection 
techniques allowed for the examination of the issues from different perspectives. Gray (2009) 
also argues that the content of the interview questions must be linked directly to the research 
objectives. To ensure credibility and validity of my research I prepared the interview 
checklist beforehand. I ensured the checklists and guides covered relevant and foreseeable 
aspects of the research. More importantly during the interviews process, even though many 
issues emerged during the conversations, I ensured every aspect of my checklist was covered. 
Likewise for the data obtained through observation, it was also controlled with the checklist I 
had prepared. It made me focus on relevant things to take note of during the fieldwork. 
62 
 
Transferability can be equated to external validity (Rolfe, 2006) and relates to the extent to 
which the findings of the research can be transferred to other settings. The ability to 
generalise findings of this research to other geographic settings may be limited. The setting of 
this research is a rural community and has peculiar culture as well as circumstances hence 
cannot be overly generalised to other settings. This notwithstanding, the findings can be 
useful indicators of the situation in other communities in Ghana that are affected by the 
exploration of oil. This is because most of these communities are lying in the coastal areas 
and have very similar cultural and social circumstances to those of Cape Three Points. These 
communities are only separated by few kilometres hence are much alike. 
 
Confirmability of the research relates to how to be able to audit the entire process, remove 
personal biases in the analysis and give opportunity to respondents to verify your conclusions 
(Crang and Cook, 2007). Even though member checks is a popular way of achieving this, 
time and distance between myself and my informants did not give me the opportunity to 
relate back to them my conclusions for verification. This notwithstanding, the back and forth 
verification of responses during the interviews with the informants at the community level 
ensured that their views were accurately recorded. I made it a point to summarise back to 
them their opinions on the various issues that were discussed. Furthermore, personally 
observing things from their perspective provided a way of actually verifying what they were 
saying. For example, if a respondent tells me he does not receive information through the 
television, I could verify this as I could not also access information from that medium.  
5.8.2 Ethical considerations  
Ethics is ‘the conduct of researchers and their responsibilities and obligations to those 
involved in the research....’(Davidson and Layder, 1994 p55) as quoted in (Dowling, 2000). 
As in many research works, ethical considerations are issues not only based on morality but 
also about maintaining standards. In conducting research, researchers have a responsibility of 
protecting research participants and the promotion of integrity of the research (Creswell, 
2009). It has been pointed out by other authors that ethical dilemmas must be anticipated and 
addressed far ahead of conducting the research proper (Berg, 2001, Creswell, 2009, Punch, 
2005). This research took into account a number of ethical issues and planned for them 
during the preparatory stages.  
The first and perhaps most important is the issue of confidentiality and anonymity. It was 
important that anyone reading my research report would not able to easily know the identity 
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of my respondents. This is because some of the issues touched on pertains to judging 
government performance and could lead to potential future victimisation. Dowling (2000) 
proposes the use of pseudonyms and masking of identities. To ensure anonymity, the identity 
of my subjects (such as names) were not sought and used in this research report. In instances 
where respondents need to be referred to, their positions within their institutions are referred 
to rather than their names. Also, materials accessed during the research that are deemed 
confidential are treated as such.  
Furthermore, informed consent was given critical consideration. Because most of the research 
involved direct interaction with subjects, adequate permissions were sought beforehand. In 
seeking permissions for interviews, adequate and relevant information about the research 
such as purpose, methods and intended uses (Crang and Cook, 2007) were provided. Potential 
respondents who felt uncomfortable were promptly allowed to opt out. 
Also, it was necessary and desirable to use a tape recorder to capture the interviews for later 
transcription. This however is an important ethical issue hence the consent of the participants 
were first obtained. And finally, efforts have been made to produce respondents’ views as 
accurately as possible not only for ethical reasons, but also to ensure trustworthiness of 
results.    
5.7.4 Power relations 
Researchers and their informants occupy different speaking positions and likewise have 
different capacities to change situations and people (Dowling, 2000). Differences between the 
researcher and respondents such as knowledge levels produce power relations. 
Power relations played some role in this research in a number ways as anticipated and it was 
important for me to plan and deal with them head on as advised by (Crang and Cook, 2007). 
Some of the interactions with the respondents that may have power relations embedded in 
them were anticipated, identified and appropriate measures considered before the fieldwork 
began.  
The first of these has to do with the interaction with the local inhabitants of Cape Three 
Points. As a researcher coming from outside their rural community and having a better 
knowledge in the subject matter, the possibility of me dominating was anticipated.  This type 
of power relation has been characterised by England (1994) as potentially exploitative 
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relationships. Having envisaged this, the situation was dealt with by engaging with the 
respondents more cordially both in terms of framing questions and my body language.  
The second aspect has to do with interviewing the traditional leaders, GHEITI national 
coordinator and government officers. This group of respondents are not only knowledgeable, 
but also wield political power, hence the balance of power tilted in their favour and 
potentially could have affected the interviews with them. To ensure this anticipated power 
relations did not affect the data collection, I had to prepare adequately by reading and being 
conversant with background knowledge on the various topics raised during the interview.  
In sum, dealing with power relations in this research required that me being flexible and able 
to reflect on situations before and during the data collection process. 
5.8.3 Fieldwork Experiences and Limitations 
The entire research and especially the fieldwork has been an interesting experience and 
represented an important element in my learning curve. 
 The choice of research topic at the initial stages was perhaps one that involved a lot of 
thoughts and interactions with my supervisor. A number of important factors were 
thoughtfully considered. The need to make a balance between my interests, resources (time, 
financial, knowledge base), and what is relevant in the contemporary literature were critical 
factors. The determination of a research methodology was also important issues determined.  
Whiles the choice of Qualitative methods allowed the necessary data to be obtained and used 
to answer the research questions posed; it equally came with some challenges. The use of 
qualitative techniques and data is not straight forward like in quantitative. It requires a lot of 
careful analysis to avoid personal biases. Thus, I made strenuous efforts in reading around 
this methodology.  
During the fieldwork proper the experience likewise was very interesting despite the 
challenges faced. It is important to mention that the data collection and analysis processes 
were dynamic, fluid and constantly changed. For example different issues were highlighted 
during the interactions which hitherto were unknown to me and invariably affected the 
development and refining of the research questions. 
An important challenge during the fieldwork worthy of mention was the untimely death of 
the President of Ghana. This did not only psychologically affected me personally but also 
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made it difficult having access to government officials for information. As the nation was in a 
mourning mood it practically made it unreasonable and difficult to approach people to 
participate in the research.  
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Chapter FIVE 
Background of Study Area 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a background description of the Cape Three point Community as the 
study area of this research. The chapter provides basic information about the geography of 
the area, economic and social aspects of the community and, most importantly, issues related 
to the community as an emerging resource community. Resource community as used refers to 
a community affected by the exploitation of natural resources. The presentations here are 
mostly based on information obtained during the fieldwork and where otherwise, references 
are provided. 
As typical of most developing countries, Ghana’s development is characterised by a spatial 
variation in terms of socioeconomic development. This variation is made manifest in terms of 
the rural-urban divide. The variation between rural and urban communities is marked by 
sharp differences in economic and social life of people living in either side. These differences 
range from infrastructural development, to access to social amenities among others. 
5.1 Geography of Cape Three Point 
Cape Three Point is one of many rural communities in Ghana. Locally, the community is 
referred to as Andenle (in the Nzema Language) or Akyenkyin (in the Ahanta Language). The 
name Cape Three Point is derived from the shape of the shoreline that houses the community. 
It is a small coastal community, more or less a peninsular protruding into the Gulf of Guinea 
sea, as can be seen from Figure 1. 
The community is located on longitude 0
0
 and latitude 0
0
 and thus often referred to as the 
“land nearest nowhere” (see FIG 1 below). The geographic location of the community is not 
only the most southerly point of Ghana, but also of the West African coastal line. Cape Three 
point is situated between Akwedaa and Princess Town. Other similar communities lining the 
west coastal strip include Discove, Miamia, Axim, Buma and Butre. 
 
For administrative governance, the community falls within the Ahanta West District in the 
Western Region of Ghana. The Western Region is home to the oil and gas development 
projects and has been noted in the past for its vast natural resources, such as forestry, gold 
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and rubber. The Western Region is the largest producer of cocoa and timber as well as the 
second highest producer of gold. 
 
 
Figure 5: Map and Aerial image of Cape Three Point 
  
Source: Google Earth and Ghanawestcoast.com 
The total population of the community is estimated to be about 900 inhabitants and is 
comprised of 200 and 430 adult males and females respectively (CRC, 2011). Like many 
other rural communities, homes in Cape Three Point are built from local materials; mostly 
clay and bamboo with iron roofing. There are around 100 houses in the community with an 
average of 7 people residing in each house (CRC, 2011). Most of these houses are owned 
privately by the households residing in them. The spatial arrangement of the homes makes 
the community a close knit one.  
5.2 Accessibility and Social Development 
The physical accessibility of the community is very poor and cumbersome. Cape Three Point, 
like its neighbours, is linked to the nearest major town Agona by a feeder road network. 
Travelling on this undulating road takes about an hour or more depending of the season and 
type of transportation. During the rainy season, vast stretches of the road, for example, 
become impassable preventing access to the community.  
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The community likewise has limited communication with the outside world. There is no 
internet service provider making available internet services in the community. The cost of 
computer and accessories to access and provide information online is beyond the pockets of 
many of the inhabitants.  Email and sourcing information online is, therefore, yet to be part of 
the community’s life. Even though there is a proliferation of radio stations in Ghana, the 
community has access to only one, Ankobrah FM. This makes accessibility to diverse 
information resource difficult.   
Out of the current five mobile communication networks, only one can be accessed from the 
community. For the inhabitants who can afford mobile phones, they can only use the Airtel 
network. Even with this limited choice, strength and availability of the network is not 
guaranteed throughout the community at all times. 
The social developments in the community are similar to those of other rural communities in 
Ghana. The community has a primary school and a junior high school staffed with just 10 
teachers (CRC, 2011). Other basic social amenities such as running water, electricity and 
health care are not available in the community. 
The community has no access to electricity, hence most rely on fuel wood and other 
traditional means to obtain energy for cooking and lighting up their homes. Even though in 
the past, the Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority (GPHA) had provided them with a generator 
to provide light, the high cost of fuel has rendered it impractical (CRC, 2011). The lack of 
electricity inadvertently influences much of the people’s life. For example watching 
television in the evening which is a common feature of most Ghanaian homes is absent in the 
community. 
A borehole and a public bathroom facility situated at the entrance of the community 
exemplify the water and sanitation predicament of the community. There is no access to 
potable drinking water in the homes of the inhabitants.  The single borehole serving over 900 
inhabitants is insufficient and its location at the very entrance of the community makes it also 
less convenient to use.  
For health care, inhabitants often rely on traditional healers living within the community. For 
those who require hospital care, they have to be transported by sea with canoes to the nearest 
hospital in Discove, a nearby town. This has negative impact on the healthcare delivery of the 
community.  
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5.3 Community Livelihoods 
As typical of most coastal communities, fishing is the dominant economic activity of the 
people. Apart from fishing, other economic activities include farming, commerce (petty 
trading) and, to a limited extent, tourism. Most of these other livelihood activities are 
however, very much dependent on the fishing industry.  
5.3.1 Fishing  
This livelihood activity is very common to all communities along the coast of Ghana. In Cape 
Three Point, artisanal fishing predominates rather than industrialised fishing. They use 
traditional fishing methods and equipment, such as paddled canoes designed and crafted by 
the locally. In recent times however, through government interventions, some canoe owners 
have begun to use canoes mounted with outboard motors. Fishing is a year-round activity, 
while catches vary dependent on the season.  
The local fishing “industry” employs men and women as well as children. The men usually 
are those that go out into the sea to bring in the fish. While a few men form the crew of a 
canoe, others also help in dragging the nets ashore. Therefore the proceeds from a fishing trip 
are distributed among the canoe owner, crew and those who help in the pulling of the nets.  
The women are also active in the industry and work with processing, storage and marketing. 
After a successful fishing expedition, the women process the catch by either salting or 
smoking. The women later sell the fish in the Agona Nkwanta market, or to the tourist chalets 
in the area.  
Apart from those actively engaged in the fishing activities, there are other inhabitants who 
also provide ancillary services to generate income of their own. There are those who are 
engaged in carving out the canoes, or mending them when they are damaged
37
. Also, there 
are women who sell food at the fishing landing beach to men returning from sea. The 
children, on the other hand, assist their parents in performing most of the fore mentioned 
activities. The younger children do not, however, go out into the sea.   
5.3.2 Other livelihood Activities 
Farming is secondary to fishing in Cape Three Point. Most of the inhabitants have farms 
where they cultivate various crops with the most common being cassava. The farming is 
mostly engaged in by women and children. The men usually help out during the off-peak 
fishing season. Produce from the farms is most often consumed by the individual households. 
                                                             
37 Some fishermen also do these activities by themselves during their spare time. 
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Surplus produce is sold locally in the community or at the Agona Nkwanta market to 
supplement the household income. 
Some inhabitants (usually the women) are engaged in petty trading. This involves the selling 
of basic items such as soap, milk, stationary and sweets that they obtain from the Agona 
Nkwata market. These items are sold to their fellow inhabitants in makeshift table-top stalls. 
Some are also engaged in selling farm produce and cooked food. 
Despite the potential, tourism is not fully developed in the community. The community’s 
capes, sandy beaches, a sign post with arrows showing the exact locations of cities such 
Tokyo, Brasilia, New York among others and an old lighthouse are conducive tourist 
attractions (see Figure 2). Even though there has not been significant investment to promote 
tourism in the area, there are a few companies providing services for tourists in the area. A 
few inhabitants also rely on the tourist industry for their livelihoods. Most are employed by 
the tourist companies providing lodging to visitors to the area, while others work as tour 
guides. Some home owners in the community also receive income from renting out rooms to 
tourist workers from other communities. The number of inhabitants employed in the tourism 
industry, however, is very few.   
Figure 6: Tourist sites: Old Lighthouse and Sign Post 
  
Picture source: Ghanawestcoast.com 
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5.4 Cape Three Point as a Resource Community 
The discovery oil and gas resources a few kilometres offshore away from the community 
have propelled Cape Three Point on to the national and international stage. A Google search 
of “Cape Three Points” would result in several hits linked to exploration of Ghana’s oil and 
gas resources. The discovery of oil and its anticipated impact on development have raised 
expectations of the community. 
Even though the oil production is offshore, the development of a petrochemical industry, and 
gas infrastructure, as well as other related activities in the region, is expected to impact on 
this coastal community as well. While the people are yet to see any meaningful benefits from 
the oil find on their community, they do already have some misgivings. As an emerging 
resource community they have already began experiencing some negative consequences. 
Some of these concerns are highlighted below:  
5.4.1 Emerging Livelihood Impacts 
Some of the inhabitants interviewed have attributed the decline in fish catches in recent times 
to the oil activities offshore. For them, the number of fish they have been catching has 
reduced significantly since the discovery of oil in 2007. They also claim that they have lost 
access to fishing territories on the high sea, especially areas close to the oil rigs. For safety 
reasons, a 1000m exclusionary zone has been established around the floating production, 
storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel used for oil production, (Tullow Oil Ghana, 2009).  
Fishermen are not allowed to fish within this zone. 
Furthermore, the inhabitants claim that significant amounts of seaweed have been washed 
onto their shore line. More problematic is that seaweed is often caught in their nets 
hampering fishing. These occurrences are new to them and have not been a problem in the 
past until oil production began.  
While I have not verified their claims independently, there may be reason to believe that they 
may have some merit. The Environmental impact assessment report of the Jubilee Partners 
for example identifies that most of the pelagic fish species of the area are attracted to the oil’s 
FPSO and as long as they remain under it or within the exclusion zone, fishermen cannot 
access it (Tullow Oil Ghana, 2009) 
5.4.2 Land Grabbing 
Another emerging issue of concern is the rate at which lands of the inhabitants are being 
appropriated by investors (both in the oil and tourism industry) and politicians, all in 
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preparation for the expansion of the oil industry in the area. Most farmlands have been sold 
off in anticipation of a planned relocation. This land problem is not peculiar to Cape Three 
Point alone. For example, the shoreline of Busua, a nearby community has been sold off and 
in future the fisher folks in the community would have no space to dock their fishing vessels 
or canoes (CRC, 2011). The chief of Cape Three claimed that government representatives 
had hinted at relocating the community in the early days after oil was discovered. When these 
relocations would take place is until now unknown. What is certain however is that the 
inhabitants have and are losing their farmlands. 
5.4.3 Unnecessary Intrusion 
The oil discovery has also brought about the disturbance of the solitude of the people of Cape 
Three Point. People are trooping the village to see the Community associated with the oil 
find. Some other people have also visited the community in anticipation of finding oil jobs 
(CRC, 2011). These frequent visits have brought about some discomfort to the inhabitants. 
Interestingly, it is not only the curious “oil tourists” and “ignorant oil job-seekers” intruding 
the village that has incurred anger. The frequent visits by researchers including NGOs and 
students according to the local people is creating nuisance. For some of them, they have 
vowed not to cooperate any longer with these researchers
38
. This is because over the period, 
findings of these researches have not been shared with them and also no promised 
interventions have taken place in the community after the researchers have collected their 
data and left.   
5.4.4 Expectations and Unfulfilled Promises 
As pointed out, the announcement of the oil find brought with it excitement and expectations 
by all Ghanaians. The people of Cape Three Point closest to the oil rigs were no exception. 
Expectations of job opportunities and social development in the community have been very 
high.  
These expectations according to the people were further heightened by government promises 
made in the early days of the oil find. A promise such as relocation to a relatively developed 
community is still not fulfilled. Most of these promises are yet to be fulfilled and local people 
find it difficult to gain employment within the oil industry. For now, they have to contend 
with their social problems and underdevelopment while waiting for government to fulfil its 
promises.  
                                                             
38 This created some initial problems for this researcher in finding respondents during the fieldwork.  
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5.5 Summary  
This chapter provided a background to the research study area. The presentation here dwelt 
mainly on the nature of the Cape Three Point community. From this chapter it is easy to 
picture life in this community and the problems they face. More importantly, the 
community’s link to the oil industry and corresponding emerging impacts are pointed out. 
This sets the stage for further discussions and analysis of the findings of this research in 
subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Access to Information and EITI Impact 
 
6.0 Introduction  
We are reminded by Kolstad and Wiig (2009) that achieving transparency is not simply about 
making information available, but other intervening factors, such as political will, 
competitiveness of the media, educational level of the citizens and their resources to make 
use of the information provided are key.   
Two key issues have been identified so far as necessary ingredients to make transparency 
initiatives work. First, government and private actors must make information readily 
available to the general public. Second, the citizens have a certain responsibility of accessing 
such information and using it as a tool to hold the managers of the resource to account.  
This chapter therefore examines how citizens, particularly the people of Cape Three Point, 
have access to information about the management of the petroleum revenues in Ghana. It 
looks at the impact of the Ghana Extractive Industries Initiative (GHEITI) in informing the 
people. Further, factors inhibiting people’s knowledge of management of the oil revenues are 
discussed.  
6.1 Access to Information channels 
People’s power to demand accountability from government actors depends on the availability 
of information to them. Thus, one of the key issues for consideration in this research was to 
investigate whether the people of Cape Three Point have access to information on the revenue 
flows from the oil companies to the government, and also how they have access to such 
information at the community level. This is important because it would reflect the level of 
transparency in the management of the oil revenues. When people have a means of obtaining 
information that is both reliable and trustworthy, then their ability to know what is going on 
becomes higher. Consequent to this, I examined the information access points of the 
community.     
Interviews with the people in the community and their traditional leader, as well as my own 
observation revealed that listening to the radio is the most important source of information in 
the community. Almost all those interviewed cited Ankobrah Fm, a privately owned radio 
station, to be their main source of information. The main language of transmission is the local 
‘fanti’ which is to the language spoken by most of the people.    
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It was common to see people glued to their portable battery powered FM radio receivers most 
times of the day beginning from the early Six O’clock news bulletin. From the men resting at 
the fishing landing beaches to the women selling in their make-shift table stalls listening to 
the radio appear to be a defining part of their day’s activities. Enquiring much further into 
why the radio is a popular source of information in the community, some of my interviewees 
pointed out that they do not listen to the radio only for information but also it serves as a 
source of entertainment. Listening to local music and other programmes broadcasted in their 
local language keeps them entertained.   
Most of those interviewed in the community noted that while they obtain some small amount 
of information from town hall meetings, they however have little or no information at all 
from other sources such as the television, newspaper, or Internet. This finding would not be 
surprising to anyone who has visited and observed the community. For example, the people 
cannot access television information, not perhaps due to affordability, but rather because the 
community is not connected to the electrical grid. It was apparent also that there was also no 
newspaper vending point in the community.  
In terms of trustworthiness of the information they obtain, interviewees generally trust what 
they hear from their “single source” radio station. Some of the interviewees pointed out that 
they have no other alternative than to trust what is broadcasted on the radio since getting 
information from other sources is limited.  Interestingly however, a few of my interviewees, 
especially the women were of the view that they trust information from town hall meetings. 
For example, one of them said “.....when we go to the community centre, the things they tell 
us we believe and we do as they say”. The community centre referred to by this interviewee is 
a meeting hall in the community. Often health education and some form of immunisation take 
place there. Health promoters visiting the community meet with the local people at that 
community centre.   
The key point is that both the radio and the town hall meeting are entry points or channels of 
communicating information to the people.  Obviously, it becomes an opportune avenue that 
can be exploited for any outcome. People who wish to spread false information to create 
mistrust leading to conflicts and antagonism can use such avenues to effect. Government and 
its agencies have a similar opportunity to reach out to the people with reliable, accurate and 
timely information. Thus, government and other agencies such as the EITI, PIAC can 
disseminate information about the management of the oil revenues using for example the 
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radio or town hall forums to good effect. The question then is whether or not such 
information has been made available in this way. 
6.2 Ghana EITI Reports and Information dissemination 
A key aspect of GHEITI’s activities involves the production of reports on its findings and 
dissemination of information to the public. Without information dissemination and 
communication, the underlining basis for pursuing transparency would be lost. The 
communication strategy adopted and its intended impacts are critical in achieving the 
institution’s stated objective to develop and implement a revenue disclosure, oversight and 
publication mechanism to ensure that Ghanaians get all the information on their 
extractive industry revenue and public expenditure enabling them hold the government to 
account (Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 2006). 
The institution since its launch in 2004 has produced seven audit reports on the mining sector 
covering company payments and government receipts spanning the period of 2004 to 2009
39
. 
Regarding the oil sector, GHEITI produced its first audit report covering the sector in the last 
quarter of 2012. Prior to this report, they had produced several newsletters covering the 
revenues in the oil sector. 
The institution has developed and costed a communication strategy it is using in 
disseminating its findings and recommendations to the general public in line with its 
objectives.  The communication strategy contained in GHEITI’s work plan includes both 
direct and indirect communication mechanisms. Some of the direct communication means 
being adopted includes the use of publications on its website, printing of hard copy audit 
reports, quarterly publication of newsletters, and workshops. 
The institution has established a comprehensive website for information dissemination. On 
the website, one can easily access a number of publications covering various audit reports 
and activities being undertaken by the secretariat. This provides a one stop shop for firstly 
knowing what the initiative is about and secondly accessing audit reports that cover company 
payments and government receipts. Beyond this electronic media outlet, printed versions of 
newsletters and audit reports are readily available from the secretariat. They can be obtained 
upon demand by anyone.   
                                                             
39
 See Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Gheiti Reducing Poverty Through Revenue 
Transparency in the Extractive Industires. In: GHEITI, G. E. I. T. I. (ed.). Accra, Ghana GHEITI. 
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In my interview with the National Coordinator, he reveals that GHEITI also has undertaken 
several outreach programmes to spread awareness about its programs and disseminate 
information to various stakeholders. Several sensitisation workshops have been organised for 
officials of MMDAs, mining companies, CSOs, community leaders and the media on 
activities and findings of the organisation (GHEITI, 2011a). Some of these workshops have 
been organised at the community level, especially in the mining communities. During such 
forums, participants are given the opportunity to ask questions for further clarifications on 
presentations given by GHEITI officials. 
 
Figure 7: A GHEITI Community Forum Session 
 
Source: Initiative (2011). 
GHEITI has also employed other indirect communication strategies to provide information to 
the public. These mainly have been through the media, both print and electronic. The media 
has been producing news items on the various workshops and sensitisation activities of the 
organisation
40
. Also more importantly, portions of the EITI reports have been published in 
the national daily newspaper, Graphic.  
6.2.1 Impact of EITI information dissemination   
As mentioned, transparency initiatives are as good as they are only if they translate into 
providing accessible information to the intended public. Thus, any communication 
mechanism adopted by transparency initiatives or institutions must in the long run lead to an 
informed citizenry capable of holding authorities accountable. This study however reveals 
                                                             
40 See for example:  Ghana News Agency. 2012. First GHEITI Report On Oil And Gas Expected In September. 
Ghana News Agency.  
Myjoyonline.Com. 2011. Ghana achieves EITI compliance status. Myjoyonline. 
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that Ghana EITI had not had much impact on the People of Cape Three Point in terms of how 
much they knew about the oil revenues. 
It became obvious during my fieldwork that many people in the community have not heard 
about GHEITI or their role in promoting transparency in the extractive industry. When I 
explained to them what GHEITI was and how they could get information from the institution, 
most of my interviewees were sceptical as to how the initiative can have any impact in the 
community. For example one interviewee asked interestingly that “....if these people 
[GHEITI] are in Accra [capital city], how can we in the village benefit? When told about the 
community sensitization workshops being undertaken by GHEITI, they still insisted no such 
thing had occurred in their community since the exploration of the oil began in 2007. 
Interestingly, I was expecting perhaps the Traditional Chief to have had some interaction with 
GHEITI at the regional level at least or some other forum. However, his knowledge of 
GHEITI was not different from those of his subjects. He had not heard about the transparency 
initiative or received any information from them before.  
One key realisation from all of this is that information is available but the information is not 
reaching the people. Publishing reports on GHEITI websites, Newspapers, among others 
which are not accessible to the Cape Three Point community has denied the people an 
opportunity to benefit from the initiative. For a community such as Cape Three Point closest 
to the oil fields to have little or no knowledge about the oil revenue reports and newsletters 
from GHEITI reflects to an extent a disconnect between the people and the Communication 
strategy of the institution. Online websites may serve theoretically large populations, but in 
reality critical stakeholders, such as people in Cape Three Point, can be disadvantaged. The 
issue goes beyond a mere recognition of the community as being a rural community with 
information deficits typical of most rural areas. It also reflects information gaps and deficits 
in the Ghana EITI communication strategy and perhaps government as a whole.     
One must take into account at this point of the fact that Cape Three Point is not a mining 
community and GHEITI’s focus over the years had predominantly been on the mining sector. 
To be fair, the possibility of these findings to be significantly different if the research had 
focused or included a mining community cannot be ignored. This notwithstanding, the 
interest of the people of Cape Three Points is nevertheless important like all other Ghanaians 
irrespective of the natural resource under consideration. Also, being closets to the oil 
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exploration field, they should be aware how much the companies are paying to the 
governments.  
It is also worthy of note that these findings are consistent with other research findings. In July 
2009, the Ghana EITI appointed a communications consultant who assessed the level of 
awareness of the initiative among various stakeholders. The survey concluded that awareness 
of EITI was very low (Yankah, 2009). For example, in the survey conducted, out of 15 media 
houses contacted, only 3 with nationwide coverage (Ghanaian Times, Ghana News Agency 
and Daily Graphic), had some broad knowledge of the initiative and its objectives. 
Interestingly, most media houses surveyed in even the mining areas repeatedly asked what 
the EITI acronym stood for (Yankah, 2009). This gives an indication that whether it is in the 
mining or oil exploration area, the situation is not so different.  Again, the country validation 
report in 2010 recognised the various efforts being made by GHEITI in the dissemination of 
information, but also pointed out the consistent low levels of awareness of EITI among all 
stakeholder groups (IDL Group, 2010).  
The implication of this is that there is still a gap in the dissemination of information to the 
public in general and the people of Cape Three Point in particular. The national coordinator 
of the GHEITI secretariat, while emphasising the target audience of the initiative to be 
everybody, acknowledges the possibility of the People of Cape Three Point and others not 
being aware of the activities and publications of the organisation. He argues that despite the 
various communication avenues provided, people have different interests and thus will not be 
bothered to access such information if they are not interested. He points out that “.....oil and 
gas issues are technical issues, is not everybody that is interested, you can even go and ask 
somebody within the Ministry of Finance here if he has heard about EITI and he will say 
no!”  The coordinator in fact may not be far from wrong. It was pretty obvious most people I 
enquired from about the location of his office had no idea about EITI or let alone its offices 
within the same building they were also working. 
The Coordinator further laments the reading culture of Ghanaians and aptly paraphrases a 
popular Ghanaian axiom: 
“In Ghana if you hide something in a book that is the safest place you can hide it”. 
These arguments are not farfetched and perhaps reflect a situation possibly faced by the EITI 
in other developing countries implementing the initiative. It fits well with the writings of 
81 
 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) that achieving transparency is not only about making information 
available but dependent on other factors such as media competitiveness and level of 
education of the people. 
The implication of this for transparency and accountability is that the danger of targeting a 
certain special group of people as  the gatekeepers or those “worthy” to have access to 
information regarding resource management is real.  For example, following the much touted 
NEITI audit reports of Nigeria’s oil sector, Shaxson (2009) reveals that such reports, even 
though they made information available, only empowered the elites and the technocrats as 
opposed to the ordinary citizens. The tendency for the larger public who do not have access 
to this information to hold misconceptions about the way the state is managing the resource is 
high. Such misconceptions or lack of information can fuel agitations and possibly conflicts. 
The possibility of the technocrats and the elites bowing to political pressure is also greater 
compared to the wider public being the drivers of change or those holding the government 
accountable. The need to make information available at the local level and most importantly 
communities affected by extraction activities, as suggested cannot be underestimated in 
achieving real transparency and accountability. 
6.2.2 Making information more available  
On the specific issue of information dissemination to the public at the grassroots level, the 
GHEITI coordinator makes a cogent suggestion that, civil society organisations are critical 
stakeholders with representation on the ground who must take their reports and make it more 
readily available to people. According to him “....CSOs takes our report and hit the ground 
running with it, in fact their presence is on the ground, they educate the people, and they 
empower them”. He underscores the challenge of GHEITI of not having presence everywhere 
in the country as compared to the CSOs. Thus CSOs ought to inform, educate and empower 
those at the grassroots through community forums. Interestingly however, in Cape Three 
Point, there is no presence of any CSO doing oil related work there. 
While the Coordinator’s suggestion about the role of CSOs is good, it also brings to the fore 
the need for the EITI international governing board to critically examine and define the role 
of CSOs as stakeholders in the EITI process. If they are to be regarded as playing a principal 
role in information dissemination, as opposed to mere audience or participants, it should be 
clearly stated and advocated. More civil society organisations with representatives at the 
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grassroots level, especially within extractive communities, must be actively engaged in the 
EITI process. They would then be able to transfer the information to the people. 
Also, the coordinator during the interview revealed that as part of making information more 
available they have included a representative of the District Assemblies affected by the 
extractive industries on the new GHEITI National Steering Committee. This representative is 
supposed to serve as a point of focus for information when needed by people at the local 
level. Beyond this, the need and ability of GHEITI to establish its proposed community 
information resource centres in various communities especially those in the extractive areas 
would be important for information dissemination. 
6.3 Knowledge of Oil Revenue Management 
Beyond the low impact of EITI, it was still interesting to examine whether or not the people 
have information about how the oil revenues are being managed and if they do, how they 
come by such information. This is particularly necessary because, apart from the EITI, the 
media, CSOs, PIAC and government itself are avenues through which information can be 
obtained.  
The local people interviewed for this study all agreed that at their community level they knew 
very little about how much was being paid by the oil companies to the government and what 
government in turn was using the revenues for. Even though they listen most often to the 
radio, they hardly hear such issues being discussed or some information being given. Most of 
the people interviewed in the community were of the view that neither government nor other 
organisations have been providing them with adequate information about the oil revenues 
being generated and how it is being spent. An interviewee said “the radio hardly speaks 
about it (oil revenues) and even if they do its just politicians arguing over it.....” another 
interviewee also said “we don’t even know how the oil looks like, so the money is beyond our 
knowledge”.  
These views were not only shared by ordinary people, but also by the traditional leader of the 
community who also had his own concerns. According to him, in the early days of the oil 
find, government officials came to meet them to discuss resettlement plans as their village 
was to be used by the oil workers and related projects. Beyond these initial visits, no one has 
come to discuss or tell them anything. What has visited them rather is the “curse” of sea 
weeds on their coasts making life unbearable especially for their fishermen. According to 
most of the interviewees and the traditional leader, most of their lands have been acquired by 
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government, politicians and investors in fervent anticipation of the oil industry in the near 
future. No one has told them, however, the size of revenues so far, or what these revenues are 
being used for. 
The point raised by the interviewee about politicians arguing about the management of the oil 
revenues gives an indication of a lack of clarity in information dissemination. Even though it 
was only one interviewee who raised this concern, it provides another side of the story. That 
is, the possibility that information about the oil revenues is being provided through their 
“radio” but they find it difficult to understand or make meaning out of the information.  
Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012) has underscored the partisan nature of the Ghanaian 
media and further notes how so many untrained but practicing journalists are political in their 
reportage and commentaries.  When politicians and such journalists with partisan interests are 
those debating these issues sometimes it becomes difficult for the ordinary person to decipher 
the truth and objective details. Political debates are good and serve as a form of public 
scrutiny, but for local people, the media must be clearer when putting out information about 
oil and other extractive revenues. In effect there must be clarity in the information being 
provided.   
In examining my data, it was also notable that the lack of information was also reflected in 
what people think about transparency in the sector.  One of the most notable consensuses in 
opinion among the people interviewed was that government has not been transparent about 
how it has been managing the resource. The discontent and negative perception about the 
management of the revenues is illustrated in this statement by a respondent “we don’t know 
anything going on, all we see is the plane above [pointing to a moving helicopter in the sky] 
carrying the oil in the sea to Accra everyday!”Another interviewee made even a more 
scathing claim that because “the government is spending all the oil money hence no 
electricity and development here”.  
It was often the case that they equated transparency to development. For them, so far as there 
has not been any significant transformation in the socioeconomic development of their 
community since the inception of the oil revenues, government has not been transparent. 
Their opinion it appeared was being shaped by the fact that they have no access to 
information and at the same time they are not seeing any transformation in their community 
in terms of development. One interviewee suggested that “if government wants us to see what 
84 
 
they are doing with the money, then they should come and build our road and schools for 
us”.  
On the contrary, the people’s view about transparency differs from the conservative but 
optimistic views of the government minister and the Ghana EITI coordinator as well. While 
eschewing complacency, the government minister made a forceful statement about how 
transparent they have been; 
I can say we are the most transparent of all, is about the implementation. In addition to 
the Petroleum Revenue Management law, we have the Petroleum and exploration bill in 
the pipeline coming up, Petroleum Commission has been established......I think there is 
enough transparency in practice, it doesn’t mean it is going to work just like that, is left 
to all of us to pursue it but I think the PIAC has got a good start. The Minister of finance 
is required to account for everything. In the 2012 budget which is a public document 
available at the Ministry’s library and website, it has a section that shows the projected 
oil revenues, the actual and the allocations [opens relevant pages of the budget to 
show][........] So whoever wants to know can assess it, we have done our best as a nation 
even though we must not be complacent –Deputy Minister of Finance    
The National coordinator of GHEITI likewise believes there is transparency even though it 
can be improved further with time;  
there is transparency but it can be improved all the time; transparency is just not a point 
you reach and just stop there, you must always aspire to higher standards of 
transparency all the time as much as you can. The Petroleum Revenue management law 
has given enormous reporting requirements for all institutions, there is also PIAC in 
which EITI is represented on, so these are the things that would propel and demand 
transparency and accountability. It is the way it is handled that will show if government 
wants it or not and so far is been good. Ghana EITI Coordinator 
Without making farfetched inferences, a certain pattern of thought can be gleaned from the 
interviews with these key interviewees. It would appear that their focus or measure of 
transparency is also on the legal frameworks and institutions being put in place. Sunshine 
laws such as Petroleum Revenue Management law are good, but they are not enough. The 
information required by such laws to be published must have intended audiences. When the 
audience do not receive such information transparency is limited. 
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Because the government and Ghana EITI have made some information available through 
their publications, it can be argued that the problem is not about a lack of information, but 
rather a lack of access to the information.  From my observations and interviews I found a 
number of factors that appear to influence people’s access to information, both of a general 
nature, and more particularly about the management of oil revenues. Some of these factors 
include the following: 
 
6.3.1 Lack of access facilities  
From the transparency literature, Birkinshaw (2006) urges that we have to move transparency 
beyond openness by removing all obstacles to information accessibility. There can be no 
effective dissemination of information if the basic infrastructure to support it is absent. It was 
obvious from the community that one of the key challenges the people face in getting access 
to information is inadequate facilities. Access to information from television is limited simply 
because there is no electricity in the community. Also, out of the five telecommunication 
networks in the country, only one is accessible in the village. Even with that, one has to be 
positioned at vantage points in order to connect to the operator’s network. This makes it 
practically impossible for anyone to connect to the internet with their mobile phones to access 
any information if they so wish.  
Even when the people may be willing to know what is going on, their ability to do so is very 
limited. It was a common theme in the opinion of the people that in their community if they 
do not receive information from the radio, their abilities are limited. An interviewee puts it 
this way “...we want to know but if the radio does not say, how can we also know? The 
information resources of the community are very limited. Norris (2004) averts that to 
improve access side of transparency, infrastructure policies must take into consideration the 
plight of underserved areas and core user groups.   
6.3.2 Lack of awareness 
Another factor affecting the level of accessibility of information is the people’s seeming lack 
of awareness of where to source the information. Apart from most people having not heard 
about the activities of the EITI for example, even more worrying is the fact that they had no 
idea of the Petroleum Revenue Management Law. The majority if not all of interviewees had 
no idea of this law and what was contained therein. This is particularly problematic, since this 
law does not only require transparency in the management of the revenues, but is also an 
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important law that the people can use to demand accountability. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the law obligates the government to make available information about the 
management of the revenues. If the people were aware of the law, they would have, for 
example, known about the role of the PIAC and how useful their Member of Parliament can 
be.  
6.3.3 Government Information management policy  
When government controls information it can decide how and how much of information is 
made available to the public. For many obvious reasons, governments can starve the citizens 
of vital information to achieve various goals. In the case of Ghana, while the government has 
made some amount of information available to various institutions, such as Parliament, EITI, 
and civil society organisations, the will to make that information readily available to the 
citizens at the grassroots level is largely absent. This can be explained perhaps as the 
government intending to minimise people’s expectations in case the oil revenues are lower 
than expected. While this reasoning cannot be backed by any government policy statement, it 
is a fair inference that can be drawn from my interaction with both the Deputy Minister of 
Finance and the Ghana EITI coordinator. Both alluded to the need to temper the expectations 
of the people with the information given out. The Deputy Minister, for example, argued that 
supplying information about the amount of revenues generated by government in millions of 
Dollars would sound huge in the mind of the local fisher folk at Cape Three Point and lead to 
unnecessary expectations and demands. He went on to argue that this would be problematic, 
because the revenues in reality are small compared to the needs of the country, stating that:  
.... you see we are doing some 80000 bpd and not even 100,000 or like Nigeria, so for me 
from a fiscal perspective we may end up raising expectations very high [.....].out of 
government’s tax revenues of $10 million we have collected 0 [......] So is true that some 
villages close to the extraction point may not be made aware but if care is not taken we 
raise so many expectations higher than what is there in reality. I think there are enough 
mechanisms in place to ensure transparency, even though am not belittling the 
importance of informing the people though. 
The position of the government can be seen as reasonable to some extent, in so far as the 
possibility that people will overestimate the benefits from oil revenues does exist.  However, 
managing expectations by limiting information has its consequences as well. Firstly, it leads 
to bias in the sharing of information to the benefit of bureaucrats and other decision makers. 
This risks reinforcing elitism and existing power relations. The ability and interest of these 
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powerful few to hold the government to account is far limited compared to the entire 
citizenry driving the accountability agenda. Humphreys et al. (2007) also concur that when 
more people are involved, the probability of at least one not being corrupt is higher. 
According to an assessment by Bank Information Centre and Global Witness (2008), 
information about extractive revenues would be more effective if it is made available to those 
at the local level and more so extractive communities in comprehensible form. To make 
progress against corruption, pressure from the citizens at the bottom is critical (Sandgren, 
2005) 
A second and even more disturbing outcome would be the potential for the emergence of 
mistrust, lack of confidence in government and more grievances by the people, especially in 
those areas mostly affected by the exploration of the oil resource. In the absence of credible 
information, people at the community level may be more likely to believe anything and 
everything they hear. Disgruntled groups can mobilise the people against the government and 
oil companies to demand their share of the revenues. This has the potential to create unrest 
and discontent.  
A third consequence is the general perception of the average citizen about government 
transparency and accountability. While government may score high on transparency indices 
of international organisations and CSOs (such as the IEA P-TRAC index) mostly 
headquartered in the capital Accra, the perceptions of the people at the community level such 
as Cape Three point could be different. For example, as discussed previously, with or without 
information, the interviewees were of the opinion that there has not been transparency in the 
management of the revenues judging by the lack of development in their community. A better 
mechanism for building trust and confidence is by sharing information and explaining to the 
people the revenues being generated and used. Carrying the people along in the management 
process is better than leaving them in the dark. 
6.4 Summary 
Even though Ghana has shown commitment to improving transparency and thus 
implementing the EITI, there is still more to be done to ensure the citizens are well informed 
and empowered to hold the authorities accountable. From the view point of interviewees in 
Cape Three Point, their community knows little about the oil revenues. This indicates a gap 
between transparency initiatives and what they can actually achieve. This gap we see in the 
case of Cape Three Point is occasioned by access to information. Without being repetitive, 
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Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) point that it is not enough to provide information but the 
information must actually reach the people is spot on. The government in terms of managing 
its natural resources can be considered to be open, but not necessarily transparent. Signing on 
to transparency initiatives and establishing such institutions is not enough in achieving real 
transparency, but at best theoretical transparency or what Heald (2006) describes as nominal 
transparency. It is critical that government, while making information available, takes steps to 
bridge the information divide between the centre (i.e. capital city, elite groups) and the 
periphery (i.e. the poor, rural communities, extraction communities) such as Cape Three 
Point. 
Notwithstanding the above, it is also important for the people to develop interest and be 
willing to access the information made available by the government and its agencies. From 
the literature (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003) argues that a competent and demanding citizenry is 
required to demand or make use of any existing accountability mechanisms. This would be 
part of their performance of civic responsibility. The next chapter looks at the People’s 
capacity and willingness to demand transparency and accountability.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Civic Responsibility and Capacity Constraints 
 
7.0 Introduction 
Beyond making information readily available, comprehensible and accessible, another 
important issue of consideration is the willingness of the people to demand transparency and 
accountability. The people must be willing and interested to know what is going on in the 
management of the oil revenues. This forms the civic responsibility of the people.  
Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) notes that transparency initiatives and accountability that exists in a 
country requires a competent and demanding public to put it to use and where such 
mechanisms do not exist it would require the public to demand for it.  To perform this civic 
responsibility however, several moderating factors can influence people’s ability to demand 
transparency and accountability. Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) provides us with some indicators of 
such a demanding society to include individuals who are younger, educated, relatively well-
off, residing in urban areas and politically more sophisticated. Some of these indicators were 
identified and discussed in chapter two with respect to Ghana in general. This chapter focuses 
on the people of Cape Three Point by identifying their willingness and interest in the oil 
revenues. The chapter further looks at some of the factors that influence the people’s capacity 
to demand transparency and accountability. 
7.1 Demanding Accountability: Interest and Willingness 
To achieve accountability, the citizens must be interested in constructing knowledge out of 
the information made available from the government, media or civil society organisations. It 
is out of this that they can, for example, decide on the fate of the resource managers (i.e 
politicians) during elections, or through other lawful civil actions such as protests and strikes. 
Without their willingness and interest, government and oil companies would be less 
motivated about being accountable and transparent. To put it in simple terms, when the 
resource owners are less concerned and careless about how the resource is being managed, 
the opportunity for looting and misapplication would be created. 
The performance of civic responsibility by the citizens therefore is critical in ensuring 
accountability and potentially reducing the likelihood of the resource curse. While institutions 
such as Parliament, EITI, and CSOs can and must play oversight roles, the ultimate 
responsibility lies with the people to hold the state to account. Institutions would not function 
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effectively when the people themselves are not interested in what is going on. Even though 
government is obliged to make information available, it is equally important to find out if the 
people are interested and willing to receive and act on this information. 
7.1.1 Interest in Revenue Information 
The research conducted reveals that people are interested in knowing about the management 
of the oil revenue flows and how government is using it. Interviewees indicated that people in 
the community would welcome any attempt by the government to provide them with 
information.  Opinions of those interviewed gave the indication that they are interested in 
knowing, for example, the total amount of revenues government has received and the 
development projects that the money is being put to. Their interest was less related to total 
revenues being generated but more about the fine details of the expenditures or distribution of 
the resource. Specifically, some were of the view that government should periodically 
provide an account of the distribution of the revenues to regional and local government 
authorities in their area.  
It was apparent during the interviews that both young (below age 30) and older interviewees 
(above age 30) were enthusiastic about having access to relevant information. This departs 
from the view of Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) that such interests would be prevalent predominately 
among younger people. Similarly, there was no variation among male or female interviewees. 
On the whole, interest was high among all the interviewees and they were quite sure such 
interest would be similar for the larger community.       
The level of interest shown was quite surprising as this is a rural community with low levels 
of literacy. However, this can be attributed to the community being one of many communities 
within the oil extraction catchment area. The interest shown is positive for transparency and 
accountability. This demonstrates that people are curious and want to know what is going on. 
This justifies the need for government and other related institutions to make available 
information to the public. Where the people live, be it centre or periphery, socioeconomic 
status, or educational level should not be equated to interests. The interests shown by 
respondents in Cape Three Point illustrates that citizens’ interest to know exists.  
This study also reveals a key issue about what type of information really represents 
transparency and what people would want to see as accountability. It emerged during the 
interviews that what people want to hear is not necessarily the type of information provided 
by government or transparency initiatives such as EITI. I gathered that people’s sense of 
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accountability of the revenues is linked to development in their localities. For example as one 
young man pointed out during the interviews “.......they should tell us how many schools, 
hospitals and roads they have built in our area with the oil money.......we don’t want the 
money to be mentioned in millions and millions, we want to know specific thing they have 
done with it”. It can be argued that the interest shown is linked to the under development of 
the area especially as often they make reference to information about how the revenues are 
being used. The possibility that citizens living in relatively well developed parts of the 
country not having the same interest in obtaining information cannot be discounted. 
The above, however, also has implications for the Extractive industries Transparency 
initiative. Currently, the initiative provides information about reconciliation between what 
extractive companies pay to government and what government says it receives from the 
companies as revenues. What transparency initiatives such as EITI believe people would 
want to know may not necessarily be what people are interested in.  From the interests shown 
by the interviewees, it would be necessary that the Ghana EITI provide diverse forms of 
information including how these resource revenues are being distributed and used especially 
at the local level. Such information would be more relevant to the people as it would suit their 
information needs and allow them to better relate to the management process. While the 
reconciliatory approach currently being implemented at the national level  may serve the 
needs of other stakeholders (such as CSOs, donor governments and their agencies and of 
course some section of the public), information about the local use of the revenues would be 
useful for others as shown by this study. 
7.1.2 Willingness to Demand 
Apart from gauging people’s interest in receiving information, this study further went on to 
investigate people’s willingness to take action and demand that information. This is important 
because as owners of the resource they must be able to put pressure on the government to do 
the right thing. This is an important element of accountability. The findings of the research 
indicate that people appear not willing to demand for such information or accountability. This 
contrasts with their interest in knowing about the oil revenues. While people in the 
community are interested in knowing what is going on, that interest has not been translated 
into taking the initiative and demanding such information. In the same manner, interviewees 
were unsure of what actions they could take to hold the government to account.  
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Most of the interviewees said that they had not in any way tried in the past to obtain 
information about how the oil revenues are being used. They equally were unsure of anyone 
in the community in the past who had tried demanding information from government 
authorities. The local people interviewed all agreed that since the inception of the oil 
exploration in 2007, they have at some point in time brought to the fore issues related to their 
dwindling fishing fortunes. They also, through their local district assembly representative and 
chief, have talked about the underdevelopment of the community. However, specifically 
demanding accountability from government or the oil companies about the revenues has not 
been part of the community demands.  
The lack of demand from the community however is not farfetched. As mentioned in chapter 
two, the findings of the Afrobarometer survey of 2012 indicate a certain culture among 
Ghanaians of not taking the initiative to hold state officials to account. As pointed out by that 
survey, very few Ghanaians have contacted their Government representatives for information 
in the past. Thus, the people of Cape Three Point appear not to depart from that norm. 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) opines that culture is a determinant in achieving accountability. This 
finding can be attributed to the larger issue of the Ghanaian culture. Further extensive 
research in this area would however be required to draw any strong conclusions.  While the 
phenomenon can be discussed in relation to culture, the case of Cape Three Point goes 
beyond culture in generality. It is also related to issues of ownership rights, perception, 
history and offshore nature of the oil development as well capacity constraints. The issue of 
capacity would be taken up in subsequent subsection of this chapter. 
Gaventa (2002) asserts that for citizen participation in accountability to be meaningful, the 
status of citizens must be strengthened from being that of simple beneficiaries of 
development to legitimate claimants. The principal-agent theory underling transparency 
similarly assumes or accords citizens (principals) rights of ownership. From the community 
however, those interviewed felt more that it was not in their right to demand accountability 
from the government. They did not see themselves as rightful owners of the oil resources, but 
rather people who should benefit from decisions of government about how the oil revenues 
should be used. As such they were of the view that demanding more information is not 
something they should be doing. Some actually believed such a demand can trigger 
government anger and deny them benefits in the future. An interviewee shares the sentiment 
that “... as for us we can’t go asking questions about the government’s oil money, they will be 
angry at us”. For these interviewees they are less likely to take any action on any information 
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provided them or demand even for it. If more people would be willing to participate in the 
accountability process, it would be required that they are empowered and educated on their 
legitimate rights. 
Again, perception of the people about themselves and how they perceive others’ views of 
them feeds into their seeming lack of willingness to demand for accountability or at least 
information. It was obvious from the views of the interviewees in the community that they 
saw themselves as less critical stakeholders in the oil revenues. This is in a way closely 
related to their interpretation of their rights discussed previously. It can also be linked to a 
sense of seeing government officials as rulers as opposed to public servants. They also saw 
others (government) being less interested in their opinions and believed (rightly or wrongly) 
that their views would not be respected. For many of those interviewed they saw themselves 
as rural fisher folks far from influencing government opinion and decisions in the oil sector. 
This however contrasts with at least the remark of the Government minister that “......I think 
there are enough mechanisms in place to ensure transparency, [even though am not belittling 
the importance of informing the people though]. Government may not be belittling the people 
or disrespectful of their opinions but their lack of interaction with the people it appears feeds 
a certain perception of disrespect.   
The lack of willingness shown can also be interpreted as stemming from the nature and 
history of the oil development discussed in chapter two. The historical development of 
Ghana’s petroleum industry reveals two significant implications within the transparency and 
accountability policy frame and citizens nexus. First, it can be realised that unlike countries 
such as Nigeria where petroleum activities has been dominantly onshore, in Ghana it has 
been rather offshore. This has meant that local people such as those in Cape Three Point have 
been somehow disconnected from the management process. The environmental impacts and 
land tenure problems often associated with onshore exploration, which has given rise to local 
people to be actively engaged in the management and struggle for the resource, has been 
absent in Ghana. This partly explains why the people may not have a sense of ownership 
rights and would be less willing to hold the government to account. The situation could 
possibly be different if it were an onshore development.  
The second implication has to do with how legislations have developed over the years in the 
industry. Due to the limited and ad hoc nature of discoveries predating 2007, very little was 
done by governments over the years to ensure transparency and accountability through 
94 
 
legislations in the sector. For example, it was not until 2010 that a proper legislation was put 
in place to ensure transparency in the management of the oil revenues. It is therefore not 
surprising that interviewees are not aware of such laws that give them power to demand 
accountability. 
7.3 People’s Capacity and Constraints 
This subsection looks at the people’s resources that can enable them to process any 
information that may be provided to them. The study found that a number of factors limit the 
people’s abilities in this regard. These factors described as capacity constraints are presented 
and discussed subsequently.  
7.3.1 Socio-economic livelihoods/poverty 
Countries are simply not poor because of corruption, but they are also corrupt due to poverty 
(Sandgren, 2005). Acts of corruption by both public and private actors have meant the denial 
of basic social services to the citizens, whilst wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few. 
The direct impact of corruption producing poverty in many countries is no longer an issue in 
doubt. 
Beyond this however, corruption at the same time is a resultant by-product of poverty 
(Viisimaa, 2008). When people have poor access to education and information abundance is 
low, their ability to exact their rights is reduced. Because of poverty, people cannot demand 
accountability from their leaders (Transparency International, 2012) and this has reinforced 
exclusion and further exploitation. 
The capacity of the people of Cape Three Point to demand their right to information and 
demand accountability from the government is limited in part by poverty. The majority of the 
inhabitants are engaged predominantly in fishing and peasant farming. Fishing as an 
economic livelihood is dwindling on the coastal areas in Ghana generally and the people of 
Cape Three Point have been further affected by the emergence of the seaweed.  
The impact of the people’s economic status on demanding transparency and accountability 
was quiet obvious during the study. Most people interviewed, whilst showing interest in 
knowing about the revenue flows, said they would rather pursue activities that can bring 
about development and improvement in their lives than “chase” government officials for 
information. This interviewee aptly said “the government came only once.....all I care about 
is how to find money for my children’s school fees”.  An old lady interviewed also poured her 
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heart out saying “look at me, I have not eaten since morning, all I am concerned about is 
getting some of the (oil) money to feed myself and my children”. 
Employment and a good standard of living appeared to be a priority of the community people 
interviewed rather than demanding transparency and accountability. A number of the youth 
spoken to during the research likewise pointed out the need for development in their 
community. More especially, they were more interested in seeing more jobs being created for 
them in the community rather than chasing the government to demand accountability.  Thus, 
to achieve transparency and accountability through pressure from the bottom, the provision of 
information is not sufficient. It is important that pressing needs of communities such as water 
supplies, electricity and livelihoods must be met. This calls for a more holistic or integrated 
approach to fighting corruption through a combination of community livelihood development 
and Information dissemination. The two from this research finding are interrelated. When 
adequate information is disseminated in the absence of substantial livelihoods, people’s 
capacity to take action on the information provided would be limited and vice versa. The 
dilemma however is that transparency is supposed to help people to demand these 
improvements but in reality we see that these improvements need to be in place before 
transparency can even work. 
7.3.2 Educational level  
It is not only enough to produce and disseminate information. The people’s ability to read, 
understand and construct knowledge out of the information is a prerequisite to action being 
taken. When people cannot read or understand the published reports of the PIAC or GHEITI 
on the oil revenue flows, then the real likelihood of the people being in the loop of what is 
going on is limited. They can only take meaningful action when they can read and construct 
knowledge out of the reports. In Ghana, some 46% of adults are currently considered to be 
illiterate (Tsikata, 2012). This alarming rate reflects a certain level of people’s ability to read 
and write. The picture gets even worse when disaggregated to the rural level. In order to 
identify the people of Cape Three Point’s capacity to read and understand any published oil 
revenue reports their educational level provided one useful indicator that could be measured.
  
The study revealed that most of the people have had little or no education.  The literacy level 
in the district is low and is worse for the rural communities such as Cape Three Point. Many 
of the interviewees were completely illiterates while others with their basic education can 
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only barley read or write basic English. Even some of the community leaders would find it 
difficult to comprehend an EITI report. 
   
This becomes particularly problematic when linked to the popular view shared by the Ghana 
EITI that the best place to hide information from a Ghanaian is in a book. Low literacy and 
poor reading habits generally has negative impact on revenue reports produced, especially 
when they are technical and less interesting to the average person. The implications of this for 
achieving transparency and accountability is that, when information on revenues is presented 
in a highly technical manner or simply in English, as has been done on the websites and 
publications of GHEITI and PIAC, the people may not comprehend it and construct any 
knowledge out of it. Even if the information is provided, the level of education and literacy of 
the people would make it difficult to construct meaning and take actions to either punish or 
reward the resource managers (i.e government). This raises issues of comprehensibility of 
reports, language of reports, context based reports etc. 
 
Within this remit most interviewees were of the view that the community would benefit more 
from direct interaction with authorities. That is they would prefer people coming to their 
community or community radio to hold discussions with them about the oil revenues rather 
than writing in the newspapers and publishing reports. Even though the idea of reports was 
not popular with the people interviewed, some indicated a translated version in their local 
languages would be welcomed. 
7.3.3 Lack of Voice Mechanism 
The study further reveals that not only do the people have limited information access 
mechanisms but also they have very limited voice mechanisms. That is, even those who may 
be willing to demand accountability may not have the space and avenues to address their 
concerns. Even though the radio station accessible to them have “phone-in” programmes 
through which they can make their voices heard, most of the interviewees noted that it was 
too expensive calling into such programmes and most them do not even own a phone. It was 
very much obvious that writing their concerns for publication in newspapers was also beyond 
their means unless some journalists take interest in them.  
Also, the community chief noted that it was his expectation that the District Chief Executive 
officer of the area would visit frequently to hear out their concerns. However, prior to this 
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research fieldwork, according to the chief, the officer had been there only once within the 
year. This implies that even when the people have access to information, their abilities to 
process that information by voicing out their concerns can be considered to be limited. In 
effect, it is not only access to information that is limited, but also mechanisms for seeking 
clarifications or demanding explanations is lacking. This curtails largely their abilities to take 
initiatives even if they are willing to do so.    
7.3.4 Community organisation/participation 
Another factor influencing the ability of the people to receive, interpret and take action on 
information provided is a lack of community organisations or representation. How the 
community is able to mobilise, take decisions and engage with authorities would go a long 
way in influencing their access to relevant and reliable information.  
At the community level, it became apparent during the fieldwork that even though some 
NGOs had done some work in the community connected to social services and research, local 
offices or representatives were nonexistent. For example, while the civil society organisation, 
Platform for Oil and Gas was actively engaged in oil related campaigns at the national level, 
it had no representatives in this community, which is perhaps closest to the oil field. Such 
organisations could serve as vital conduits of information to the local community by sharing 
and simplifying revenue flow reports for them. They can perform crucial roles in educating 
and empowering the people to take appropriate actions and decisions relative to the oil 
revenues. The lack of such organisations has largely limited not only access but also capacity 
of the people to demand accountability. 
 
It also became apparent during the research that the community had no organised groups or 
representatives to take action or speak with authorities on their behalf. Most interviewees 
looked up to their Traditional chief and the Assembly Member of the area to have discussions 
with the government. Even with this, the interviewees were mostly of the opinion that the 
community leaders had little engagement with the government in deciding what the oil 
revenues were used for. The interview with the chief as pointed out earlier brought to the fore 
the realisation that the community leaders had had no interactions with government officials 
apart from the initial meetings in the wake of the oil finds.  
7.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented findings and discussion of the last two research questions. 
Specifically, it looked at the willingness and interest of the people in demanding 
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accountability from their government officials who manage the resources on their behalf. It 
also looked at the constraints on people’s capacity to process any information about the 
revenue that they may come across. 
From the analysis and discussions it emerged that, whereas the interest to know about the 
revenues exists among the community people, their willingness to demand for such 
information or accountability is lacking. The underlining reasons behind this lack of initiative 
may relate to factors such as history and nature of the oil development, perceptions and sense 
of ownership rights. 
In the case of relevant information even reaching the people, the study has revealed that 
several factors can inhibit the people’s abilities to process and take action on such 
information. These identified constraints include poverty, low literacy levels, lack of voice 
mechanisms and community organisation. 
The chapter highlights that much of what transparency theory can offer many not necessarily 
be achieved in contexts such as Cape Three Point. Beyond making information available, the 
recipients and their social circumstances have a role to play in what happens to that 
information if it ever gets to them at all. Where they cannot construct knowledge out of the 
information, efforts to disseminate information would be rendered less useful in achieving 
transparency and accountability. Transparency initiatives and policies must look beyond the 
information supply side (i.e. government and/or companies) to the demand side, which is the 
citizen. The citizens must be willing and capable of receiving, processing and acting on the 
information. Anything short of this would curtail the transparency efforts.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Summary of Findings and Discussions 
 
 8.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the arguments, key findings and discussions of the 
research provided in the preceding chapters. It further identifies some of the implications of 
the findings for achieving transparency and accountability in the management of the oil 
revenues in Ghana. Beyond these implications, recommendations and pathways for an 
effective flow of information between citizens and government officials are provided. The 
focus of the research has centred mainly on Cape Three Point, a rural community close to the 
oil development fields in Ghana. This community has been chosen because of its closeness 
and potential risk of negative impacts for the oil development. Also, to ascertain or 
demonstrate that information flow from the state institutions at the centre to local people at 
the periphery may not reach the intended audiences.  
Institutions such as the IEA, GHEITI, and the government itself have alluded to an above 
average level of transparency in the manner in which the oil revenues are being managed. For 
example, the results of the IEA P-TRAC 2012 survey scored government above average on 
revenue transparency and expenditure transparency (see chapter 2). Essentially the questions 
have been whether or not the information being provided by the government on the revenue 
flows actually reaches the people and also whether or not the ordinary citizens have the 
capacity and will to act on the information? This has been the focal question the research has 
sought to answer. 
This concluding chapter is presented in four subsections. The first section summarizes the 
main theoretical arguments that underpinned this research and a re-statement of the research 
questions. The second subsection provides the main findings and discussions of the research, 
whiles the third subsection identifies the implications of the findings for avoiding the 
resource curse through increasing transparency and accountability. The last subsection 
provides pathways for improving information dissemination with a focus on local people.  
8.1 Research Question and Theoretical Arguments 
The study began by examining the negative relationship between natural resource endowment 
and poor economic performance, a phenomenon referred to as the resource curse. A cursory 
look at the literature provides extensive evidence that demonstrates how resource rich 
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countries have tended towards poor social and economic performance, and has a higher 
likelihood to experience armed conflict.  The curse is attributable to poor economic 
management, rent seeking and corruption by government officials. The theoretical chapter 
identified that both economic and political prescriptions can be used to combat the problem. 
However, the political aspect has received much attention recently.    
The emerging consensus identified as important to improving resource governance is  what 
has been described by Karl (2007) as “a far reaching fiscal social contract based on 
transparency – one that creates incentives to change the rent seeking behaviour of all actors 
both international and domestic, involved in the oil game” (p. 256). This refers to a social 
contract between government officials managing the resources and the citizens who are the 
resource owners. The concept of transparency is not only replete in the literature but has been 
the focus of civil society campaigns such as those of PWYP, RWI, EITI, Oxfam, and 
Transparency International. While transparency and accountability is one of many panaceas 
for poor resource management, the paramount issue is how to achieve it. 
To research this issue, the key argument was that information flow between state actors and 
citizens is necessary to achieve real transparency and accountability. This argument was 
explored using the Principal-Agent Model. The principal-Agent model posits among other 
things that for the principal (the citizens) to be able to hold the Agent (government) 
accountable, the asymmetry of information must be removed. The absence of information 
leads to agency problems. Thus, citizens can only hold governments accountable (by 
punishing or rewarding) for how they manage the resources if there is perfect information 
flow between them. In other words their ability to punish or reward them is hampered by a 
lack of information. Access to such information however is costly and can be difficult to 
come by (Prat, 2006). 
The focus of much research has been on building effective institutions to ensure transparency 
and accountability (see (McGee and Gaventa, 2010, Mehlum et al., 2006, Knack and Keefer, 
2003), very few have looked at whether or not the information provided by these institutions 
actually is accessible and likely to be acted upon by the citizens based on their capacity. This 
has been a gap within the literature on resource curse vis a vis transparency and 
accountability. This research thus examined people’s access to information and their capacity 
to act on it.  Ghana’s oil industry was selected and the main focus was on how the people of 
Cape Three Point have access to information about the oil revenue flows. This study went on 
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to identify if they have the civic will and ability to take action on any information provided. 
The specific research questions investigated were: 
1. To what extent has GHEITI provided information to the people of Cape Three Point? 
2. Do the people of Cape Three Point have access to information on the revenue flows 
from the oil companies to the state? 
3. If they do, how do they have access to the information on how the government is 
utilizing these oil revenues? 
4. Are they willing to take action on any information they receive? 
5. Do the people of Cape Three Point possess the capacity to process any information 
provided about the management of the petroleum revenues? 
8.2 Summary of Methods and Findings 
The stated research questions above were tested using Qualitative research methods during 
fieldwork in Ghana over a period of eight weeks. The issues were examined by talking to key 
government and EITI officials, residents of the Cape Three Point and their traditional leaders. 
The key issues examined and the methods used are summarised in the table below:  
Table 4: Data summary and Techniques used to collect them 
Variable  Secondary 
Data 
Key 
informant/interview 
Direct 
observation 
Structured 
Community 
Interview 
Community Access to 
information 
       
Community Perception of 
revenue management 
       
Capacity /constraints (i.e 
education, literacy etc) 
       
Community 
willingness/Interest 
      
Community Social 
development 
      
Community livelihoods        
EITI impact        
EITI Communication 
channel 
      
102 
 
Oil related laws        
Oil Revenue Management 
regime 
      
Existing Transparency and 
Accountability Mechanisms 
       
 
These data were obtained from respondents within different category sets. The table below 
provides a descriptive summary of the nature of respondents used. 
Table 5: Descriptive Summary of Research Respondents 
Category Number Male Female Average Age range (years) 
Community Respondents 30 13 17 31-40 
Traditional Leaders 1 1          - N/A 
Government 1 1          - N/A 
GHEITI 1 1          - N/A 
Others 3 2 3 N/A 
The key findings and discussions for each research question are summarised below: 
8.2.1 To what extent has Ghana EITI contributed to informing the people about how the oil 
revenues are being managed? 
The study indicates that GHEITI has contributed little in getting the people of Cape Three 
Point informed. Even though the institution has been making information available through 
publications and its websites this has not translated into informing the people. This 
demonstrates a lack of progress towards GHEITI’s objective of getting all Ghanaians 
informed about how the extractive revenues are being managed. 
It is important to point out however that, this finding does not imply that GHEITI has not put 
out any information about the oil revenues in the public domain. The problem lies in the 
communication channels being used. Media such as the internet is simply beyond the reach of 
the fisher folks of Cape three Point. 
8.2.2 Do the people of Cape Three Point have access to information on the revenue flows from 
the oil companies to the state? 
Based on the interviews conducted, it was evident that the people of Cape Three Point do not 
have access to reliable and relevant information about the revenue flows. The key issue of 
consideration was to identify the main information access points of the community. It 
emerged that the radio, specifically Ankobrah FM served as the main information source for 
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the community. Despite the existence of this information source, much information has not 
been disseminated to the community.  
The limited nature of information access in the community is attributable to factors such as 
lack of facilities, lack of awareness among others. Also important in this regard are the 
government’s direct or indirect intentions to manage expectations of the people. This is borne 
out of the need to temper expectations and excessive demands relative to the current size of 
the oil revenues.  
Thus, whilst government, GHEITI and PIAC have published information about the 
management of the oil revenues on websites and in reports, the people’s access to such 
information is limited. Achieving the core objective of accountability and transparency, 
therefore, is not fully met based on the views of respondents in Cape Three Point. Generally, 
the government it can be observed has been open to some extent, but has fallen short of being 
transparent and accountable. As part of transparency and accountability initiatives planning, 
people’s resources for accessing information must be a prerequisite consideration.  
8.2.3 How do they have access to Information about how the government is utilizing the oil 
revenues? 
As a sequel to the previous research question, the study found that the people have not had 
any means of knowing how government was spending the oil revenues. Most of those 
interviewed recounted how little they knew about what government have used the revenues 
for so far. For some the dire poverty and lack of development in the community is due to 
misuse of the revenues. The people, according to the research results, have a lot of trust in 
what they hear from the radio and town hall meeting forums. This notwithstanding they have 
not been able to receive any information from these media. While communicating through 
mediums such as websites as being used would serve some groups of people (such as elites 
and urban dwellers), it may not necessary be useful to other significant portions of the public. 
These other constituents through no fault of their own may be disempowered from holding 
the government to account. The danger is that spread of distrust, misconceptions and strife 
can be problematic to both government and the oil extractive companies.  
8.2.4 Are the people willing to take action on any information they receive? 
For this particular research question, a mixed result was obtained. The people are interested 
in knowing what is going on in the industry and genuinely would like to be informed. On the 
other hand, the study showed they have not demonstrated any initiative in demanding 
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accountability from the state. Majority of the respondents have not attempted obtaining 
information about the use of the revenues in the past. 
This shows a contrast between an interest to gain knowledge and at the same time a lack of 
initiative in getting to demand accountability. The seeming lack of initiative has been 
identified in the previous chapter to be attributable to poverty and capacity constraints. An 
insight gained through my interaction with them was that they are more concerned about 
sustaining their daily livelihoods.  By inference from what they said, typically on a balance of 
scale one would prefer to secure his or her daily bread rather than chase government for 
information about how the oil revenues are being managed. The catch here, however, is that 
when government is held accountable to proper management of the resource that is when the 
benefit of the resource wealth can benefit the people. It is through proper management that 
the resource revenues can be used to improve and secure the livelihoods of the people. The 
promotion of people’s livelihoods and accountability must be discussed with the 
understanding that both can influence each other.   
8.2.5 Do the people of Cape Three Point possess the capacity to process any information 
provided about the management of the petroleum revenues? 
The study found that in terms of the current state of how information is disseminated, the 
people do not have adequate capacity to process and take action on any information provided, 
even if they had access to it. This is due to their levels of literacy, economic status and lack of 
voice mechanism. 
Even though the majority of those interviewed have had some level of basic education, their 
ability to read materials in English is limited. Thus, reports and newspaper articles about the 
management of the oil revenues presented in English (as is being done now) may be of little 
use to them, even if they had access. Again, when such materials are presented in technical 
language (using industry jargons), even if a few could read it, their ability to comprehend and 
construct knowledge out of it would be limited. Such reports even though may be available, 
its comprehension and consequent knowledge that can be constructed out would be limited. 
Apart from reading limitations and technicality of such oil financial reports, the people’s 
capacity to mobilize to take action (e.g. demand accountability) was also found to be limited. 
From my interviews and observations, currently there is no form of community pressure 
groups or focused groups with interest in oil related issues. Also, there is no presence of 
CBOs, NGOs, or CSOs to educate, mobilise and empower the people towards any 
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meaningful action. Indeed not only are they limited by access and capacity but also they lack 
awareness as to who to direct their voice to, who to engage and appropriate mechanisms for 
seeking accountability.   
8.2.6 Summary of Findings 
Conclusively, the above analysis and discussions have demonstrated that even though 
government may be providing some amount of information to the public, accessibility 
however is on the low side. From the Cape Three Point context we see why it is so. There is a 
veil or information gap between the people and the government. This illustrates the gap 
between what accountability and transparency initiatives and theories promises and the 
reality. The diagram below summarizes all that has been discussed. 
Figure 8: Government-People Information Nexus 
 
From the above summary figure, we see that in achieving transparency and accountability, 
information flow from the Agents (Government) does not necessarily reach its intended end 
users, the Principals (Citizens).  The flow of information is moderated or veiled by factors 
such as communication deficits, government policy, cultural and Socio-economic barriers. It 
can therefore be deceptive if Transparency indexes such as the IEA P-TRAC index which 
does not take into consideration the citizen side of issues are conclusive about some level of 
transparency and accountability.                                                                                                 
8.3 Implications for Transparency and Accountability 
The above research findings have implications for achieving transparency and accountability 
in the oil industry and consequently avoiding the oil resource curse. While some of these 
implications have been mentioned previously, they are presented again below and 
summarised thematically. 
State Actors 
and 
Extractive 
Industries ( 
Agents) 
•   Oil Revenues 
information 
•EITI 
•PIAC 
 
Information 
flow 
Informataion Access 
Veil ( Information   
asymmetry) 
•communication resource 
deficit 
•poverty 
• illiteracy 
•Government Policy 
•Rural -Urban Divide 
•Attitude 
 
Citizens 
Engagement 
( Principal) 
•Transparency & 
Accountability 
•Societal 
Monitoring 
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False or illusionary Transparency: when information being disseminated by the state does 
not reach the intended people, a certain sense of illusionary transparency is created in the 
minds of the government. As realised from this research the government and GHEITI at the 
centre believe they are doing enough to be transparent and accountable, but this is not truly 
the case as those closest to the oil resource are lacking in knowledge regarding the 
management of the oil revenues. Those at the centre the research illustrates possibly 
overestimate their transparency initiative. What they claim about their efforts in transparency 
is different from what is on the ground. Similarly, international donor countries and CSOs 
could perceive a transparent system but examination of the evidence, as far as the citizens are 
concerned, would indicate that the reality is quite different. This research therefore is a good 
wake up call for government and other actors to conduct more research at the local level that 
evaluates the impact of their information communication efforts. 
 
Also, the study shows some of the faulty assumptions about transparency and accountability. 
Transparency theories assumes that people  recognise their rights of ownership as principals 
but this is not always the case as seen in the contest of Cape Three Point.  Similarly what 
transparency initiatives think the people want to know and what the people actually want to 
know may not always be the case. 
Negative Perception: This research indicates that while government is open and making 
some information available, the people at the periphery have formed negative perceptions 
about the management of the revenues so far. This can be attributed to a gap in the 
dissemination of information. While such perceptions are in many cases unfounded, it simply 
demonstrates how people can form their own opinions in the absence of credible information. 
Negative perception generally is not good for the government as they could be unjustifiably 
punished, for example during elections. 
Negative attitudes and antagonism: When citizens hold negative perceptions this can lead to 
undesirable attitudes and antagonism. For Cape three points, which is a community within the 
oil development catchment area, their negative perceptions are not good for the industry in 
general. When they believe they are not getting what they should get from the revenues, how 
they treat oil related developments in the area in future could be negative. Their willingness 
for example to lease more lands for development could be limited. At worst they could be 
antagonistic towards the oil companies. All this is about a lack of trust due to the information 
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gap. Other countries plunged into similar situation began not only because of endemic 
political corruption but simply poor information sharing. 
8.5 Pathways: Bridging the Information Divide 
It’s been established from this study that Ghana’s case of transparency and accountability is 
not strictly a lack of information, but rather a lack of access and capacity to process such 
information to ensure the oil revenues are not plundered. The gap or veil in the information 
dissemination can be improved through some these mechanisms: 
8.5.1 Decentralisation  
To enhance information dissemination, oil information centres must be created at least at 
regional capitals throughout the country and also at the district level for the oil affected areas. 
While involving a representative of the affected district assemblies in the GHEITI committee 
is a good step, setting up information centres would be even better. This would provide an 
avenue for citizens to “walk-in” and “shop” for information especially where infrastructural 
facilities do not support a variety of information access points in their communities. 
 
Engaging local people from communities affected by the exploration is necessary to enhance 
transparency and accountability, as well as stability in the oil region. Representatives from 
the community level through the district to the regional level must be actively involved in 
various decision making processes about the distribution and allocation of the oil resources. 
Particularly, discussions as to how much revenue are generated, how much has been allocated 
to the districts affected and how it would be utilised must be discussed publicly at town hall 
meetings and district assembly forums. 
8.5.2 Livelihood Empowerment:  
It has emerged from this research and others that poverty and livelihoods can influence 
people’s ability to demand accountability. Until the people’s basic needs, such as food, 
shelter, education and sustainable income, are guaranteed, their ability to focus attention on 
keeping the government in check is limited. It is important therefore that while strategies are 
being adopted to promote transparency and accountability, the people are also empowered 
economically. 
For those in the coastal communities such as Cape Three Point whose economic livelihoods 
are endangered by the oil exploration, alternative sustainable livelihoods must be initiated. 
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When there is economic empowerment, citizens are more likely to have greater interest in 
pursuing public goods such as transparency and accountability. 
8.5.3 New Transparency Discourse and Approach  
Replete in the transparency and accountability framework currently are campaigns and policy 
actions to ensure governments and extractive companies disclose information to the public. 
For example, PWYP has championed the campaign for revenue disclosure. This research has 
shown that disclosure is necessary but not enough to ensure accountability. It is time for a 
retrospective discussion about who the target of information released is, and how they receive 
and process such information.  
It is critical that approaches and strategies are developed to ensure that the public have access 
and capacity to take actions and decisions based on what they have. This would require new 
thinking and new strategies that would have citizens as the target audience as opposed to civil 
society organisations and a few bureaucrats. 
8.5.4 Context Matters 
Information dissemination should be seen as context dependent. More often than not policy-
makers and campaigners have sought to replicate directly successful accountability initiatives 
elsewhere to other countries. This however has been unsuccessful because of variation in 
contexts. It is important that decision makers take critical consideration of local conditions 
prevailing in every country. Whilst use of internet is an option in developed countries, such 
mediums may not be necessarily effective in developing countries.  Thus, to promote 
transparency and accountability, local conditions including cultural norms, attitudes, 
educational level, institutions and infrastructural constraints should be critically assessed 
before initiatives are implemented. Information must be tailored to different user groups 
within the public. Ghana EITI must define the target groups for their reports and accordingly 
determine what type of information they need.  
8.5.5 Use of existing community resources 
To make information dissemination more efficient and citizen oriented, government and 
transparency institutions must make a proactive effort to use community information 
resources available. For example the people of Cape Three would be better informed through 
interactive community discussion forums as opposed to internet, newspaper reports and 
television programming.  Community radio stations such as Ankobrah FM can also be 
targeted as more effective channels of communication as opposed to national media houses 
which may not have local coverage. 
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Furthermore, local associations and groupings must be used as focal points of mobilisation 
and engagement with government officials in demanding accountability. The fishermen’s 
association in Cape Three Point, for example, can represent the community in demanding 
accountability. 
8.6 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research 
While efforts were made to produce a holistic understanding of the issues discussed, there are 
some limitations that cannot go unrecognised. Methodologically, the study could have 
benefited from a wider sample in order to draw more conclusive and far reaching findings. 
For example, a national survey or the use of more communities in the oil region could have 
been useful. The trade off however would have been the in depth and fine details of people’s 
feelings and experiences that this study provided.  
Also, the use of different categories of informants with different backgrounds (e.g. education) 
provided varied interpretations and understanding of the concepts. It can be argued that 
because for example the government minister is more educated than the community 
informants it would be obvious that he would have a better understanding of the issues. This 
notwithstanding, it also highlights some strengths of the research. That is what people in 
government or authority perceive or believe to be a transparent process may not always be 
same for the people at the community level. 
Furthermore, the field work was conducted at the time the Ghana EITI was expanding its 
activities into the oil and gas sector. The initiative had produced its first comprehensive 
report for the sector even though it had in the past published newsletters about the oil 
revenues. The possibility that the research findings specific to the impact of EITI to be 
different in the near future when enough grounds has been covered in the sector cannot be 
discounted. While recognising this limitation, the study provides good indicators for the 
Ghana EITI to know the considerable grounds they need to cover if they are to achieve their 
objective of getting all Ghanaians informed. 
The study given the limited time and available resources also could not have covered every 
critical issue and thus leaves room for further research by others. Further detailed research is 
recommended in areas such as a comparative analysis of rural-urban dwellers access to 
information and their perception of transparency and accountability and also community 
organisation and its impact on accountability.      
110 
 
REFERENCE LIST 
 
PRMA 2011. Petroleum Revenue Management Act. ACT 815. Ghana: Paliament of Ghana. 
Adjoa, H. N. Was Ghana right in choosing the Royalty Tax system in the oil sector? Danquah Institute 
Quarterly. 
Afrobarometer 2012. GHANA ROUND 5 AFROBAROMETER SURVEY. Afrobarometer/Centre for 
Democratic Development. 
Amoako-Tuffour, J. 2010a. An Evaluation of Ghana’s Petroleum Fiscal Regime. Ghana Policy Journal, 
4, 7-34. 
Amoako-Tuffour, J. 2010b. How Ghana plans to manage its Petroleum Resources: A step towrads 
Transparency and Governance Standards. IEA MONOGRAPH. Accra. 
Asfaha, S. G. 2007. National Revenue Funds: Their Efficacy for Fiscal Stability and Intergenerational 
Equity. Social Science Research Network. 
Auty, R. M. 1986. Resource-based industrialization and country size: Venezuela and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Geoforum, 17, 325-338. 
Auty, R. M. 1993. Sustaining development in mineral economies, London, Routledge. 
Auty, R. M. 2001. Resource abundance and economic development, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Auty, R. M. 2006. resource-driven models of the development of the political economy. In: AUTY, R. 
M. & DE SOYSA, I. (eds.) Energy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
Lessons Not Learned. Routledge. 
Ayittey, G. 2006. "Nigeria's struggle with corruption" hearing before the subcommittee on africa, 
global human rights and international operations of the committee on international 
relations house of representatives. Washington D.C. 
Bank Information Centre and Global Witness 2008. “Assessment of International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank Group Extractive Industries Transparency Implementation. 
Bellver, A. & Kaufmann, D. 2005. Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy 
Applications. World Bank Policy Research Working Pape. 
Bentham, J. 1999. The collected works of Jeremy Bentham: Political tactics, Eds. Michael James, 
Cyprian Blamires, and Catherine Pease-Watkin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berg, B. 2001. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. 
Berg, B. L. & Lune, H. 2004. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. 
Birkinshaw, P. 2006. Freedom of information and openness: Fundamental human rights. 
Administrative law review 58, 177. 
Boschini, A. D., Pettersson, J. & Roine, J. 2007. Resource Curse or Not: A Question of 
Appropriability*. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109, 593-617. 
Bradshaw, M. & Stratford, E. 2010. Qualitative research design and rigour. 
Brannen, J. 1992. Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches: An overview (pp. 3–37). 
Mixing methods: qualitative and quantitative research. Aldershot: Avebury. 
Brohman, J. 1996. Popular development: Rethinking the theory and practice of development, 
Blackwell Oxford. 
Bulmer-Thomas, V. 2003. The economic history of Latin America since independence, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cavill, S. & Sohail, M. 2004. Strengthening accountability for urban services. Environment and 
Urbanization, 16, 155-170. 
Chetwynd, E., Chetwynd, F. & Spector, B. 2003. Corruption and poverty: a review of recent 
literature. Management Systems International. 
Collier, P. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It, New York, Oxford Univ. Press. 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 54, 563. 
111 
 
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. 2012. High-value natural resources development and conflict:Channels of 
causation. In: PÄIVI LUJALA & SIRI AAS RUSTAD (eds.) High-Value Natural Resources and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. London: Earthscan. 
Crang, M. 2002. Qualitative methods: the new orthodoxy? Progress in Human Geography, 26, 647-
655. 
Crang, M. & Cook, I. 2007. Doing ethnographies, London, SAGE. 
Crc 2011. Semi-Annual Report :USAID Integrated Coastal and Fisheries Governance Initiative for the 
Western Region, Ghana. Coastal Resources Center, University of Rhode Island. 
Creswell, J. W. 1994. Research design, Sage publications Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Creswell, J. W. 2009. Research design : qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches, Los 
Angeles, SAGE. 
Darby, S. 2008. EITI-Beyond the Basics. Revenue Watch Institute. 
Darby, S. 2009. Talking Transparency–A Guide for Communicating the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. Oslo: EITI Secretariat. 
Davidson, J. O. C. & Layder, D. 1994. Methods, sex and madness, Routledge. 
Davis, J. M., Ossowski, R. & Fedelino, A. 2003. Fiscal policy formulation and implementation in oil-
producing countries, Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. 
Djankov, S. F., Mcliesh, C., Nenova, T. & Shleifer, A. 2001. Who owns the media? Background paper 
for World Development Report 2002. 
Dowling, R. 2000. Power, subjectivity and ethics in qualitative research. In: HAY, I. (ed.) Qualitative 
research methods in human geography. New York: Oxford Press. 
Dunn, K. 2000. Interviewing. In: HAY, I. (ed.) Qualitative research methods in human geography. New 
York: Osxford University Press. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. The Academy of Management 
Review, 14, 57-74. 
Eiti 2005. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Source book. 
Eiti 2012. Fact sheet. 
England, K. V. 1994. Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research∗. The 
Professional Geographer, 46, 80-89. 
Eyles, J. & Smith, D. M. 1988. Qualitative methods in human geography, Polity Press Cambridge. 
Fasano, U. 2000. Review of the Experience with Oil Stabilization and Savings Funds in Selected 
Countries. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper No. 00/112  
Findlay, R. & Lundahl, M. 1994. Natural Resources,'Vent-for-Surplus' and the staples Theory. In: 
GERALD, M. (ed.) From Classical Economics to Development Economics. New York: 
St.Martin's Press. 
Flowerdew, R. & Martin, D. L. 2005. Methods in human geography: a guide for students doing a 
research project, Pearson Education. 
Gary, I. 2008. UNDP Discussion paper No. 6:fuelling poverty reduction. International Oil and Gas 
Forum. phnom cambodia: UNDP. 
Gauthier, B. & Zeufack, A. 2011. Governance and oil revenues in Cameroon. In: PAUL, C. & 
VENABLES, A. J. (eds.) Plundered Nations?: Successes and Failures in Natural Resource 
Extraction. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gaventa, J. 2002. Exploring citizenship, participation and accountability. IDS bulletin, 33, 1-14. 
Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 2006. Implementation Strategy and Work Plan 
2006-2008. In: GHEITI, G. E. I. T. I. (ed.). Accra. 
Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 2010. GHEITI NEWSLETTER. In: GHANA EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRY TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (ed.) Gheiti.org.gov. Accra, Ghana: GHEITI Secretariat. 
Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Gheiti Reducing Poverty Through Revenue 
Transparency in the Extractive Industires. In: GHEITI, G. E. I. T. I. (ed.). Accra, Ghana GHEITI. 
112 
 
Ghana National Petroleum Company. Exploration and Production [Online]. Accra, Ghana: GNPC. 
Available: http://www.gnpcghana.com/activities/explorationIntro.asp [Accessed 09/9/2012 
2012]. 
Ghana News Agency. 2012. First GHEITI Report On Oil And Gas Expected In September. Ghana News 
Agency. 
Ghana News Agency 2013. Ghana must ensure transparency in management of oil revenue - Okonjo-
Iweala. Graphiconline.com. 
Ghana Statistical Service 2008. GHANA LIVING STANDARDS SURVEY:REPORT OF THE FIFTH ROUND 
(GLSS 5). Accra. Ghana: Ghana Statistical Service. 
Gheiti, G. E. I. T. I. 2011a. 2011 Annual Report. Accra, ghana: Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative,. 
Gheiti, G. E. I. T. I. 2011b. GHEITI Newsletter,. Accra: GHEITI Secretariat. 
Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E. & Chadwick, B. 2008. Methods of data collection in qualitative 
research: interviews and focus groups. British dental journal, 204, 291-295. 
Glesne, C. & Peshkin, A. 1992. Becoming qualitative researchers: An introduction, Longman White 
Plains, NY. 
Graneheim, U. H. & Lundman, B. 2004. Qualitative content analysis in nursing research: concepts, 
procedures and measures to achieve trustworthiness. Nurse education today, 24, 105-112. 
Gray, D. E. 2009. Doing research in the real world, SAGE Publications Limited. 
Gyimah-Boadi, E. & Prempeh, H. K. 2012. Oil, Politics, and Ghana’s Democracy. Journal of 
democracy, 23, 94-108. 
Gylfason, T. 2001. Natural resources, education, and economic development. European Economic 
Review, 45, 847-859. 
Hameed, F. 2005. Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes. IMF Working Papers, 05/225. 
Heald, D. 2006. Varieties of transparency. In: HOOD, C. & HEALD, D. (eds.) Transparency: The key to 
better Governance? Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. 
Held, D. & Hale, T. 2011. Handbook of transnational governance, Polity. 
Herman, E. 2002. The media and markets in the United States. In: ISLAM, R. (ed.) The Right to Tell: 
The role of Mass Media in Economic Development. Washington D.C: The World Bank. 
Heuty, A. & Carlitz, R. 2009. Resource Dependence and Budget Transparency. Online: Revenue 
Watch Institute. 
Hood, C. 2006. Transparency in Historical Perspective. In: HOOD, C. & HEALD, D. (eds.) Transparency: 
the key to better governance. Oxford, Uk: Oxford University Press. 
Huberman, A. M. & Miles, M. B. 2002. The qualitative researcher’s companion. Thousand Oaks. 
Humphreys, M., Sachs, J. D. & Stiglitz, J. E. 2007. Escaping the resource curse, New York, Columbia 
University Press. 
Idl Group 2010. Validation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Ghana. Accra, 
Ghana: The GHEITI SECRETARIAT. 
Initiative, G. E. I. T. 2011. GHEITI NEWSLETTER. Accra,Ghana: GHEITI Secretariat. 
Institute of Economic Affairs 2011. IEA Petroleum Transparencyand Accountability Index:The P-TRAC 
Index 
2011 Report. In: ASAFU-ADJAYE, J. (ed.) THE IEA P-TRAC INDEX. Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs 
Ghana. 
International Budget Partnership 2012. The Open Budget Survey 2012. 
International Monetary Fund 2007. Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency. Washington D.C: IMF. 
Isham, J., Woolcock, M., Pritchett, L. & Busby, G. 2005. The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural 
Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth. The World Bank 
Economic Review, 19, 141-174. 
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
113 
 
Karl, T. 2007. Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract. In: HUMPHREYS, 
M., SACHS, J. D. & STIGLITZ, J. E. (eds.) Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Karl, T. L. 1997. The paradox of plenty, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press. 
Kearns, R. 2000. Being there: Research through observing and participating. Qualitative research 
methods in human geography, 103-121. 
Kitchin, R. & Tate, N. J. 2000. Conducting research in human geography: theory, methology and 
practice, Harlow, Prentice Hall. 
Knack, S. & Keefer, P. 2003. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using 
alternative institutional measures. S. Knack, Democracy, Governance and Growth, 56-77. 
Kolstad, I. & Søreide, T. 2009. Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy 
makers. Resources Policy, 34, 214-226. 
Kolstad, I., Søreide, T. & Williams, A. 2008. Corruption in Natural Resource Management-An 
Introduction. U4 Brief, 2008. 
Kolstad, I. & Wiig, A. 2009. Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich 
Countries? World Development, 37, 521-532. 
Kolstad, I. & Wiig, A. 2011. Natural resources, corruption and trust: A complex relationship. U4 Issue, 
2011. 
Lal, D. & Myint, H. 1996. The political economy of poverty, equity, and growth, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press. 
Larsen, E. R. 2004. Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway 
Caught up with and Forged ahead of Its Neighbors. Discussion Papers,Research Department 
of Statistics Norway. 
Larsson, T. 1998. How Open Can a Government be?: The Swedish experience. In: V, D. & I, T. (eds.) 
Openness and Transparency in the European Union. The European  Institute of Public 
Administration. 
Leite, C. A. & Weidmann, J. 1999. Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and 
Economic Growt. IMF Working Paper No. 99/85. 
Liamputtong, P. & Ezzy, D. 2005. Qualitative research methods, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Limb, M. & Dwyer, C. 2001. Qualitative methodologies for geographers: issues and debates, London, 
Arnold. 
Lindsay, J. M. 1997. Techniques in human geography, London, Routledge. 
Lindstedt, C. & Naurin, D. 2010. Transparency is not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in 
Reducing Corruption. International Political Science Review, 31, 301-322. 
Lujala, P. 2009. Deadly Combat over Natural Resources Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of 
Armed Civil Conflict. The Journal of conflict resolution, 46, 50-71. 
Lujala, P. 2010. The spoils of nature: armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources. 
Journal of peace research, 47, 15. 
Lujala, P., Gleditsch, N. P. & Gilmore, E. 2005. A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource. 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 538-562. 
Lujala, P. & Rustad, S. A. 2012. Building or spoiling peace? Lessons from the management of high-
value natural resources. In: PÄIVI LUJALA & SIRI AAS RUSTAD (eds.) High-Value Natural 
Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. London: Earthscan. 
Malena, C. & Forster, R. 2004. Social Accountability An Introduction to the Concept and Emerging 
Practice. 
Maloney, W. F. 2002. Innovation and growth in resource rich countries. Working Papers Central Bank 
of Chile. 
Mbaku, J. M. 1996. Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Fultility of Cleanups. Cato Journal, 16, 99. 
Mcgee, R. & Gaventa, J. 2010. Review of impact and effectiveness of transparency and accountability 
initiatives. Institute of Development Studies, Brighton provide a useful critical discussion of 
methods used to assess transparency and accountability initiatives. 
114 
 
Mcmahon, G. 1997. The Natural Resource Curse: Myth or Reality? Economic Development Institute, 
the World Bank, Washington, DC, Final Draft. 
Mcmillan, J. 2005. Promoting transparency in Angola. Journal of Democracy, 16, 155-169. 
Mehlum, H., Moene, K. & Torvik, R. 2006. Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic Journal, 
116, 1-20. 
Mikesell, R. F. 1997. Explaining the resource curse, with special reference to mineral-exporting 
countries. Resources Policy, 23, 191-199. 
Miles, M. B. & Huberman, A. M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook, Thousand 
Oaks, Calif., Sage. 
Mishra, D. P., Heide, J. B. & Stanton, G. C. 1998. Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency 
Relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 35, 277-295. 
Mofep, M. O. F. a. E. P. OIL and GAS-Revenue Management and Codination. In: MOFEP, ed. Annual 
MDBS Workshop, May 16th-18th  2011 2011 Accra. MInistry Of Finance and Economic 
Planing. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2003. Culture of corruption or accountability deficit. E. Eur. Const. Rev., 12, 80. 
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. 1988. Industrialization and the big push. National Bureau 
of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
Murshed, M. S. 2001. Short Run Models of Natural Resource Endowments. In: AUTY, R. M. (ed.) 
Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. 
Murshed, M. S. 2004. When does natural reosurce abundance lead to a resource Curse?. . EEP 
Discussion Paper 04-01 International Institute for Environment and Development. 
Myjoyonline.Com. 2011. Ghana achieves EITI compliance status. Myjoyonline. 
National Communications Authority, N. 2011. list of licenesed television in Ghana. Accra: National 
Communications Authority. 
Neuman, W. L. 2005. Social research methods: Quantitative and qualitative approaches, Allyn and 
Bacon. 
Norris, P. 2004. Giving voice to the voiceless: Good governance, human development and mass 
communications. 
Paliament of Ghana 1992. National Constitution. Ghana. 
Pillay, S. & Dorasamy, N. 2010. Linking cultural dimensions with the nature of corruption: An 
institutional theory perspective. International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 10, 
363-378. 
Piotrowski, S. J. 2010. Transparency and Secrecy: A Reader Linking Literature and Contemporary 
Debate, Lexington Books. 
Pitlik, H., Frank, B. & Firchow, M. 2010. The demand for transparency: An empirical note. The Review 
of International Organizations, 5, 177-195. 
Powell, L. E. L. & Myers, A. M. A. 1995. The Activities-specific Balance Confidence (ABC) Scale. The 
journals of gerontology. Series A, Biological sciences and medical sciences, 50A, M28-M34. 
Prat, A. 2006. The More Closely we are Watched, the Better we Behave? In: HOOD, C. & HEALD, D. 
(eds.) Transparency: the key to better governance? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Public Interest and Accountability Committee 2011. Report on Petroleum Revenue management for 
2011. 1 ed. Accra Ghana: Public Interest and Accountabilty Committee(PIAC). 
Punch, K. F. 2005. Introduction to social research: Quantitative and qualitative approaches, Sage 
Publications Limited. 
Reporters without Borders 2012. World Press Freedom index 2011/2012. Paris, France: Reporters 
without Borders. 
Robson, C. 2002. Real world research: A resource for social scientists and practitioner-researchers, 
Blackwell Oxford. 
Rolfe, G. 2006. Validity, trustworthiness and rigour: quality and the idea of qualitative research. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 53, 304-310. 
115 
 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. 1963. Problems of industrialization of eastern and south-eastern Europe, 
Center for International Studies, MIT. 
Ross, M. L. 2001. The extractive sectors and the Poor. Oxfam America. 
Ross, M. L. 2003. How mineral resources affect the poor. 
Ross, M. L. 2004. What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? Journal of peace 
research, 41, 337-356. 
Ross, M. L. 2012. The oil curse: How Petroleum Wealth shapes the develoment of Nations, Princeton, 
N.J., Princeton University Press. 
Ross, S. A. 1973. The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. The American Economic 
Review, 63, 134-139. 
Rosser, A. 2006. Escaping the Resource Curse. New Political Economy, 11, 557-570. 
Sachs, J. D. & Warner, A. M. 1995. NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. 
NBER Working Paper No.5398  
Sachs, J. D. & Warner, A. M. 1999. The big push, natural resource booms and growth. Journal of 
Development Economics, 59, 43-76. 
Sala-I-Martin, X. & Subramanian, A. 2003. Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration 
from Nigeria. NBER Working Paper No. 9804. 
Sandgren, C. 2005. Combating corruption: the misunderstood role of law. Int'l Law., 39, 717. 
Sandgren, C. Combat of Corruption and Access to Information.  FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
WORKSHOP, 9TH AND 10TH OCTOBER 2008 2008 KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA. 
Sarraf, M. & Jiwanji, M. 2001. Beating the resource curse. The case of Botswana, Environment 
Department, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Schumacher, J. A. 2004. Introducing Transparency into the Oil Industry . The Quest for EITI. Global 
Jurist Advances, 4, 1. 
Shaxson, N. 2009. Nigeria’s extractive industries transparency initiative: Just a glorious audit. 
Chatham House Programme Paper. London: Chatham House. 
Shiller, R. J. 2002. Irrational Exuberance in the Media. In: ISLAM, R. (ed.) The right to Tell: The role of 
Mass Media in Economic Development. Washington D.C: World Bank. 
Soros, G. 2007. Forward. In: HUMPHREYS, M., SACHS, J. & STIGLITZ, J. E. (eds.) Escaping the resource 
curse. Cambridge Univ Press. 
Stevens, P. 2003. Resource Impact-Curse or Blessing? A literature survey. Available: 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol13/article13-14.pdf [Accessed 
25.03.2003]. 
Stiglitz, J. E. 1999. On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in 
Public Life. Oxford Amnesty Lecture. 
Stiglitz, J. E. 2002. Transparency in Gonvernment. In: ISLAM, R., DJANKOV, S. & MCLIESH, C. (eds.) 
The Right to tell : the role of mass media in economic development. Washington D C: World 
Bank. 
Stiglitz, J. E. 2002b. Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics. The American 
Economic Review, 92, 460-501. 
Sutherland, R. Exploration history and regional geology.  Capital Markets Day, october 2008 2008. 
Tullow Oil Plc,. 
Svensson, J. 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 19-
42. 
The Ghanaian Times. 2011. Ghana Lauded For Internet Penetration [Online]. 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh: Governmnet of Ghana Official Website. Available: 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/features/18257-ghana-lauded-for-internet-
penetration. 
Transparency International 2012. Poverty and Corruption in Africa:Community Voices break the 
cycle  
Triandis, H. C. 1994. Culture and social behavio, New York, Mcgraw-Hill Book Company. 
116 
 
Tsalik, S. 2003. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit?, New York, Open Society Institute. 
Tsikata, D. 2012. Ghana Social Development Outlook report. Accra, Ghana: Institute of Statistical, 
Social and Economic Research ( ISSER. 
Tsui, K. 2005. More Oil, Less Democracy?: Theory and Evidence from Crude Oil Discoveries. Job 
Market Paper. 
Tullow Oil Ghana 2009. Environmental Impact Statement:Ghana Jubilee Field Phase 1Development. 
In: MARK IRVINE, ALBERT DE JONG & PROF AK ARMAH (eds.). Accra, Ghana. 
Tullow Oil Plc. 2010. Jubilee Fields [Online]. tullow oil. Available: 
http://www.tullowoil.com/GHANA/index.asp?pageid=11 [Accessed 10/09/2012 2012]. 
Usui, N. 1997. Dutch disease and policy adjustments to the oil boom: a comparative study of 
Indonesia and Mexico. Resources policy, 23, 151-162. 
Uzoigwe, M. U. 2012. Exploring multi-stakeholder initiatives for natural resource governance: the 
example of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI. PHD, University 
of Birmingham. 
Viisimaa, P. 2008. Poverty and Corruption. Transparency International Working Paper, 02/2008. 
Winchester, H. P. 2000. Qualitative research and its place in human geography. 
World Bank 2009. Economy-Wide Impact of Oil Discovery in Ghana. PREM 4 Africa Region. 
Washington D.C: World Bank. 
World Bank 2011. World Development Indicators. World Databank. Online: World Bank. 
Wright, G. & Czelusta, J. 2002. RESOURCE-BASED ECONOMIC GROWTH, PAST AND PRESENT. 
Available: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~carsonvs/papers/580.PDF. 
Yankah, K. 2009. GHANA EITI COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. Accra, ghana: Ghana EITI. 
Yin, R. K. 2011. Qualitative research from start to finish, New York, Guilford Press. 
Zhang, Y. & Wildemuth, B. M. 2009. Qualitative analysis of content. In: WILDEMUTH, B. M. (ed.) 
Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science. 
Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
Appendices 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Royalty on Gross Production of Crude Oil 
- Percentage varies from block to block, water depth dependent, but not fixed in current 
law. 
- Ranges from 5% - 12.5% of gross production of crude oil, 3% of gross volume of gas 
production. 
● State Initial Carried Interest 
- State receives a 10% interest in each contract area. This interest is “carried” during the 
exploration and devel-opment phases. All the risk of exploration and development is 
borne 
by IOC’s equity since the latter finances both the exploration and development costs. 
● State Additional Interest 
- If a discovery is in commercial quantities, the State is entitled to buy additional interest 
in each contract area, for which it is responsible for full costs during development and 
production phases. The allowable percentage of this interest varies for each contract. 
● Petroleum Income Tax 
- Petroleum Income Tax Law (PITL) sets default rate at 50%, but can be altered by 
contract. 
- In Jubilee, the rate has been set at 35%, 10% higher than the corporate profit tax rate. 
● Additional Oil Entitlement (AOE) 
- An additional payment to be made to the government if the post tax rate of return for a 
project exceeds a tar-geted level. Trigger points at RORs of 12.5%, 17.5%, 22.5%, and 
27.5%. AOE terms have become more pro-gressive over time. 
● Other Taxes and Fees 
- Including surface rental fees and a 5 percent withholding tax on subcontractors. 
● Cost recovery, Deduction and Cost Containment 
- Exclusion of taxation of capital gains. 
● Stability clauses relate to protection from tax regime changes as provided in petroleum 
agreements. 
● All gas is the property of the State. 
● Contractor funds all exploration and funds development and production expenses less 
the 
extent of the State’s initial carried and additional participating interest 
 Agriculture and industry 
 physical infrastructure and service delivery in education; science and 
technology;  
 potable water delivery and sanitation;  
 infrastructure development in telecommunication, road, rail and port;  
 physical infrastructure and service delivery  
 housing delivery;  
 environmental protection, sustainable utilisation and protection of natural 
resources;  
 rural development;  
 developing alternative energy sources; 
 strengthening of institutions of government concerned with governance 
and the maintenance of law and order;  
 public safety and security;  
 Provision of social welfare and the protection of the physically 
handicapped and disadvantaged citizens.  
 
  
  
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Appendix 3 
Interview Guides 
INTRODUCTION Name. purpose, ethical issues, familiarisation etc. 
Overview of current operations in 
Ghana 
1. What areas of extractive industries are covered currently 
2. Response level form extractive industries and Government 
3. Extent of impact of their work on informing the public  
4. Target audience 
Transparency in the oil sector 1. Current reporting requirements for  
a. oil companies 
b. Government 
2. To what extent has government and oil companies met 
these requirement 
3. Current challenges or defaults 
4.  General perception of transparency in the management of 
the oil revenue 
5.Suggestions for improvement 
Public /community Awareness 1. To what extent has their activities lead to public being 
informed 
2. What has been the impacts-direct or indirect 
3. How do they inform the public? 
2. What are some of their monitoring or feedback mechanisms 
3. What specific role do they play in getting exploration 
communities informed? 
4. How successful or otherwise has this been? 
5. Plans for the future. 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
INTRODUCTION Name. purpose, ethical issues, familiarisation 
etc. 
Overview of current transparency policies in 
Ghana 
1. Discuss policies and legislative instrument for 
transparency in management of oil revenue 
2. Government commitment & challenges 
3. Extent of impact of their work on informing 
the public  
4. Target audience 
5. What does Government think about 
transparency (is there genuine interest? 
Transparency in the oil sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. what are some of the specific activities 
promoting transparency in terms of 
a. oil revenues received 
b. how the revenues are being used 
2. the impact of these initiatives 
3. Current challenges and future initiatives 
4. How is the revenue management law being 
119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eiti/GHEITI 
 
followed to the later? 
5.  General perception of transparency in the 
management of the oil revenue 
6.Suggestions for improvement 
 
1. What do they think about GHeiti? 
2. Is it playing an important role? 
3. How does government relate to them and why 
is it housed by the finance ministry (conflict of 
interest?) 
 
Public /community Awareness 
 
1.  To what extent has their activities lead to 
public being informed more specifically oil 
affected communities like cape three point  
2. What are some of the grievances in terms of 
revenue management has been brought to their 
notice from the oil affected communities. 
3. How are these being solved? 
4. How successful or otherwise has this been? 
5. Plans for the future. 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
